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Part I
General introduction
1
2In my dissertation I extend and apply tools that are designed to test consistency of ob-
served behavior with theoretically optimizing behavior. e ĕrst three chapters of my dis-
sertation will treat production behavior, the fourth chapter treats consumption behavior.
Although production and consumption behavior are two diﬀerent ĕelds of study, there is a
close link. e motivation to combine the study of production and consumption behavior
in this dissertation is twofold. First, there is a conceptual analogy between production and
consumption behavior. On the one hand, a producer uses inputs to produce outputs. On
the other hand, a consumer could be seen as if he uses goods to ‘produce’ utility. e level of
utility, produced by a bundle of goods, will then depend on the preferences of the consumer
in question. Just as an optimizing producer is called eﬃcient, an optimizing consumer is
called rational. e main diﬀerence between the two ĕelds pertains to the observability of
the outputs of the production process. In the production setting the output levels are usu-
ally observed, which leads to a powerful analysis of eﬃcient production behavior. In the
consumption setting, an additional challenge is that it is practically impossible to observe
utility levels. However, as we will explain later, the observed choices of consumers implic-
itly reveal information on the preferences of the consumers, which will allow us to analyze
whether the observed behavior is rational or not. is approach is known in the literature
as the revealed preference approach to consumer demand.
A second motivation to combine the study of production and consumption in this dis-
sertation is that production and consumption are interrelated in a household context. In the
theory of household production (Becker (1965)), households are both producers and con-
sumers of goods. Households combine time and market goods to produce domestic com-
modities. For example, home cooked meals are produced by means of food and cooking
time. e domestically produced commodities then directly contribute to the utility of the
household members. In the fourth chapter we will integrate production in a consumption
context. To our knowledge, Chapter 4 is the ĕrst study that explicitly integrates household
production in a revealed preference analysis of household consumption.
Both in the context of production and consumption, there is a major interest in testing
consistency of observed behavior with theoretically optimizing behavior and in quantify-
ing deviations from optimizing behavior. In the context of consumption the basic assump-
3tion of the standard (neoclassical) model of consumer behavior is that people make rational
choices. In particular, a rational consumer chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes his
utility, subject to a budget constraint. Since rationality of the economic agent forms the
starting point of choice theory, it is crucial to investigate whether the assumption of ratio-
nality makes sense in a particular setting. At this point it might be worth to note that, given
consistency with the behavioral model, other issues concerning the behavioral model can
be addressed. In particular, Varian (1982) mentions the recovery of consumer preferences
and the prediction of behavior in other economic situations (such as other price regimes).
However, the focus of this dissertation will be the testing of consistency.
In the context of production, the main interest is to quantify how close the observed
production behavior is to optimizing behavior. is is called the degree of ‘eﬃciency’ of the
observed behavior. Eﬃciency analysis of production activities is ofmajor interest both in the
public and private sector. If ineﬃciencies are detected, the comparison with eﬃcient peers
can then provide valuable information to remedy the observed ineﬃciencies. By producing
more eﬃcient, managers can get more results with the same means.
I will follow a nonparametric approach to production and consumption analysis. e
attractive feature of a nonparametric approach - in contrast to parametric methods - is that
there is no need to impose (unveriĕable) functional representations to analyze observed be-
havior. For example, parametric methods to analyze eﬃcient production behavior rely on
a functional speciĕcation of the production process. However, the eﬀects of ineﬃciency
could be confounded with those of a misspeciĕcation of the functional form (Fried et al.
(2008)). is issue is avoided by using a nonparametric method. Similarly, parametric
methods in the context of consumption behavior require a functional speciĕcation of con-
sumer demand. Consequently, in a parametric framework, one always tests a joint hypoth-
esis: whatever one wants to test, plus the additional assumptions concerning the functional
form (Varian (1983)). An attractive feature of a nonparametric approach is that it rules out
the issues corresponding to this joint hypothesis: a nonparametric approach - such as re-
vealed preference analysis - can provide a test of rationality, without additional assumptions
concerning a functional form.
To summarize, the ĕrst three chapters ofmy dissertation nonparametrically analyze pro-
4duction behavior, the fourth chapter integrates household production in a nonparametric
analysis of consumption. Please note that the chapters of this dissertation were originally
written as separate papers. We have tried to limit the repetition of arguments in this disser-
tation, but there might be some overlap, to improve exposition of the ideas and the Ęuent
reading of the chapters. Moreover, it is possible that diﬀerent chapters use diﬀerent nota-
tion. In line with the structure of my dissertation, the remainder of the introduction ĕrst
provides some background on nonparametric production analysis and discusses our contri-
butions in production analysis. Finally, we come back to consumption analysis, to discuss
revealed preference analysis and the integration of household production in a consumption
framework.
Production behavior
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) A well-known approach to evaluate the eﬃciency of
production activities is Data EnvelopmentAnalysis (DEA).DEA is nonparametric in nature:
there is no need to assume a speciĕc functional representation of the production technology.
Instead, DEA is a ‘data oriented’ method, which estimates a ‘best practice’ frontier, within a
set of comparable production units. Furthermore, the method is able to measure the level
of eﬃciency of the units, which are not situated on the best practice frontier. In particular,
DEA reconstructs the production possibility set on the basis of the observed input-output
combinations, using standard production axioms. A unit’s eﬃciency is then measured as
the distance from its input-output combination to the frontier of this production possibility
set.
Besides DEA, a well-known econometric technique to analyze eﬃciency is stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA). A strength of SFA is that the method takes into account noise, such
as measurement error, which is largely ignored by standard DEA methods. In return, SFA
methods assume a given functional form for the relationship between inputs and an outputs
and need to choose a distribution for the noise and for ineﬃciency. A good reference is
the handbook Coelli et al. (2005), which extensively discusses both DEA and SFA and the
strengths and limitations of both methods. Moreover, Cherchye et al. (2016) discuss how
5both streams of literature deal with empirical challenges.
In this dissertation, we focus on the nonparametric method DEA. Building on the work
of Farrell (1957), the seminal paper ‘Measuring the eﬃciency of decision making units’ by
Charnes et al. (1978) introduced DEA in its present form. e term Decision Making Unit
(DMU) refers to a productive organization, which converts multiple inputs into multiple
outputs. e deĕnition of a DMU is Ęexible and DEA is widely applicable for eﬃciency
estimation both in the public and private sector.
We refer to Färe et al. (1994), Cooper et al. (2007) and Cook and Seiford (2009) for
overviews of the major developments in DEA over the past three decades. As Cook and
Seiford (2009) indicate, there has been an impressive growth both in theoretical develop-
ments and applications of the ideas to practical situations. In my dissertation, I hope to
contribute in both respects.
Economic perspective on DEA Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert
and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984), among others, have advocated a ‘behavioral’ non-
parametric approach to analyzing producer behavior. is approach starts from a behavioral
model of optimizing behavior. Depending on the context, the behavioral approach oen
assumes that producers pursue either proĕt maximization or cost minimization.
In Chapter 1, we discuss the ‘economic’ perspective on DEA: we start from a clear speci-
ĕcation of the production-behavioral models and impose the least structure on the produc-
tion possibilities. e economic perspective is opposed to the conventional ‘axiomatic’ DEA
approach for reconstructing production possibilities. However, some production properties
are diﬃcult to verify in practice and one should be careful to impose production properties
that cannot be justiĕed in a convincing way. We argue in favor of carefully checking the
empirical validity of axioms and for investigating the sensitivity of the results with respect
to these axioms if it is diﬃcult to verify them empirically.
An axiom that is oen questioned, is convexity of the production possibility set. Free
disposal hull models (FDH), initiated by Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993), assume
that only the observed DMUs make up the frontier, and not convex combinations of those
units (such as in standard DEA models). We discuss in Chapter 1 how duality relation-
6ships between the behavioral and the axiomatic approach may justify the use of convexity,
at least in particular settings. In this dissertation, we therefore work in a setting with relaxed
convexity assumptions.
Starting from the behavioral perspective of DEA, several extensions can be made to
strengthen the eﬃciency analysis and to enhance realism. is will be the subject of Chapter
2 and 3 inmy dissertation. ese chapters consist both of amethodological and an empirical
part.
Additional structure As a ĕrst extension, it may be useful to add structure to the trans-
formation process from inputs to outputs. Traditional DEA methods typically treat DMUs’
production processes as a black box and use no information at all on how the inputs and out-
puts are exactly linked to each other. However, there is in reality oen information available
on the link between inputs and outputs. A growing stream of DEA literature has contributed
to opening the black box of eﬃciency measurement. For example, the network DEA model
has been built around the concept of subtechnologies (see Färe and Grosskopf (2000), Färe
et al. (2007) and Cook and Zhu (2014)). Another example is Cherchye et al. (2013), who
introduce amulti-outputmethodology, using the notion of output-speciĕc production tech-
nologies. Cherchye et al. (2013) show that including information on the allocation of inputs
to outputs considerably strengthens the analysis: the introduced methodology has more
power to identify ineﬃcient production behavior. A crucial diﬀerence between the meth-
ods above is that Cherchye et al. (2013) deal with joint inputs in the production model,
which are not considered in the existing network DEA models. In particular, Cherchye
et al. (2013) distinguish between output-speciĕc inputs, which can be allocated to particular
outputs, and joint inputs, which simultaneously beneĕt the production of multiple outputs.
By including joint inputs in the analysis, the authors model the presence of economies of
scope. Economies of scope occur if the average production cost decreases when the number
of outputs increases (Baumol et al. (1982)), which forms a prime economic motivation for
simultaneously producing multiple outputs.
In Chapter 2, we build on the multi-output methodology of Cherchye et al. (2013) and
propose an extension that quantiĕes possible eﬃciency gains by reallocating inputs over
7outputs. In particular, we introduce a measure of coordination eﬃciency, which captures
these eﬃciency gains. Furthermore, we illustrate the proposed methodology by studying
the education and research conducted at US universities. We believe that university perfor-
mance forms an interesting application area, because universities typically have a two-fold
assignment, i.e. education and research. Interestingly, we can distinguish between expenses
that can be allocated directly to the research and eduction divisions and expenses that have
a joint nature. To be concrete, the output-speciĕc inputs in our application are university
expenses that are clearly directed towards either education or research. Next, joint inputs
contain expenditures related to “public” services like libraries, museums, media, technol-
ogy and administration. Given our speciĕc methodological contribution, a primal focus
in Chapter 2 will be on the (eﬃcient) allocation of university budgets over education and
research outputs.
Additional technological information Second, we may impose additional technological
information, for example on returns to scale. Returns to scale have been widely studied
within the framework of DEA (see e.g. Banker et al. (2004) for an overview). In Chapter 3
we extend Cherchye et al. (2013) by including alternative returns to scale assumptions in the
methodology. If there is no information available on the nature of the returns to scale, one
usually assumes variable returns to scale. By contrast, if there is a plausible argumentation
that decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale prevail, one could impose this returns
to scale assumption to obtain a methodology that has more power to identify ineﬃcient
behavior. To formally include alternative returns to scale assumptions in the methodology,
we build on thework of Petersen (1990) and Bogeto (1996). However, our ĕnal intention in
Chapter 3 is not to impose a particular returns to scale assumption, but to estimate the most
appropriate returns to scale assumption for each output. To estimate returns to scale, we
follow a method discussed by Podinovski (2004a) and Podinovski (2004b). An interesting
feature of themethodology inChapter 3 is that it allows for imposing and estimating returns-
to-scale that are speciĕc to individual outputs. is leads to a more realistic model, in which
diﬀerent outputs can experience diﬀerent impacts relative to proportional changes in the
related inputs. is in contrast to traditional DEA models, which assume that the returns
8to scale classiĕcation applies to the entire input-output bundle. When estimating returns
to scale, it is crucial to control for environmental factors, that may inĘuence the ability to
convert inputs into outputs. We therefore advocate a methodology that explicitly takes into
account environmental heterogeneity. Since the relevant environmental factors might diﬀer
from output to output, we allow the environment to be output-speciĕc. Finally, since the
estimation of returns to scale is sensitive to outliers, we combine our methodology with
the robust order-m method (Daraio and Simar (2007a)). Intuitively, the robust method
mitigates the impact of outliers by resampling from the original sample.
In Chapter 3, we study output-speciĕc returns to scale in prisons in England andWales.
We use publicly available data, provided by the Ministry of Justice. In the context of pris-
ons, we argue that it is crucial to consider output-speciĕc returns to scale. We take three
output objectives into account. Naturally, we consider the incarceration of convicts as one
of themain outputs of a prison. Besides incarcerating convicts, we consider in our study also
qualitative outputs including the provision of a humane prison environment and success-
ful reintegration. Depending on the output in question, the opinions on the optimal scale
size strongly diﬀer. e usual motivation for large prisons is a reduction of the cost-per-
place. Meanwhile, opponents fear a low quality of life and little prospects for reintegration
in large-scale prisons. Chapter 3 therefore focuses on what we call the potential ‘prison size
dilemma’. Our multi-output methodology allows us to empirically test whether the opti-
mal scale size of prisons diﬀers when the focus is either on costs-per-place, quality of life in
prison or successful reintegration.
To our knowledge, we posit an original estimation strategy that adequately models the
multidimensional prison production process. e advocated methodology is tailored to all
speciĕcities of the prison production process and enables us to meaningfully answer the
prison size dilemma, by using publicly available data. Moreover, we discuss in detail how
public policy makers can further reĕne the analysis by adding information on the allocation
of expenses to particular outputs.
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In the ĕnal chapter of my doctoral dissertation, we contribute to the revealed preference
literature to study household behavior. In particular, we integrate household production
in a revealed preference analysis of household consumption. Before discussing household
production, we ĕrst provide some background on revealed preference methodology, which
is a method to analyze consumption choices.
Revealed preference Revealed preferencemethodologywas initiated by Samuelson (1938,
1948), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). e method
starts from a data set of observations on consumer behavior - with information on quanti-
ties and prices - and constructs ‘revealed preference relations’, indicating which bundles of
goods are preferred over others. Varian (1982) argues that the basic behavioral hypothesis in
the context of consumption is that the consumer chooses a bundle of goods that is preferred
to all other bundles that he can aﬀord. Stated more formally, a rational consumer chooses
the bundle of goods that maximizes its utility, subject to a budget constraint. Varian (1982)
then shows that a bundle is utility maximizing subject to its budget constraint if and only
if it is expenditure minimizing over all the revealed preferred bundles. e latter is easily
veriĕed and is known as the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). A major
advantage of revealed preference methodology is that it allows us to test rationality, without
making (unveriĕable) assumptions about a functional speciĕcation of the preferences. Re-
vealed preference methodology thus provides a nonparametric alternative to the standard
parametric approach to consumer demand.
Households with children In Chapter 4 we study the consumption and time use of a sam-
ple of Dutch couples with children. ere is some discussion in the literature on the role of
children in the decision making process of the household (e.g. Dauphin et al. (2011)). is
discussion is particularly relevant for older children (age 16 and older), however it is less
debatable that younger children are bystanders in the household. To model the presence of
(younger) children in the household, children are oen treated as a public good in the house-
hold (e.g. Blundell et al. (2005) and Cherchye et al. (2012)). Parents care for the well-being
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of the children and can generate (or ‘produce’) well-being for the children by spending time
together and by spending money on the commodities of the children. is is the approach
we will follow. In particular, we look into the time that parents invest into their children,
such as bathing, dressing, playing, reading stories, going with the child to the doctor and
taking the child to school or hobbies.
Household production and process beneĕts In a household labor supply model, house-
holds need to decide on consumption and time use. With respect to time use, there is typ-
ically a trade-oﬀ between hours of leisure and income as a result of hours of market labor.
Besides leisure and market work, a third option is that household members also allocate
time to some domestic production activity. Just some examples of domestic production are
cleaning, cooking or caring for children. Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977) assume that
households can produce domestic commodities by allocating time and resources to the cor-
responding activity. As mentioned before, we will focus in Chapter 4 on one speciĕc do-
mestic commodity: child well-being. Child well-being is treated as a domestic commodity,
which is produced by the parents of the household, by a combination of time spent with
children and consumption goods allocated to children.
It seems reasonable that time spent on a particular production activity generates both
indirect utility, through the commodity which is produced, and direct utility in terms of
leisure. For example, child care time may also be perceived as leisure for the caring parent.
is is captured by the notion of ‘process beneĕts’: parents may enjoy the process of caring
for the children. Process beneĕts are a form of joint production. Pollak andWachter (1975)
argue thatwhen time is an input in the household production process, joint production is the
rule and not an exception. Although allowing for joint production complicates the estima-
tion of the household production function - see Pollak andWachter (1975) for a discussion
- it is perfectly possible to analyze the allocation of goods and time among household activ-
ities. Graham and Green (1984), Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) and Gørtz (2011) extend
the model of Gronau (1977) to take process beneĕts into account. However, these papers
focus on estimating a parametric version of the model, with and without process beneĕts.
By contrast, in Chapter 4, we analyze process beneĕts using revealed preferencemethod-
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ology. Doing so, there is no need to specify a functional form for the utility function or
the household production function. Moreover, the output of the home production process
need not be observed. is makes our methodology particularly useful to investigate non-
marketable goods such as child well-being.
Part II
Production behavior
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Chapter 1
e economic meaning of
Data Envelopment Analysis:
a ‘behavioral’ perspective
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Abstract
We reconsider the motivation of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the
non-parametric technique that is widely employed for analyzing productive
eﬃciency in academia, the private sector and the public sector. We ĕrst ar-
gue that the conventional engineering motivation of DEA can be problematic
since it oen builds on unveriĕable production axioms. We then provide a dual
viewpoint and highlight the ‘behavioral’ interpretation of DEA models. We
start from a speciĕcation of the production objectives while imposing minimal
structure on the production possibilities, and construct tools to meaningfully
quantify deviations of observed producer behavior from optimizing behavior.
is brings to light the economic meaning of DEA, provides guidelines for se-
lecting the appropriate model in practical research settings, and prepares the
ground for instituting new DEA models. We hope that our insights will con-
tribute to the further dissemination of DEA, and stimulate public sector appli-
cations of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.1
1is chapter is based on joint work with Laurens Cherchye (KU Leuven) and Bram De Rock (ULB). I refer to
the paper of Cherchye et al. (2014b), which has been published in Socio-economic planning sciences.
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1.1 Introduction
e public sector is increasingly interested in the productive eﬃciency of its entities. For
instance, Coelli et al. (2003) extensively discuss the relevance of eﬃciency evaluations for
regulated sectors. More generally, the growing number of empirical applications suggests
that productive eﬃciency analysis is of key interest for many sectors such as academia, the
business community and government institutions; see, e.g., Gattouĕ et al. (2004) and Em-
rouznejad et al. (2008) for overviews. is observation calls for well-established empirical
tools that are specially tailored for testing consistency of observed behavior with (theoreti-
cal) optimizing behavior, and for quantifying deviations from optimization (or ‘ineﬃcien-
cies’).
Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian
(1984), among others, have advocated a ‘behavioral’ non-parametric approach to analyzing
producer behavior. is approach starts from a behavioral model of optimizing/eﬃcient
behavior and allows for testing implications of micro-economic theory directly on the data.
at is, one does not need a functional representation of the production technology, and so
one can minimize the risk of erroneously rejecting optimizing producer behavior due to an
erroneous parametric speciĕcation of the (typically unknown) technology. is is partic-
ularly convenient, since economic theory does in general not imply a particular functional
form and reliable speciĕcation tests are not available in many cases.
Non-parametric eﬃciency analysis is increasingly applied for measuring the degree of
‘eﬃciency’ of observed producer behavior, most commonly under the label ‘Data Envelop-
ment Analysis’ (DEA; aer Charnes et al. (1978)).2 DEA models are conventionally mo-
tivated from ‘engineering’ information, e.g. pertaining to the prevalent returns-to-scale or
the marginal rates of input substitution/output transformation. Still, such engineering in-
formation is mostly diﬃcult to verify in practice. In fact, imposing production properties
that cannot be justiĕed in a convincing way seems to conĘict directly with the very nature
of non-parametric analysis, which is oen credited for imposing minimal structure on the
research setting under investigation. is consideration is particularly relevant for DEA
2See Färe and Grosskopf (1994), Cooper et al. (2007), Fried et al. (2008), and Cook and Seiford (2009) for
extensive surveys of DEA models.
16 1.1. INTRODUCTION
evaluations of the public sector, which are usually characterized by minimal information on
the nature of production possibilities.
In this chapter, we adopt an ‘economic’ (as opposed to ‘engineering’) perspective on
DEA: we start from a clear speciĕcation of the production-behavioral models and use min-
imal (non-veriĕable) engineering information. Our insights re-interpret DEA eﬃciency
measures as measures for violations of economically optimizing behavior. To keep our
exposition simple, we mainly focus on proĕt maximizing and cost minimizing behavior.
However, as we will indicate, our insights readily extend towards alternative production-
behavioral models. By making explicit this economic motivation of DEA, we hope to con-
tribute to its further dissemination and to stimulate public sector applications of DEA that
build on its behavioral interpretation.
We note at the outset that our discussion bears some analogy to that in Varian (1990)
and Färe and Grosskopf (1995), where a similar interpretation of DEA eﬃciency measures
is (implicitly) advocated. Unfortunately, although these ideas have some clear advantages,
they are only minimally used in the applied DEA literature; see, e.g., Cherchye et al. (2008,
2013, 2014c) for some applications that demonstrate the advantages of the behavioral per-
spective of DEA. If only for that reason, it seems useful to set out methodological guidelines
for economically meaningful applications of DEA. Furthermore, our discussion includes
a number of insights that have not yet been articulated in the literature, and prepares the
ground for instituting new DEA models depending on the production-behavioral model
that is subject to testing.
e remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we brieĘy review the con-
ventional ‘axiomatic’ DEA approach for reconstructing production possibilities. Section 3
is concerned with non-parametric economic eﬃciency analysis, following the perspective of
Afriat (1972), Hanoch andRothschild (1972), Diewert andParkan (1983) andVarian (1984).
Section 4 bridges the gap between the seemingly distinct viewpoints adopted in Sections 2
and 3, and brings to light the economic meaning of DEA. Section 5 presents an empirical
application on eﬃciency in academia and illustrates the relevance of an appropriate DEA
model. Section 6, ĕnally, reproduces the main insights and provides some concluding dis-
cussion.
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1.2 Reconstructing production possibilities: an axiomatic
approach
A producer creates outputs from various combinations of inputs (factors of production). To
study producer choices we need a convenient way to summarize the production possibili-
ties, i.e. which inputs and outputs are technologically feasible. e set of all technologically
feasible input-output combinations is called the production possibility set.
To formally represent that set, we denote by z = (z1; : : : ; zq) 2 Rq a (non-zero) netput
vector with zj the value of netput commodity j. Positive components of z represent outputs
and negative components represent inputs. roughoutwe assume that the vector z captures
at least one input and at least one output, and that all producers use the same commodities
as inputs and produce the same outputs. e production technology is represented by the
(non-empty and closed) production possibility set
T = fz 2 Rqj netput z is technically feasibleg : (1.1)
If wemake the explicit distinction between input and output vectors, we use z = ( x; y)
with x 2 Rl+ the input vector and y 2 Rm+ the output vector (q = l +m). en, the set T
can be decomposed into input requirement sets
LT (y) =

x 2 Rl+ j( x; y) 2 T
	
; (1.2)
which contain all input vectors x that can produce the output vector y.
Production axioms. e true production possibility set T (or the input requirement set
LT ()) is usually not observed. erefore the DEA-type axiomatic approach typically ap-
proximates the unobserved set T by an empirical production set that is constructed from
a set of observed producers. We represent each observed producer s by the netput vector
zs = ( xs; ys), with s 2 S = f1; : : : ; jSjg, for S the set of observed producers. To con-
struct the empirical approximation of T , we will consider the production axioms 1.1-1.4.3
3In a theoretical framework, Shepard (1970) provides a comprehensive list of production axioms (including
ours), which we do not intend to fully review. Other axioms presented in the DEA literature (see, e.g., Färe et al.
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Axiom 1.1 (Inclusion of observations). 8s 2 S : ( xs; ys) 2 T .
is axiom says that all observed netput vectors are technologically feasible and thus
that they should belong to the (unobserved) production set T . is is really an empirical
postulate rather than a production postulate. Itmakes that we exclude empirical phenomena
such as measurement error or outlier behavior.4
Axiom 1.2 (Monotonicity). If z 2 T and z0  z then z0 2 T:
Monotonicity, sometimes also referred to as ‘strong (or free) disposability’ of inputs and
outputs, implies that the producer can always costlessly dispose unwanted inputs and/or out-
puts. at is, more inputs cannot lead to producing less outputs and producing less outputs
cannot lead to usingmore inputs. It implies thatmarginal rates of substitution/transformation
(between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere negative
or, in other words, there is no congestion.
Axiom 1.3 (Convexity in netput space). If z 2 T and z0 2 T , then z+(1  ) z0 2 T for
all  2 [0; 1] :
Axiom1.4 (Convexity in input space). Ifx 2 LT (y) andx0 2 LT (y), thenx+(1  )x0 2
LT (y) for all  2 [0; 1] :
Convexity in netput space entails thatmarginal rates of substitution/transformation (be-
tween inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere increasing.
Convexity in input space, ĕnally, is aweaker version ofAxiom1.3 and entails non-decreasing
marginal rates of input substitution.
Apart from these speciĕc production axioms, the (axiomatic) DEA approach typically
builds on a ‘minimal extrapolation’ requirement, which says that the production set approx-
imation should be the minimal set that is consistent with the axioms adopted; see Banker
et al. (1984).
Production set approximations. Diﬀerent production set approximations are obtained
from diﬀerent sets of axioms. First, if we impose Axioms 1.1 and 1.2, then the resulting
(1994)) are not considered because they are not instrumental to our following discussion.
4See, e.g., Grosskopf (1996) for extensions of DEA that weaken this assumption.
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production set approximation consistent with the minimum extrapolation principle is the
monotone hull of the data: M(S).5
M (S) = fz 2 Rq jz  zs for some s 2 S g (1.3)
Second, if we additionally assume convexity in the netput space (i.e. Axiom 1.3), then
we get the convex monotone hull of the data: CM(S).6
CM (S) =
(
z 2 Rqj8s 2 S : z 
X
s2S
szs; s  0 and
X
s2S
s = 1
)
(1.4)
Finally, replacing Axiom 1.3 by Axiom 1.4 leads to the approximation CIM(S), which
corresponds toM(S) with the additional property that input requirement sets are convex.7
CIM (S) =
8<:( x; y) 2 Rq
 8s 2 S : x 
P
s2S sxs and sy  sys
with s  0 and
P
s2S s = 1
9=; (1.5)
Increasing stringency of the diﬀerent assumptions underlying these three production set
approximations implies
M(S)  CIM(S)  CM(S): (1.6)
e setsM (S) ; CM (S) and CIM (S) are illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 2 for respec-
tively netput space and input space. Figure 1.1 represents these production set approxima-
tions for a situation with 3 producers that use a single input to produce a single output, i.e.
S1 = f1; 2; 3g and zs = ( xs; ys) 2 R   R+, with s 2 S. e monotone hull of the
dataM (S1) is the area under the full line, whileCM(S1) coincides with the area under the
dotted line. Observe further that for this particular situation (with only one input and one
output)M (S1) = CIM (S1). Figure 1.2 represents the input requirement sets for a situa-
tion with 3 producers that each produce the same output with two inputs, i.e. S2 = f1; 2; 3g
5See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993) suggested this approximation
in a DEA context.
6See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Banker et al. (1984) proposed it in a DEA context.
7See Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) for more discussion. Bogeto (1996) considers this approximation in a
DEA context.
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and zs = ( xs; y0) 2 R2 R+, with s 2 S. As the three producers in S2 produce exactly
the same output y0, we get that LCM(S2) (y0) = LCIM(S2) (y0).
Figure 1.1: Empirical production possibility sets
From these illustrations we can conclude that production axioms directly aﬀect the em-
pirical production set. Hence, an important question pertains to the validity of these axioms.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist any a priori reason why a production set should
necessarily be monotone or convex. In fact, it turns out that monotonicity and convexity
assumptions are problematic in many practical settings, and that reliable non-parametric
speciĕcation tests are currently not available; see Cherchye and Post (2003) for an in-depth
discussion. (McFadden, 1978, pp. 8-9) aptly summarizes that the common rationale for
monotonicity and convexity assumptions in production theory lies in their analytical con-
venience rather than in their economic realism. As such a ‘non-engineering’ justiĕcation
of DEA is recommendable, which motivates our ‘behavioral’ (or ‘economic’) perspective in
the next section.
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Figure 1.2: Empirical production possibility sets
1.3 Economic eﬃciency analysis: a non-parametric approach
While the axiomatic approach focuses on the speciĕcation of production possibilities, we
now take the dual perspective: we start from a speciĕcation of the production objectives
and impose the least structure on the production possibilities. Production objectives vary in
diﬀerent situations. emost frequentlymaintained position is that producers pursue proĕt
maximization. In some instances, however, cost minimization for given output might seem
a more reasonable assumption. For instance, when the producer is a price taker in input
markets but operates in regulated output markets (as is oen the case for public agencies).
In the following, we focus on proĕt and cost eﬃciency analysis of producer k (2 S),
i.e. the producer associated with netput choice zk = ( xk; yk). In the ĕrst subsection,
we assume that proĕt eﬃciency and cost eﬃciency is evaluated at (non-zero) price vectors
pk 2 Rq+ and wk 2 Rl+, respectively. Note that the ĕrst part of the netput price vector pk
corresponds to the input price vectorwk, such that pk = (wk; : : :). In the second subsection
we deal with the setting in which this price information is not available.
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1.3.1 Cost and proĕt eﬃciency with price information
eminimumcost that could have been achieved by producer k (i.e. the producer associated
with input choice xk) when producing yk is8
cT (zk; wk) = min
x2LT (yk)
xwk: (1.7)
We say that producer k acts cost eﬃcient if the observed cost equals the minimum cost (i.e
xkwk = cT (zk; wk)) and cost ineﬃcient if cT (zk; wk) is below xkwk.
Similarly, the maximum attainable proĕt at pk is deĕned as
T (zk; pk) = max
z2T
zpk: (1.8)
Again, proĕt eﬃciency (resp. ineﬃciency) is achieved by producer kwhen zkpk = T (zk; pk)
(resp. zkpk < T (zk; pk)).
Ineﬃcient production behavior is oen observed in practice and can can have diﬀerent
interpretations; see, e.g., Demsetz (1997) for an extensive discussion. Observed producer
ineﬃciency can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the producer optimization prob-
lem may be ill-speciĕed. For example, the producers objective function can be erroneously
deĕned; e.g. the objective functionmay not be fully linear in netputs (due to imperfect com-
petition). Second, as the speciĕed producer objective is typically that of producer owners,
producer ineﬃciency can also be interpreted as would the producer owners incompletely
control the producer managers (i.e. ineﬃciency due to agency problems). Both explana-
tions instantiate the need for economic eﬃciency measures, to serve either as indicators of
‘economic signiĕcance’ of speciĕcation errors (see Varian (1990) or as ‘performance’ indi-
cators (and possible monitoring instruments for producer owners; see Bogeto (2004)).
Intuitively, meaningful eﬃciency measures give us an idea about how ‘close’ observed
behavior is to optimizing behavior. In general, a reasonable measure of ‘closeness’ tells us
how far the producer fails to optimize the postulated objective function. For example, when
the production objective is speciĕed as proĕt maximization, a reasonable measure should
8For simplicity we assume that minimum cost (in (1.7)) and maximum proĕt (in (1.8)) is deĕned wherever
needed.
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capture how much additional proĕt the producer could have acquired if it had behaved dif-
ferently.
Cost eﬃciency measurement. For xkwk > 0, Farrell (1957) suggests as a measure for
cost eﬃciency the ratio of minimal to actual cost, i.e.
CT (zk; wk) =
cT (zk; wk)
xkwk
: (1.9)
It is clear that CT (zk; wk) 2 [0; 1].9
As discussed above, the precise speciĕcation of T is usually unknown. erefore, the
starting point within the non-parametric approach to analyzing production behavior is that
a (non-empty) subset f( xs; ys)js 2 Sg  T is observed (i.e. Axiom 1.1 in Section 2).
In principle, one may conduct a cost eﬃciency analysis by replacing T by this set. is
gives minimal (‘necessary’) non-parametric tests for economic eﬃciency and upper bound
estimates for the degree of cost ineﬃciency, i.e. CS (zk; wk)  CT (zk; wk) by construction
(for some k 2 S).
However, in practice additional assumptions about the set LT () can be useful.10 For
example, Varian (1984) assumes that less output does not require more input, i.e.
Axiom 1.5 (Free output disposability). If ( x; y) 2 T and y0  y, then ( x; y0) 2 T .
Axiom 1.5 is a weaker version of the monotonicity Axiom 1.2. We note that our below
reasoning is easily extended to accommodate for alternative assumptions regarding output
disposability (like those considered in Färe et al. (1994)).
As in the previous section, we can then again obtain an approximation of the produc-
tion possibility set. Axiom 1.1 and Axiom 1.5, combined with the minimal extrapolation
9is measure is not deĕned for xkwk = 0. Given that x 2 Rl+ for all ( x; yk) 2 T andwk 2 Rl+ we have
xkwk = cT (zk; wk) = 0 in that case. at is, cost eﬃciency is attained, and we can assign a cost eﬃciency value
of unity to producer k. To keep the exposition simple we abstract from this case in the following.
10is enlarges the set of possible comparison partners. Otherwise, cost eﬃciency analysis, for example, could
only compare the cost level of the evaluated producer to that of other observed producers that produce exactly the
same output vector, of which the number is usually very small. However, it is worth emphasizing that cost eﬃciency
analysis is possible even when only using Axiom 1.1. An insightful discussion of this point is given by Tulkens and
Vanden Eeckaut (1999).
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requirement, leads to
OM (S) = f( xs; y) jy  ys for some s 2 S g : (1.10)
Note that by constructionOM(S) is a subset of the setM(S), deĕned in (1.3), since the
latter assumes monotonicity for the set T .
When Axioms 1.1 and 1.5 are rightly conjectured, necessary tests for cost eﬃciency can
be performed with respect to OM (S) and an upper bound for the cost eﬃciency measure
in (1.9) can be derived, i.e. COM(S) (zk; wk)  CT (zk; wk) for some k 2 S.
Proĕt eﬃciency measurement. Nerlove (1965) proposed two types of measures: diﬀer-
ence measures and ratio measures. We restrict attention to ratio proĕt eﬃciency measures,
since these measures have a convenient degree interpretation.11 In addition, ratio measures
are easy to work with under limited price information (see our discussion in Section 3.2).
We need to distinguish two cases. First, for T (zk; pk) > 0 we deĕne the degree mea-
sure
+T (zk; pk) =
zkpk
T (zk; pk)
: (1.11)
Second, for T (zk; pk)  0 and zkpk < 0 we deĕne
 T (zk; pk) =
T (zk; pk)
zkpk
: (1.12)
Note that in the limiting case T (pk) = zkpk = 0 proĕt eﬃciency occurs. Conse-
quently, we can simply attribute an eﬃciency value of unity to producer k in that case, i.e.
T (zk; pk) = 1 if T (pk) = zkpk = 0. Obviously, T (zk; pk) 2 ( 1; 1] with a value
of unity revealing proĕt eﬃciency and a value below unity capturing feasible relative proĕt
increase.
Finally, we again have to approximate T by using the set of observed netput vectors
(indexed by S). As discussed above, this could lead to several diﬀerent approximations
(M(S); CIM(S),....). For the sake of brevity, we will make abstraction of this discussion in
11Within the non-parametric literature diﬀerence and ratio measures for proĕt eﬃciency have been discussed
by Banker and Maindiratta (1988). Our basic insights readily extend towards diﬀerence measures; compare with
Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck (2007).
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the setting of proĕt eﬃciency measurement and we will only focus on the setting that starts
from the observed set of netput vectors (i.e. we only impose Axiom 1.1.)
1.3.2 Measuring shadow cost and proĕt ineﬃciency
Not only the set T but also price vectors are oen imperfectly observed, or the prices that are
observed may not reĘect the true opportunity costs perceived by producers. In that case a
shadow price approach can be followed, i.e. basically those prices are selected that are ‘most
favorable’ to the observation under evaluation (see, e.g., Färe et al. (1990). Belowwe consider
the extreme case where the evaluator only knows pk 2 Rq+ and wk 2 Rl+, while excluding
the zero vector. In words, we assume that prices can take any non-negative value, but they
can not all be zero simultaneously. Note that, while we exclude the case where all input and
output prices are zero, we still allow for zero (shadow) prices for some input and/or output
commodities.
Shadow cost eﬃciency. Using OM (S)  T the (incomplete information) counterpart
of (1.9) can be deĕned as (for some k 2 S)
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= max
w2Rl+

cOM(S) (zk; w)
xkw
jxkw > 0

: (1.13)
To show how one can compute this measure, we have to reformulate it. In this ratio
formulation prices can be scaled without aﬀecting the value of CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

. In fact,
shadow prices as obtained within the non-parametric approach typically have a ratio inter-
pretation only. at is, they express the value of one commodity relative to that of other
commodities, but they bear no direct interpretation in terms of the absolute value of each
commodity, at least not without additional price information. us, we can set the ‘shadow’
cost level of producer k equal to unity without losing the informational content of the cor-
responding (relative) shadow prices, i.e. we can use
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= max
w2Rl+

cOM(S) (zk; w) jxkw = 1
	
: (1.14)
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Further using deĕnitions (1.7) and (1.10), we can equivalently reformulate (1.14) as
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= max
w2Rl+;c
fc jxkw = 1 and c  xsw for all s 2 S for which ys  ykg :
(1.15)
is last formulation makes clear that simple linear programming tools suﬃce to com-
pute CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

. e implicit ‘beneĕt-of-the-doubt’ pricing, i.e. the selection of
most favorable (shadow) prices, is reĘected in the max operator. Obviously, the index
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+
 2 [0; 1] gives an upper bound for the ratio measure CT (zk; wk) under
incomplete price and incomplete technology information.
Shadow proĕt eﬃciency. Similarly, we can use shadow prices to deal with incomplete
price information (i.e. pk unknown) to analyze proĕt eﬃciency. en, the analogues of the
proĕt eﬃciency measures (1.11) and (1.12) are respectively
+S
 
zk;Rq+

= max
p2Rq+

zkp
S (zk; p)
jS (zk; p) > 0

(1.16)
and
 S
 
zk;Rq+

= max
p2Rq+

S (zk; p)
zkp
jS (zk; p)  0 and zkp < 0

: (1.17)
ese measures can be re-expressed as
+S
 
zk;Rq+

= max
p2Rq+
fzkp jzsp  1 for all s 2 Sg (1.18)
and
 S
 
zk;Rq+

= max
p2Rq+;u2R+
fu jzkp =  1 and zsp   u for all s 2 Sg : (1.19)
epossibility of zero actual proĕt andnon-zeromaximal proĕt is captured in+S
 
zk;Rq+

,
while the possibility of non-zero actual proĕt and zeromaximal proĕt is captured in S
 
zk;Rq+

.
e only remaining problem occurs when producer k is proĕt eﬃcient only at prices that
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generate a zero proĕt level, i.e.
max
p2Rq+
fzkp jzkp  zsp for all s 2 S g = min
p2Rq+
fzkp jzkp  zsp for all s 2 S g = 0: (1.20)
Such cases can be detected using linear programming tools. Clearly, we cannot reject proĕt
eﬃciency when (1.20) holds.
Consistent with the idea of beneĕt of the doubt weighting we propose as a proĕt eﬃ-
ciency measure
IS
 
zk;Rq+

=
8<: max

+S
 
zk;Rq+

; S
 
zk;Rq+
	
1
if (1:20) does not hold
if (1:20) holds
:
(1.21)
e indexIS
 
zk;Rq+
 2 [0; 1] gives an upper bound for the ratio measureT (zk; pk)
under incomplete price and incomplete technology information. Not only the mere eﬃ-
ciency value but also the fact whether (1.20) holds and, if (1.20) does not hold, whether
+S
 
zk;Rq+

or  S
 
zk;Rq+

yields the maximum in (1.21) provides useful information,
and is thus preferably considered together with the proĕt eﬃciency value. As our exposi-
tionmakes clear, this information tells us whether the shadow prices that are implicitly used
involve a proĕt, a loss or a break-even for the producer under study.
1.4 Bridging the gap: the economic meaning of DEA
e dual formulation of the linear programming problem (1.15) reveals a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the abovemeasure for cost eﬃciency and theDebreu (1951)- Farrell (1957)
input measure for technical eﬃciency.12 Similarly, the dual problems of (1.18) and (1.19)
show a relationship between the proposed measure for proĕt eﬃciency and the ‘McFad-
den gauge’ function (see McFadden (1978)). ese dual interpretations bring to light the
economic interpretation of DEA, which typically computes technical eﬃciency measures
12is relationship in fact illustrates the duality between cost functions and the Shephard input distance func-
tions (Shepard (1970)), which have the same informational content as the Debreu-Farrell input technical eﬃciency
measures. In particular, the Debreu-Farrell input measure for technical eﬃciency is reciprocal to the Shephard in-
put distance function; see Debreu (1951) for more discussion.
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(Debreu Farrell measures) with respect to axiomatic approximations of the production pos-
sibility set. at is, it allows for interpreting these DEAmeasures as measures for violations
of economically optimizing behavior.
1.4.1 Cost eﬃciency
e dual formulation of (1.15) is (for some k 2 S)
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= min
2R+;s2R++
fj
X
s2S
sxs  xk;
X
s2S
s = 1 and sys  syk8s 2 Sg:
(1.22)
is can equivalently be reformulated as
CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= min
2R+
fj( xk; yk) 2 CIM(S)g: (1.23)
Hence, CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

can be computed as the maximum equiproportionate reduc-
tion of inputs within CIM(S). is is precisely the Debreu-Farrell input measure deĕned
with respect to CIM(S). e fact that this reference production set is obtained falls in
line with the general result that monotonizing and convexifying input requirement sets
does not interfere with the analysis of cost eﬃciency; see Varian (1984) for more discus-
sion. at is, the minimum cost level remains unaﬀected and thus CIOM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

=
CICIM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

: Hence, minimal cost reduction is also given by the maximal equipro-
portionate input shrinkage factor as computed with respect to CIM(S).
We illustrate our discussion by means of Figure 1.3. is continues our example intro-
duced in Figure 1.2, but now S02 = f(1; : : : ; 5)g and zs = ( xs; y0) 2 R2   R+, with
s 2 S; i.e. we include two additional observations. e input vectors are displayed in Fig-
ure 1.3. e input requirement sets associated with diﬀerent sets of axioms are the same as
those in Figure 1.2.
Let us ĕrst consider economic/cost eﬃciency. Suppose that the relative input prices
correspond to the slope of the bold iso-cost line. Under these input prices, the vector x1 is
cost minimizing. Obviously, this conclusion does not change when imposing monotonic-
ity and/or convexity on the input possibilities. e same result applies for measures of cost
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eﬃciency. For example, for the vectors x4 and x5 the associated cost eﬃciency ratios equal
0x40=0x4 and 0x50=0x5, respectively; monotonicity and convexity assumptions do not alter
these results.
Next, turn to the situation of incomplete price information. From (1.23), an upper
bound approximation for the cost eﬃciencymeasure is then provided by the Debreu-Farrell
input measure as computed with respect to the convexiĕed andmonotonized input require-
ment set. e resulting value equals 0x400 / 0x4 for x4 and 0x500=0x5 for x5. e upper
bound interpretation is immediate: 0x400=0x4 > 0x40=0x4 and 0x500=0x5 > 0x50=0x5.
Further, cost eﬃciency is achieved by x2 and x3; both vectors meet the necessary condition
for cost minimization under the (minimal) information that is available about technology
and prices.
Figure 1.3: e economic meaning of DEA: cost eﬃciency
is example illustrates that DEA measures provide upper bound approximations for
cost eﬃciency measures, and that imposing convexity can improve (i.e. lower) these up-
per bound estimates. Indeed, convexity does not interfere with economic eﬃciency results
and imposing it does even enhance the upper bound interpretation of technical eﬃciency
measures in terms of economic eﬃciency. However, it is worth to emphasize that impos-
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ing convexity does interfere with technical (or DEA-type) eﬃciency analysis as such; see for
instance the results for x5.
1.4.2 Proĕt eﬃciency
For proĕt eﬃciency we obtain as dual problem for (1.18)
+S
 
zk;Rq+

=

max
2R;s2R+
n

 P
s2S szs  zk and
P
s2S s = 1
o 1
: (1.24)
is measure captures (the inverse of) the maximum equiproportionate expansion of
netputs (or scale augmentation) within CM (S). is is the McFadden gauge function as
computed with respect to CM (S).
+S
 
zk;Rq+

=

max
2R
n

 zk 2 CM(S) o 1 : (1.25)
Similarly, the dual problem of (1.19) is
 S
 
zk;Rq+

= min
2R;z2R+
(

X
s2S
szs  zk and
X
s2S
s = 1
)
(1.26)
= min
2R
f jzk 2 CM(S)g : (1.27)
is measure captures the maximum equiproportionate netput reduction (or scale re-
duction) within CM (S). As such, it can be labeled the ‘inverse’ McFadden gauge function.
Expressions (1.24) and (1.26) are consistent with the established fact that imposing mono-
tonicity and convexity on production possibilities does not aﬀect proĕt eﬃciency analysis,
i.e. IS
 
zk;Rq+

= ICM(S)
 
zk;Rq+

.13
Note that (1.24) and (1.26) reveal alternative directions ofmeasurement to evaluate proĕt
eﬃciency under incomplete price information. Both directions ĕt within the general direc-
tional distance function framework to evaluate (shadow) proĕt eﬃciency discussed in Färe
andGrosskopf (1995) andChambers et al. (1998). Interestingly, the beneĕt of the doubt idea
(underlying the shadow price approach that is followed) suggests (endogenous) selection of
13See Varian (1984) and Banker and Maindiratta (1988) for more discussion.
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themost favorable direction of measurement.14
is beneĕt of the doubt idea also gives the economic intuition behind (1.24) and (1.26).
First, for any price vector under which actual (and maximum) proĕt is positive, the maxi-
mum netput scale expansion (within CM (S)) gives the minimum proportional proĕt ex-
pansion (compare with (1.24)). Similarly, if actual (and maximum) proĕt is negative, then
reducing netput scale to a certain degree (within CM (S)) always reduces the proĕt loss to
the same degree (compare with (1.26)).15 Since we do not know the actual prices, we need
to consider both scenarios, and the beneĕt-of-the-doubt idea suggests selecting the most
favorable scenario (see (1.21)).
We again illustrate our discussion on proĕt eﬃciency by means of a ĕgure. Figure 1.4
represents a situation with 4 producers that use a single input to produce a single output, i.e.
S01 = f1; 2; 3; 4g and zs = ( xs; ys) 2 R   R+. Suppose that the relative input-output
price corresponds to the slope of the bold iso-proĕt line. Under these input and output
prices, the vector z3 is proĕt maximizing. Note that the associated proĕt level is positive
for these prices. e conclusion on proĕt eﬃciency clearly does not change when imposing
monotonicity or convexity on the technology set. Similarly, convexity and monotonicity do
not impact the degree of proĕt eﬃciency, which corresponds to the ratio of the actual proĕt
to the maximum proĕt. For example, for the vector z4, the associated proĕt eﬃciency level
equals 0z40z04 .
Next, we illustrate that DEA measures provide upper bound approximations for proĕt
eﬃciency measures. In a situation of incomplete price information, we need to consider the
possibility of positive as well as negative proĕt. We therefore use both the McFadden Gauge
function and the ‘inverse’ McFadden Gauge function, as computed with respect to the con-
vexiĕed and monotonized technology set. For example, let us consider the shadow proĕt
eﬃciency of z4. First, for any price vector under which the proĕt is positive, the maximum
proportionate netput scale expansion 0z
00
4
0z4
gives the minimum proportional proĕt expan-
sion. Second, if the proĕt is negative, the maximum proportionate netput reduction 0z
000
4
0z4
indicates the minimum reduction in proĕt loss. e shadow proĕt eﬃciency then equals
14See also Cherchye et al. (2010b) for an elaborated discussion of this interpretation of the Mc Fadden gauge
function in terms of proĕt eﬃciency.
15Observe that the beneĕt of the doubt principle calls for selecting prices that yield actual and maximal proĕt
with the same sign, as this guarantees the proĕt eﬃciency measure to be non-negative.
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Figure 1.4: e economic meaning of DEA: proĕt eﬃciency
the maximum of 0z40z004 and
0z0004
0z4
. For this example, the scenario of positive proĕt is clearly the
most favorable, implying that the shadow proĕt eﬃciency equals 0z40z004 for z4. is illustrates
the upper bound interpretation of shadow proĕt eﬃciency, since 0z40z004 >
0z4
0z04
.
1.5 Application
In the previous sections, we highlighted the interpretation of DEA models as measuring
violations of economically optimizing behavior. Our following application on eﬃciency in
academia illustrates how crucial the speciĕcation of an appropriate behavioral model is. In a
ĕrst step, we evaluate universities’ eﬃciency in terms of cost minimization, by following the
shadowprice approach that we presented above. In a following step, we analyze the (possibly
distortive) eﬀects of using nonveriĕable assumptions regarding behavioral objectives and
technical production possibilities.
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Data and variables. Our application uses data on 133 US universities in 2011-2012.16 e
universities in our sample are all reported in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking in the year
2012. is ensures a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample. e sample consists
of both public and private universities, where 89 universities are public and 44 are private.
From the private universities, we only selected non-proĕt institutions, to guarantee that all
universities in our sample share similar objectives.
We consider two inputs and three outputs. First, we use two categories of staﬀ as uni-
versity inputs: academic staﬀ, which have teaching duties and conduct research, and other
(non-academic) staﬀ, which includes administrative and technical staﬀ. Next, we use under-
graduate student enrollments, graduate student enrollments and number of doctor’s degrees
granted as outputs. Table 1.1 provides some summary statistics for our selection of inputs
and outputs.17
Mean. Std. Min. Max
Input Academic staﬀ 2284 1275 355 6297
Other staﬀ 5165 3537 963 21557
Output Undergraduate enrollments 17833 10183 650 55016
Graduate enrollments 5248 3216 757 16373
Doctor’s degrees 322 215 2 892
Table 1.1: Summary statistics data
Core model. We believe that cost minimization provides a suitable behavioral model to
evaluate the eﬃciency of the universities in our sample. Indeed, we may reasonably argue
that outputs are to a large extent exogenous (i.e. beyond the control of university managers),
so that cost minimization for given outputs is a plausible assumption. us, following our
argument to imposeminimal prior structure (and to avoid unveriĕable assumptions) for the
production behavior that is evaluated, the cost eﬃciency measureCIOM(S) (or, equivalently,
its dual speciĕcationCICIM(S)) constitutes an appropriate eﬃciency measure for the setting
that we consider here. erefore, we will use this measure as our core eﬃciency measure in
our following analysis.
16We retrieved our data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which collects and analyzes
detailed information on education in the United States.
17Staﬀ and student enrollments are expressed in full-time equivalents.
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Table 1.2 presents some summary statistics on the eﬃciency scores for our core model.
We ĕnd that the average cost eﬃciency in the sample equals 0:86, which indicates that the
average cost reduction potential amounts to 14%. Interestingly, the average eﬃciency is
rather high, which conforms to our expectation that most universities eﬀectively do operate
in a (nearly) cost minimizing manner.
Next, when distinguishing between public and private universities, we observe that pub-
lic universities operate on average more cost eﬃcient than their private counterparts. More-
over, when focusing on the median eﬃciency measures, we ĕnd that more than 50% of the
public universities turns out to be cost eﬃcient, while the opposite conclusion applies to pri-
vate universities. In this respect, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the null hypothesis that pub-
lic and private universities achieve the same eﬃciency level returns a p-value of only 9; 9%.
is signiĕcant diﬀerence seems to indicate that private universities must have (slightly)
diﬀerent objectives than simply cost minimization.
Mean Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
CIOM(S) = CICIM(S) 0.86 0.28 0.76 0.98 1.00 1.00
! public 0.90 0.33 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00
! private 0.83 0.30 0.68 0.97 1.00 1.00
IS 0.62 0.23 0.42 0.58 0.85 1.00
BCCI = CICM(S) 0.70 0.20 0.55 0.69 0.87 1.00
Table 1.2: Summary statistics eﬃciency results
Alternative speciĕcations. Inwhat follows, we discuss two alternative eﬃciencymeasures
that build on stronger prior assumptions regarding the objectives and production possibili-
ties underlying the observed university behavior. As we will show, these measures do indi-
cate a considerable amount of ineﬃcient behavior. Because the assumptions underlying the
two eﬃciency measures are diﬃcult to motivate a priori, we argue that the diﬀerences with
the eﬃciency results for our core model should be interpreted as indicating an ill-speciĕed
behavioral model (and not ineﬃciency per se). is clearly illustrates the basic argument
of our paper: erroneous production assumptions may substantially distort the eﬃciency
analysis (and the conclusions that are drawn from it).
Our ĕrst alternative measure uses the assumption that universities pursue proĕt max-
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imization instead of cost minimization. Table 1.2 gives the corresponding results for the
proĕt eﬃciency measureIS . For our sample, we ĕnd that the average value ofIS amounts
to only 0:62, which is considerably below the average cost eﬃciency value that we obtained
before (i.e. 0:86). is result should actually not be surprising as proĕt maximization is a
substantially stronger assumption than cost minimization. However, we ĕnd it hard to mo-
tivate the assumption of proĕt maximization for the current setting (which contains only
public and private non-proĕt institutions). erefore, in our interpretation the substantial
amount of proĕt ineﬃciency primarily reveals an ill-speciĕed model of university behavior.
In turn, this provides an additional motivation for using our core model of cost minimiza-
tion.
Our second alternative measure maintains cost minimization as the behavioral objec-
tive but puts additional structure on the production possibilities. We recall that, in its dual
interpretation, our core model corresponds to the measure CICIM(S), which uses the Ax-
ioms 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4. To deĕne our alternative eﬃciencymeasure, we replace Axiom 1.4 (i.e.
convexity in input space) by the stronger Axiom 1.3 (i.e. convexity in netput space). Follow-
ing a similar argument as above, we can show that this obtains the shadow cost eﬃciency
measure
CICM(S)
 
zk;Rl+

= min
2R+;s2R++
fj
X
s2S
sxs  xk;
X
s2S
s = 1 and
X
s2S
sys  ykg:
(1.28)
Actually, the expression on the right hand side deĕnes the technical input eﬃciency
measure that was presented by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), which is widely used in
DEA applications. We denote the measure as BCCI in Table 1.2. We ĕnd that the average
value for this measure amounts to no more than 0:70, which again is signiĕcantly below
the one for our core model. Similar to before, we conclude that the convexity assumption
has a substantial impact on the eﬃciency results. In our opinion, because there is no a pri-
ori argument to use Axiom 3 as a valid production assumption for the setting at hand, this
provides an additional motivation for using our core model here.
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1.6 Summary and concluding discussion
We have reconsidered the economic motivation of DEA by highlighting its behavioral inter-
pretation. Duality relationships can justify the use of certain production postulates in order
to draw inference about economic eﬃciency performance, and so rationalize the use of cer-
tain DEA models. is potential use of DEA is all the more attractive since its engineering
motivation is oen unpersuasive. Importantly, the appropriate DEA model depends on the
economic eﬃciency concept that is under consideration. In fact, this perspective may in-
stitute original eﬃciency evaluation models; see e.g. Cherchye et al. (2008, 2013, 2014c)
who develop new nonparametric methodology for analyzing multi-output production by
adopting a similar behavioral perspective of DEA.
We plead for carefully checking the validity of axioms that can interfere with the test
results (e.g. Axiom 1.5 in the context of cost eﬃciency analysis), and for investigating the
sensitivity of the results with respect to these axioms if it is diﬃcult to verify them empiri-
cally. In our opinion, such practice falls in line with the non-parametric philosophy, which
advocates minimal risk of speciĕcation error.
We also conducted an empirical application in which we demonstrated the importance
of carefully specifying the behavioral production model in order to obtain a meaningful
eﬃciency analysis. In this application we ĕrst motivated cost minimization as a good be-
havioral assumption to evaluate the eﬃciency of US universities. Next, we showed that our
eﬃciency conclusions were very sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the behav-
ioral objective (proĕt maximization versus cost minimization) and production possibilities
(convexity in netput space instead of input space).
ree further points pertain to our speciĕcation of the production-decision problem.
First, the economic eﬃciency tests and measures discussed above implicitly assume that
prices do not vary with quantities and that the eventual quantities and prices are perfectly
anticipated by producers. e presented economic eﬃciency measures can be employed to
quantify violations of these hypotheses. However, when diﬀerent assumptions seem more
appropriate, then the behavioral model is to be adapted, which in turn can motivate alter-
native DEA models (e.g. the monotone hull model (see (3)); compare with Cherchye et al.
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(2000) and Kuosmanen and Post (2002)).
Second, for expositional convenience we have restricted attention to producers that seek
to minimize cost or maximize proĕt given the production technology and the input-output
prices. However, depending on the setting, alternative behavioral objectives might also be
plausible. In situations in which the inputs are exogenously determined, DMUs may seek
to produce the output that maximizes revenues. Moreover, even if DMUs have control over
the inputs, DMUs may choose to maximize revenues instead of proĕts, for example to build
market share and a reputation. We refer to Shepard (1970), who discusses the dual link
between the revenue function and the output distance function.
Furthermore, in multi-output settings, the individual output-divisions might not always
behave cooperatively. It might be the case that each individual output-division seeks tomax-
imize the budget assigned. e budget-maximizing model was initiated in public choice
theory by Niskanen (1971). In particular, the budget maximizing model states that bureau-
crats seek to increase their budget in order to increase their own power. In Chapter 2, we
further discuss the allocation of budget among individual output divisions and possible ef-
ĕciency gains by reallocating the budget. Similarly, some individual divisions might be free
riding on other divisions with respect to the use of joint inputs. We refer to Cherchye et al.
(2014c), who compare the empirical validity of cooperative and noncooperative models for
describing the observed production behavior.
ird, in many environments, we need to impose additional restrictions, e.g. due to the
non-discretionary nature of exogenously ĕxed inputs or outputs or because producers face
additional cost or revenue constraints (e.g. Färe et al. (1994)). In a similar vein, theremay be
speciĕc characteristics of the data that should be accounted for when designing the appro-
priate eﬃciency evaluationmodel: input or output valuesmay not be continuous but subject
to discreteness, interval or categorical restrictions. Oncemore, diﬀerent speciĕcations of the
production-decision problems entail alternative eﬃciency analysis (DEA) models.
e core idea of this chapter is that starting froma careful speciĕcation of the production-
decision problem, which depends on the speciĕc application setting, can provide economic
motivation of alternative and perhaps even novel DEA models. We believe that it is impor-
tant to strongly hold on to this economic perspective in practical applications, rather than
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‘blindly’ resorting to standard, so-called ‘well-established’models. In our opinion this forms
a natural precondition for meaningful DEA applications.
Chapter 2
Coordination eﬃciency in
multi-output settings: a DEA
approach
39
Abstract
We extend a recently developed methodology for measuring the eﬃciency
of Decision Making Units (DMUs) in the case of multiple inputs and outputs.
e methodology accounts for economies of scope through the use of joint in-
puts, and explicitly includes information about the allocation of inputs to par-
ticular outputs. We focus on possible eﬃciency gains by reallocating inputs
across outputs. We introduce a measure of coordination eﬃciency, which cap-
tures these eﬃciency gains. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our
methodology through an eﬃciency analysis of education and research con-
ducted at US universities.1
1is chapter is based on joint work with Laurens Cherchye (KU Leuven) and Bram De Rock (ULB). I refer to
the paper of Cherchye et al. (2014a), which has been published in Annals of Operations Research. We are grateful
to Jo Van Biesebroeck, Frederic Vermeulen, the seminar audience in Leuven, and participants of the European
Workshop on Eﬃciency and Productivity Analysis 2013 in Helsinki for insightful discussion. Moreover, we are
grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments, which improved this paper signiĕcantly.
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2.1 Introduction
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a widely used approach to evaluate the eﬃciency of
Decision Making Units (DMUs). In particular, DEA evaluates a DMU’s eﬃciency by com-
paring its input and output quantities to those of other DMUs operating in a similar techno-
logical environment.2 An attractive feature of DEA is that it is intrinsically nonparametric:
DEA eﬃciency evaluations need not assume a speciĕc functional/parametric form for the
production technology. Instead, the production possibility set is reconstructed on the basis
of the observed input-output combinations, using standard production axioms. A DMU’s
eﬃciency is thenmeasured as the distance from its input-output combination to the frontier
of this production possibility set.
Traditional DEA methods typically treat DMUs’ production processes as a black box:
they only use information on the aggregate amounts of inputs and outputs, and not on how
the inputs and outputs are exactly linked to each other. Nevertheless, information on the
allocation of inputs to outputs is oen available in empirical research settings. Including
this information can substantially increase the discriminatory power of the eﬃciency anal-
ysis, i.e. it creates considerably more potential to identify ineﬃcient production behavior.
Cherchye et al. (2013) have put this idea into practice by developing a novel DEA-based
methodology for measuring the eﬃciency of DMUs characterized by multiple inputs and
outputs. eir methodology accounts for joint inputs in the production process, and explic-
itly includes information on how inputs are allocated to outputs.3
is chapter takes this multi-output methodology one step further. We propose an ex-
tension that quantiĕes possible eﬃciency gains by reallocating inputs over outputs. We cap-
ture these eﬃciency gains by a new measure of coordination eﬃciency. e measure takes
a value of one when the input allocation over outputs is eﬃcient, while a value below unity
reveals that the productive eﬃciency can further increase by reallocating the inputs more
optimally. Interestingly, our method also provides concrete guidelines on how to achieve
the better input allocation, which is especially attractive from a practical point of view.
2See, for example, Färe et al. (1994), Cooper et al. (2007), Fried et al. (2008) and Cook and Seiford (2009) for
extensive reviews of DEA.
3e treatment of multi-output production is partly inspired on recent work regarding the modeling of multi-
person household consumption. See Cherchye et al. (2007, 2011a,b).
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We also show the empirical usefulness of our methodology through an application that
evaluates the eﬃciency of US universities. We believe that university performance forms
an interesting application area because universities typically have a two-fold assignment,
i.e. education and research. In our application, we consider a university as a DMU that
consists of an education division and a research division. Given our speciĕc methodological
contribution, a primal focus will be on the (eﬃcient) allocation of university budgets over
education and research outputs.
e remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 motivates our research
question in more detail and relates it to the relevant literature. Section 2.3 formally intro-
duces our measure of coordination eﬃciency. As we will explain, this measure essentially
captures the diﬀerence between so-called centralized and decentralized eﬃciency. Section
2.4 discusses the practical implementation of our theoretical eﬃciency measures. Section
2.5 shows that our distinction between centralized and decentralized eﬃciency also bears
an interesting dual representation. Section 2.6 presents our empirical application to US uni-
versities. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Multi-output production and input allocation
To set the stage, we ĕrst provide a verbal explanation of the ideas that we formalize in the
following sections. Next, we also discuss the relationship between our approach and alter-
native approaches that have appeared in the DEA literature.
2.2.1 Centralized, decentralized and coordination eﬃciency
Multi-output production is oen motivated by the presence of economies of scope, which
originate from joint use of inputs (Cherchye et al. (2008)). Economies of scope occur if
the average production cost decreases when the number of outputs increases (Baumol et al.
(1982)). Scope economies typically originate from jointly (or “publicly”) used inputs, i.e.
inputs that simultaneously beneĕt the production of multiple outputs. e DEA-based
method of Cherchye et al. (2013) accounts for economies of scope by explicitly modeling
the presence of joint inputs in the production process.
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We assume that a DMU consists of several divisions, where each division is responsible
for the production of one or more outputs. To be clear, we assume that there is no overlap
in the outputs that divisions produce, each output can be produced by only one particu-
lar division.4 On the input side, we distinguish joint inputs from division-speciĕc inputs.
Division-speciĕc inputs diﬀer from joint inputs in that they can be allocated to the outputs
produced by a particular division.5 As we will formalize in the next section, we assume that
each division is characterized by its own production technology, while accounting for inter-
dependencies between the diﬀerent technologies through joint inputs. Note that this setting
corresponds to the concept ‘almost non jointness’, deĕned by Kohli (1985).6
As mentioned before, we are particularly interested in the way that a DMU allocates
the available inputs among the divisions. More precisely, we consider whether a realloca-
tion of the division-speciĕc inputs within a DMU can lead to eﬃciency gains. To examine
these gains from reallocation, we distinguish between centralized and decentralized eﬃ-
ciency measurement.
Essentially, the measure proposed by Cherchye et al. (2013) considers eﬃciency from
a decentralized perspective. In particular, the allocation of the division-speciĕc inputs is
considered to be predetermined and taken for granted in the eﬃciency analysis. erefore,
we will refer to Cherchye et al’s original measure as decentralized eﬃciency in the sequel.
Our following analysis will complement this measure of decentralized eﬃciency with
an alternative (novel) measure of centralized eﬃciency. Intuitively, this measure assumes
that a DMU’s central management can reallocate inputs over output divisions. Clearly, such
reallocation can give rise to new gains of productive eﬃciency. We quantify these additional
4Each DMU does not necessarily have to consist of exactly the same number of divisions. Suppose we observe
M diﬀerent kinds of output divisions for a particular setting. en each DMU may consist of a subset of these
divisions. Note that to be able to apply the proposed methodology, we do need to have a sample of DMUs which
can be subdivided in divisions in a consistent manner, such that divisions of the same kind, produce comparable
outputs for each DMU.
5Cherchye et al. (2013) assume that a DMU is organized in such a way that each division is responsible for just
one output. In that case, the notion output-speciĕc input is used, to be distinguished from joint input. However,
perfect information about the allocation of inputs to each individual output is oen not available. We therefore
consider a division structure in this chapter. A main advantage of such a division structure is that it suﬃces to have
data on the amount of inputs each division uses for the production of its outputs. Cherchye et al. (2014c) adopted
a similar division structure in a setting that is formally close to the one that we consider here.
6e concept ‘almost non-jointness’ is a generalization of the concepts ‘non-jointness in input’ quantities (all
inputs are division-speciĕc) and ‘non-jointness in prices’ (all inputs are joint). See for example Samuelson (1966),
Lau (1972), Hall (1973), Kohli (1983) and van den Heuvel (1986) who discuss and motivate these concepts.
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eﬃciency gains by our measure of coordination eﬃciency, which we calculate as the ratio
of centralized over decentralized eﬃciency. Note that the decentralized versus centralized
setting can be linked to the standard text book argument of short run versus long run. In
the short run, the division structure and the allocation of inputs might be ĕxed, however, in
the long run the allocation of the inputs becomes variable.
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we will introduce our measures of centralized and decentralized
eﬃciency as measures of input technical eﬃciency. Interestingly, our distinction between
centralized and decentralized eﬃciency also has an intuitive dual interpretation in terms of
cost eﬃciency. In dual terms, the distinction relates to the (shadow) input prices that are
used to evaluate a DMU’s cost eﬃciency, which are deĕned diﬀerently in the decentralized
and centralized cases. is will be explained more in detail in Section 2.5.
2.2.2 Related literature
At this point, it is worth indicating that there is a close link between the approach that we
develop here and other approaches that have been presented in the DEA literature. Most
notably, our set-up bears direct connections to earlier work on networkDEA and centralized
DEA models. In a sense, our method is situated on the intersection of these two existing
approaches, by combining elements that are speciĕc to each of them.
Firstly, there is clear relation with network DEA. Network models also add additional
structure to the transformation process from inputs to outputs in the DEA assessment (see
Färe and Grosskopf (2000), Färe et al. (2007) and Cook and Zhu (2014)).7 Moreover, net-
work DEA can be used to analyze the allocation of resources across various uses. For exam-
ple, Färe et al. (1997) consider the use of land to produce corn, wheat and soybeans.
Our approach has in common with network DEA that it explicitly incorporates infor-
mation about the allocation of inputs to speciĕc outputs. However, a crucial diﬀerence per-
tains to our dealing with joint inputs in the production model, which is not considered in
the existing network DEA models. e presence of joint inputs will translate into special
7e model of Cherchye et al. (2013) is close in spirit to the network DEA models with parallel subsystems.
However, network models can be applied to a variety of situations. For example, network DEA can also explicitly
model intermediate products, which are produced and used within the production process. Similarly, a network
formulation might be a dynamic model in which some outputs in period t are used as an input in period t+ 1.
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constraints that link the production process of the outputs, constraints that are absent in
conventional network DEAmodels. We refer to Lozano (2015), who discusses in detail how
the approach of Cherchye et al. (2013) can be combined with existing network models.
As indicated above, by including joint inputs in the analysis, we eﬀectively model the
presence of economies of scope, which forms a prime economic motivation for simultane-
ously producing multiple outputs. With respect to economies of scope, it is worth to men-
tion the studies of Tone and Sahoo (2003) and Sahoo and Tone (2013), who model scale
and scope economies of ĕrms due to process indivisibilities arising from the task-speciĕc
production processes of a multi-product ĕrm.
Secondly, Lozano and Villa (2004) introduced so-called centralized DEAmodels. ese
models assume that there is a centralized decision maker who “owns” or supervises the
DMUs. e centralized decision maker is interested in maximizing the eﬃciency of each
individual unit, but is also concerned about the total input consumption. Lozano and Villa
(2004) assume that inputs can be reallocated acrossDMUs and seek for an optimal allocation
of the inputs among DMUs.
Following Lozano and Villa (2004), we also use the term “centralized” eﬃciency for a
setting where input reallocation is possible. However, a main distinguishing feature of our
approach is that we allocate inputs among various uses within the same DMU, i.e. across
alternative production technologies (associated with diﬀerent output divisions). is con-
trasts with centralized DEA models, which reallocate inputs across DMUs that are charac-
terized by identical production technologies.
In this chapter, we assume that each division produces diﬀerent outputs. However, in
a setting with divisions that are not responsible for the production of diﬀerent outputs,
but rather produce a similar set of outputs, the centralized eﬃciency model, introduced
by Lozano and Villa (2004), would be more appropriate to study a reallocation.
2.3 eoretical eﬃciency measures
Aer introducing some necessary notation and terminology, we will formally deĕne our
measures of centralized, decentralized and coordination eﬃciency. To structure our dis-
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cussion, we will ĕrst consider a theoretical set-up in which the production technology is
known. e next section will consider the practical implementation of our theoretical eﬃ-
ciency measures.
2.3.1 Preliminaries
Eﬃciency analysis starts from a data set with T observed DMUs that produce N outputs.
We assume that each DMU is subdivided into M divisions, where each division m (1 
m M ) produces one or more outputs. Let dm represent the number of outputs produced
by division m. us, we have N = d1 + : : : + dM . For each DMU t (1  t  T ), we
observe the vector of produced outputs yt 2 RN+ , where
yt = (y1t ; : : : ; yMt ); (2.1)
so that ymt 2 Rd
m
+ denotes the vector of outputs produced by divisionm. Similarly, we also
observe the division-speciĕc and joint inputs. For any output divisionm, the vector qmt 2
RNspec+ contains the division-speciĕc inputs. We let qt =
PM
m=1 qmt , i.e. qt represents the
total division-speciĕc inputs of DMU t. Finally, Qt 2 RNjoin+ represents the joint inputs of
DMU t. We note that these joint inputsQt cannot be allocated to particular divisions; they
are simultaneously used in the production process of all output divisions. Taken together,
the empirical analysis starts from the following data set:
S = f(yt; q1t ; : : : ; qMt ;Qt) j t = 1; : : : ; Tg: (2.2)
Next, we consider a separate production technology for each output division. Impor-
tantly, we account for interdependencies between the diﬀerent technologies through jointly
used inputs. More formally, we characterize the production technology of a divisionm by
input requirement sets Im(ym), which contain all combinations of division-speciĕc and
joint inputs (qm;Q) that can produce the output quantities ym, i.e.
Im(ym) = f(qm;Q) 2 RNspec+  RNjoin+ j(qm;Q) can produce ymg: (2.3)
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Finally, as explained above, our centralized eﬃciency measure assumes that the central
management of a DMU coordinates the production process of all divisions. More specif-
ically, the central management determines how much of the total amount q of division-
speciĕc inputs goes to every division. To formalize this idea, we need to consider input
requirement sets I(y) for the “aggregate” output vector y (deĕned over all divisions simul-
taneously). ese input requirement sets are constructed from the division-speciĕc sets
Im(ym), as follows:
I(y) = f(q;Q) j 9 q1; : : : ; qM such that
MX
m=1
qm = q and 8m : (qm;Q) 2 Im(ym)g:
(2.4)
us, each set I(y) contains all combinations of division-speciĕc and joint inputs (q;Q) that
can produce the output y = (y1; : : : ; yM ). In particular, we say that (q;Q) can produce y
if the input q can be allocated among the divisions such that every division can produce the
associated output ym.
2.3.2 Eﬃciency measures
roughout, we will consider input-oriented eﬃciency measurement, which identiĕes the
maximumpossible input reductionwhile keeping the output ĕxed. In doing so, we adopt ra-
dial (or Debreu-Farrell) eﬃciency measures, which are most popular in applied DEA work.
Essentially, for some evaluated DMU and a given technology (represented by input require-
ment sets), these radial measures seek the maximum equiproportionate input reduction for
the given output. Attractively, the measures have a natural degree interpretation: they are
situated between 0 and 1, with an eﬃciency score of unity indicating technically eﬃcient
production, while lower values reĘect greater productive ineﬃciency. Finally, and impor-
tantly, radial measures also have an interesting dual representation in terms of cost eﬃ-
ciency, which we will illustrate in Section 2.5.
Let us ĕrst introduce our radial measure of decentralized eﬃciency TEdt , which -to
recall- is the one that was originally proposed by Cherchye et al. (2013). In formal terms, we
have
TEdt = minf j 8m : (qmt ; Qt) 2 Im(ymt )g: (2.5)
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ismeasure captures themaximumequiproportionate reduction of the inputs (captured by
) that is feasible, conditional on the given (observed) allocation of division-speciĕc inputs
among the divisions.
By contrast, our (novel) centralized eﬃciencymeasureTEct no longer takes the observed
input allocation for granted. It quantiĕes themaximum input reduction that is feasible while
accounting for possible (optimal) reallocation of the division-speciĕc inputs. We deĕne
TEct = minf j (qt; Qt) 2 I(yt)g: (2.6)
Basically, the measure considers not only the production process of the individual divisions
(like the measure TEdt ) but also the coordination among divisions. In other words, in con-
trast to our measure of decentralized eﬃciency, our centralized eﬃciency measure takes
into account the ineﬃciencies that result from a suboptimal allocation of the inputs to the
output divisions.
is directly provides the basic intuition of our following result, which states that de-
centralized eﬃciency is never lower than centralized eﬃciency.8
Proposition 2.1. We have that TEc  TEd.
In turn, this motivates the following ratio measure CoEt as a natural measure for the
eﬃciency of input coordination among divisions:
CoEt =
TEct
TEdt
: (2.7)
By construction, this coordination eﬃciency measure is situated between 0 and 1. A coor-
dination eﬃciency value of unity indicates that the inputs are allocated in an optimal way
across the divisions. By contrast, a lower eﬃciency value reveals that DMU t’s productive
eﬃciency can be further increased by input reallocation. More speciĕcally, for the given out-
put DMU t can achieve additional input reduction by adjusting the input mix over output
divisions.
8e proofs of our results appear in Appendix 2.B.
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As a ĕnal note, we can also write
TEct = C
oEt  TEdt ; (2.8)
which provides an intuitive decomposition of centralized eﬃciency as the product of coor-
dination eﬃciency and decentralized eﬃciency.9
2.4 Practical implementation
In practice, the true input requirement sets Im(ym) (used for the decentralized measure
TEdt ) and I(y) (used for the centralizedmeasure TEct ) are typically not observed. eDEA
approach proceeds by deĕning empirical approximations of these input sets on the basis of
some standard production axioms. In turn, this deĕnes operational eﬃciencymeasures that
can be computed by means of standard linear programming techniques.
2.4.1 Empirical eﬃciency measures
In what follows, we use the same production axioms as Cherchye et al. (2013):
Axiom 2.1 (Nested input sets). ym  ym ) Im(ym)  Im(ym)
Axiom 2.2 (Monotone input sets). (qm;Q) 2 Im(ym) and (qm;Q)  (qm;Q) )
(qm;Q) 2 Im(ym)
Axiom 2.3 (Convex input sets). (qm;Q); (qm;Q) 2 Im(ym))
8 2 [0; 1] : (qm;Q) + (1  )(qm;Q) 2 Im(ym)
Axiom 2.4 (Observability means feasibility). (yt; q1t ; : : : ; qMt ;Qt) 2 S )
8m : (qmt ;Qt) 2 Im(ymt ):
In words, Axiom 2.1 says that, if some input can produce the output ym, then it can also
produce any lower output ym. Essentially, this means that outputs are freely disposable.
9Note that it is possible to consider coordination eﬃciency in a dynamic context, and further decompose the
productivity index. See Grosskopf (2003) for a discussion on the Malmquist productivity index and its decom-
position. Moreover, Ang and Kerstens (2016) introduce a nonparametric measure of coordination productivity
growth, based on the Luenberger productivity indicator. e coordination productivity indicator is decomposed
into a coordination technical ineﬃciency change component and a coordination technical change component.
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Similarly, Axiom 2.2 deĕnes free input disposability, i.e. more input never reduces the out-
put. Next, Axiom 2.3 states that, if two inputs can produce the output ym, then any convex
combination of these inputs can also produce the same output. Finally, Axiom 2.4 says that
the observed input-output combinations are certainly feasible.10
Of course, other axioms can be used as well. For example, such axioms may impose
alternative assumptions regarding the nature of returns-to-scale (constant, decreasing or
increasing) that underlie the production technology. For compactness, we donot extensively
discuss such assumptions here. However, it is worth emphasizing that these assumptions
can be incorporated into our method, by combining our method with the work of Petersen
(1990) and Bogeto (1996). An interesting feature of our methodology is that it allows for
imposing returns-to-scale assumptions that are speciĕc to individual divisions.11
Cherchye et al. (2013) have shown that, if Axioms 2.1-2.4 hold, an empirical inner bound
approximation of the true (but unobserved) set Im(ymt ) is deĕned as
I^(ymt ) = f(qm;Q)j
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  qm;
X
s2Dmt
ms Qs  Q;
X
s2Dmt
ms = 1; 
m
s  0g;
(2.9)
with
Dmt = fsjymt  yms g (2.10)
the set of dominatingDMUs.12 By construction, we have I^m(ymt )  Im(ymt ) under Axioms
2.1-2.4. e set I^(ymt ) is the smallest production set that is consistent with Axioms 2.1-2.4
for a given data set S and, therefore, it deĕnes a useful empirical approximation of the true
set Im(ymt ).
10Essentially, this assumes that the input and output data are not contaminated by measurement errors. e
DEA literature has forwarded alternative proposals to deal with errors-in-the-data in practical applications. To
compactify our exposition, we will abstract from measurement issues in what follows, but these existing method-
ologies are fairly easily integrated in the framework that we set out here. See Cherchye et al. (2013) for related
discussion.
11e resulting production technologies can then also be used to estimate division speciĕc returns-to-scale; see
Podinovski (2004c) for more discussion.
12Note that for each divisionm,Dmt contains by construction only one element for the division with the highest
output level. As such, these divisions are eﬃcient by default. is is a well-known issue in DEA and is due to the
absence of making assumptions regarding to the returns-to-scale in the production process. A solution is to work
with a constant returns-to-scale technology. Under the assumption of constant returns-to-scale, an increase in
inputs results in a proportionate increase in the output level. As a result, both small and large divisions can be
compared with each other.
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By combining (2.4) and (2.9), we obtain the following empirical approximation of the
setbI(y):
bI(y) = f(q;Q) j 9 q1; : : : ; qM such that X
m
qm = q and 8m : (qm; Q) 2 I^(ym)g:
(2.11)
Clearly, because I^m(ymt )  Im(ymt ) we also have that I^(yt)  I(yt).
Using the empirical approximations I^m(ymt ) and I^(yt), we can deĕne the empirical
counterparts of TEdt and TEct as, respectively,
dTEdt = minfj8m : (qmt ; Qt) 2 I^m(ymt )g; (2.12)
and dTEct = minf j (qt; Qt) 2 bI(yt)g; (2.13)
which have a readily analogous interpretation as the theoretical measures. Interestingly, the
empirical measures dTEdt and dTEct can be computed by solving simple linear programming
problems, which we discuss in more detail below.
Before doing so, we point out two properties of the measures that are relevant for our
following exposition. Firstly, because I^m(ymt )  Im(ymt ) and I^(yt)  I(yt), we naturally
obtain
TEdt  dTEdt and TEct  dTEct ; (2.14)
i.e. the empirical eﬃciency measures deĕne natural upper bounds for the theoretical mea-
sures. Secondly, just as in the theoretical case, the centralized eﬃciency measure dTEct never
exceeds the decentralized measure dTEdt .
Proposition 2.2. We have that dTEc  dTEd.
Analogous to before, the result in Proposition 2.2 motivates the empirical measure for
coordination eﬃciency
[CoEt =
dTEctdTEdt ; (2.15)
which has a similar meaning as the theoretical measureCoEt. Again, a low coordination ef-
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ĕciency reveals that eﬃciency gains are possible by reallocating the inputs in amore optimal
way.
2.4.2 Linear programming formulation
We conclude this section by discussing the linear programming formulation of dTEdt anddTEct . By using (2.9) and (2.11), it is straightforward to verify that
(LP-1) dTEdt = min
t0;ms 0
t
s:t:
(D-1) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms Qs  tQt
(D-2) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  tqmt
(D-3) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms = 1;
(LP-2) dTEct = min
t0;ms 0;qm0
t
s:t:
(D-0)
X
m
qm = tqt
(D-1) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms Qs  tQt
(D-2)’ 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  qm
(D-3) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms = 1:
Both (LP-1) and (LP-2) compute eﬃciency measures that quantify the maximum pos-
sible input reduction (captured by t) for DMU t, when t is compared to its dominating
DMUs.13 Before solving the linear programs, we need to identify the setDmt of dominating
13Note that in these LPswe donot use convex combinations of the outputs to deĕne possible comparison partners
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DMUs for each division. To be concrete, for each division m, we need to ĕnd the DMUs
for which yms  ymt . Subsequently, the linear program compares for each division m, the
inputs for DMU t to convex combinations of the corresponding inputs for the dominating
DMUs. In particular, for each divisionm a reference vector is constructed on the basis of a
convex combination of all DMUs s that produce at least the output ymt . Each variable ms
then represents the weight of every DMU s in this convex combination. ese variables are
also called “intensity parameters” in the DEA literature.
e essential diﬀerence between (LP-1) and (LP-2) pertains to the variables qm that
appear in (LP-2). Speciĕcally, in (LP-2) the input quantities qm can be chosen freely (except
from the non-negativity requirement and the adding-up constraint (D-0), i.e.
P
m qm =
tqt), whereas in (LP-1) the division-speciĕc inputs are ĕxed at their observed level qmt .
is additional freedom to choose the quantities qm in (LP-2) also directly explains the
inequality dTEc  dTEd in Proposition 2.2.
Interestingly, the linear programming problem (LP-2) not only deĕnes an empirical
measure of centralized eﬃciency. It also returns reference values for the division-speciĕc
inputs (i.e. the solution values for qm) that correspond to an optimal input allocation. is
is especially attractive from a practical point of view. For DMUs that have a low coordina-
tion eﬃciency, it provides speciĕc guidelines on how to improve the input allocation over
output divisions.
One ĕnal note pertains to the possibility that input reallocations may be restricted in
practice. For example, it may well be that some inputs are simply not adjustable and/or
that changing the input mix is very expensive. Conveniently, it is fairly easy to adapt our
framework to take such considerations into account. In particular, as long as the associated
restrictions can be formulated in linear form, they can simply be added to (LP-2) without
interfering with the linear nature of the resulting programming problem. For compactness,
and becausewe believe this type of extension is relatively straightforward, wewill not further
elaborate on this.
for the given DMU. at is, we only consider DMUs that eﬀectively produce more output. is follows from the
fact that in Axiom 3 we do not assume convexity in both inputs and outputs simultaneously. As discussed in
depth in Cherchye and Post (2003), this assumption is oen problematic in practical applications. However, it is
fairly straightforward to change Axiom 3, and correspondingly the linear programs (LP-1) and (LP-2), to allow for
convexity in both inputs and outputs.
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2.5 Dual representations
An interesting feature of ourmeasures of centralized and decentralized eﬃciency is that they
can be given a dual representation as measures of cost eﬃciency, evaluated at shadow input
prices. e diﬀerence between the two measures relates to the input prices that are used
for evaluating the division-speciĕc inputs. As we will explain, this diﬀerence can be given
a precise interpretation in terms of centralized versus decentralized decision making (i.e.
with versus without input reallocations across output divisions).
2.5.1 Decentralized eﬃciency
We ĕrst consider our measure of decentralized eﬃciency. e dual version of the linear
program (LP-1) can be written as14
(LP-3) dTEdt = max
cmt 0;Pmt 2RNjoin+ ;
Pt2RNjoin+ ;pmt 2RNspec+
MX
m=1
cmt
s:t:
(C-1)
MX
m=1
Pmt = Pt
(C-2) 8m : cmt  (pmt )0 qms + (Pmt )0Qs 8s 2 Dmt
(C-3)
MX
m=1
(pmt )
0 qmt + P0tQt = 1:
To explain the cost eﬃciency interpretation of this dual program, we need to interpret
the vectors Pmt , Pt and pmt as shadow price vectors. For every division m, pmt and Pmt
contain the shadow prices for the division-speciĕc and joint inputs, respectively. Similarly,
Pt contains the prices for the joint inputs at the level of the aggregate DMU.
For the joint inputs, the division-speciĕc prices Pmt are related to the DMU-level prices
Pt by the adding-up restriction (C-1). is adding-up restriction implies that the shadow
prices Pmt actually represent the fractions of DMU t’s aggregate prices Pt that are borne
14Appendix 2.A gives speciĕc details on how we obtain the dual problems (LP-3) and (LP-4).
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by each divisionm. In a sense, they represent the “willingness-to-pay” (reĘecting marginal
productivities) of the diﬀerent divisions for the jointly (or “publicly”) consumed inputs. is
parallels the interpretation of so-called Lindahl prices that correspond to the eﬃcient pro-
vision of public goods.
Next, the constraint (C-3) deĕnes a cost normalization for the evaluated DMU t. It
speciĕes that the shadow prices must be such that the aggregate cost of DMU t equals unity.
Given all this,
PM
m=1 c
m
t can be interpreted as theminimum cost for producing the out-
put of DMU t. Each variable cmt then represents theminimum cost for producing the output
of DMU t’s division m, while accounting for the interrelation with the output production
of the other divisions (through joint inputs). In particular, restriction (C-2) imposes that
cmt cannot exceed the cost level associated with any other DMU s that produces at least the
output ymt (i.e. s 2 Dmt ).
In this respect, we also note that, by construction, t 2 Dmt for any m. erefore, the
normalization constraint (C-3) guarantees that
MX
m=1
cmt  1(=
MX
m=1
(pmt )
0 qmt + P0tQt)); (2.16)
which implies that the sum of division-speciĕc minimal costs
PM
m=1 c
m
t is situated between
0 (because of the non-negativity constraints) and 1. Conveniently, because DMU t’s aggre-
gate cost level is normalized at unity, this alsomakes that the sum
PM
m=1 c
m
t in the objective
of problem (LP-3) can be interpreted as the ratio of minimal cost (for the aggregate output
yt) over DMU t’s actual cost. Putting it diﬀerently, the objective function value of (LP-3)
expresses DMU t’s cost eﬃciency in relative terms.
e max operator in the objective guarantees that the shadow prices pmt , Pmt and Pt
are chosen such that this measure of cost eﬃciency is maximized. In a sense, this actually
gives the “beneĕt-of-the-doubt” to the evaluated DMU.Most favorable prices are chosen, so
putting DMU t in the best possible light.
One important ĕnal note is in order. In program (LP-3) the prices pmt for the division-
speciĕc inputs may vary depending on the division m at hand. Intuitively, the fact that
diﬀerent divisions can use diﬀerent (shadow) prices for these inputs reĘects that these in-
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puts are not directly substitutable across divisions. is eﬀectively relates to the very essence
of our notion of decentralized eﬃciency, which assumes that input reallocations across di-
visions are impossible. It will also imply a crucial diﬀerence with the dual representation of
our centralized eﬃciency measure.
2.5.2 Centralized eﬃciency
We next turn to our centralized eﬃciency measure. e dual of program (LP-2) is given as
(LP-4) dTEct = max
cmt 0;Pmt 2RNjoin+ ;
Pt2RNjoin+ ;pt2RNspec+
MX
m=1
cmt
s:t:
(C-1)
MX
m=1
Pmt = Pt
(C-2) 8m : cmt  p0tqms + (Pmt )0Qs 8s 2 Dmt
(C-3)
MX
m=1
p0tqmt + P0tQt = 1:
is linear programming problem has basically the same structure as problem (LP-3).
erefore, it also has a directly similar cost eﬃciency interpretation. However, there is a
subtle but important diﬀerence, which pertains to the shadow prices for the division-speciĕc
inputs. In the new problem (LP-4), these prices are the same for all divisions m (i.e. pmt
= pt for all m). e intuition directly relates to our concept of centralized eﬃciency: in
contrast to the decentralized eﬃciency setting, we now assume that input reallocations over
divisions are possible, which means that division-speciĕc inputs are perfectly substitutable
across divisions (and, thus, we use common division-speciĕc shadow prices).
A last remark relates to the possibility to impose restrictions on input substitutability
across divisions. As discussed at the end of Section 2.4, restrictions on input reallocations
could be implemented as linear constraints added to the primal problem (LP-2). In a similar
vein, we could also include additional restrictions to the dual problem (LP-4). It follows
from our above discussion that particular constraints on the (non)substitutability of inputs
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can here be implemented in the form of shadow price restrictions. For example, one may
want to impose that some division-speciĕc inputs are perfectly substitutable across divisions
(resulting in common shadow prices for all divisions) while other inputs are not (implying
division-speciĕc shadow prices).
2.6 Application: US university education and research
We illustrate the practical usefulness of our methodology through an empirical application
that evaluates the eﬃciency of US universities. In particular, we are interested in the alloca-
tion of the university budget across education and research divisions. Wemeasure inputs as
expenditures, which we subdivide into division-speciĕc and joint expenses. In this applica-
tion, division-speciĕc inputs are university expenses that are clearly directed towards either
education or research. Next, joint inputs contain expenditures related to “public” services
like libraries, museums, media, technology and administration. In what follows, we will
ĕrst motivate our input and output data in more detail, and subsequently present our main
eﬃciency results.
2.6.1 Input and output data
When it comes to evaluating university eﬃciency, the deĕnition of the relevant input and
output dimensions is all but straightforward. ere is a lack of consensus in the literature on
the most appropriate selection of inputs and outputs.15 To focus our discussion, and given
that our objective here is mainly to illustrate the practical application of our methodology,
we opt for a fairly basic speciĕcation of a university’s production process.
We are interested in the joint production of education and research conducted by univer-
sities, and we will particularly concentrate on the allocation of the university budget across
15In particular, there is a lack of consensus in the literature whether research funding should be modeled as an
input or as an output of the universities. DeWitte and López-Torres (2015) provide an extensive overview of studies
that model research funding either as an input or as an output. e diﬃculty to categorize research funding either
as an input or an output might be the result of an endogeneity problem. In particular, the ability of the universities
to attract research funding depends on the quality of the research output they produce. Mayston (2015) argues
that a research grant should therefore be seen as an endogenous resource input. We refer to Mayston (2015) and
references therein for a discussion and suggestions to handle endogeneity within a DEA framework. To keep the
exposition simple, we chose to model research income as an input in the university production process, however,
one should keep the endogeneity of research income in mind when interpreting the results.
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the education and research divisions. In this respect, our study here is close in spirit to
Beasley (1995), who analyzed the teaching and research eﬃciency of chemistry and physics
departments in the UK. is author also takes into account that some resources are shared
between the diﬀerent activities. However, an important diﬀerence is that Beasley (1995)
considered the shared input as a division-speciĕc input of which the allocation over research
and teaching is unknown. By contrast, our speciĕc methodology allows us to treat shared
inputs as joint inputs that simultaneously beneĕt the production of both teaching and re-
search. We must note that we therefore assume in this chapter that economies of scope
between teaching and research are present. In principle, this assumption can also be tested,
see for example De Witte et al. (2013), who investigate economies of scope in research and
teaching. e authors ĕnd a (limited) presence of economies of scope. Moreover, De Witte
et al. (2013) provide an interesting literature overview on the debate of the precise relation-
ship between teaching and research.
We use data on 130 US universities in 2012. Our sample contains both (87) public and
(43) private non-proĕt institutions. We retrieved the main part of our data from the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics (NCES). e NCES collects and analyzes detailed in-
formation on education in the United States. In order to obtain a sample that is suﬃciently
comparable (i.e. homogeneous), we (only) selected universities that are classiĕed as research
universities, with high or very high research activity (according to the Carnegie classiĕca-
tion). Moreover, our selected universities all appeared in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking
in the year 2012.16
Output selection. We consider two outputs for the education division and two outputs
for the research division of each university. e two education outputs are undergraduate
and graduate enrollments, expressed in full time equivalents. e advantage of considering
enrollments (and not degrees granted) is that this measure also takes into account students
who have not yet completed their studies but did receive education from the university. Our
enrollment data come from the NCES and pertain to the academic year 2011-2012.
e two research outputs are number of doctor’s degrees and a measure of publication
16e Shanghai ranking is a widely used world ranking of universities that simultaneously accounts for several
indicators of research performance. See www.shanghairanking.com for more details.
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output. Again, number of doctor’s degrees is taken from the NCES and relates to the year
2012. Next, our measure of publication output is constructed such that it not only accounts
for the quantity but also the quality of scientiĕc publications, where quality is measured in
terms of researchers’ citations. Speciĕcally, we quantify publication output as the mean of
3 scores that are also used for the Shanghai ranking: HiCi (i.e. highly cited researchers in
21 broad subject categories), N&S (i.e. papers published in Nature and Science) and PUB
(i.e. papers indexed in Science Citation Index-expanded and Social Science Citation Index).
Although the total Shanghai score is computed as a weighted sum of 6 individual criteria,
we have selected the three individual criteria which are directly related to publications. We
take the mean of those three criteria, to construct a proxy for publications. In this respect,
we follow the Shanghai ranking, which also gives equal weight to these three criteria to com-
pute the total Shanghai score. ese three scores are standardized between 0 and 100. In
particular, the highest scoring institution is assigned a score of 100, and the scores of the
other institutions are calculated as a percentage of the top score.
We would like to make two further remarks with respect to our measures of research
output. First, in our analysis we start from the standardized Shanghai scores, to construct a
proxy for publication output. However, if one would have access to the raw data, one could
construct a composite indicator, see Nardo et al. (2008) for a handbook on constructing
composite indicators. In principle, when construction a composite indicator, one needs to
go through a number of steps, which involve modeling choices to be made in each step. In
this respect, an interesting reference is Cherchye et al (2008), who discuss creating composite
indicators with DEA and robustness analysis with respect to these modeling choices.
Second, we have opted for a fairly basis speciĕcation of the research output. How-
ever, there exist many alternative options to quantify research performance. For exam-
ple, Vinkler (1998), Vinkler (2006), Ruiz et al. (2010) and Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) have de-
veloped multidimensional indicators for evaluating the research performances of research
institutes. Alternatively, De Witte and Rogge (2010) propose a methodology to aggregate
multi-dimensional research output, to evaluate individual researcher performances.
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Input selection. We use university expenses as inputs. e public universities report ex-
penses according to GASB (Governmental Accounting Standards Board), while the private
universities report according to FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board).17 Wedistin-
guish between expenses that can be allocated directly to the research and eduction divisions
and expenses that have a joint (or “public”) nature.18
Our division-speciĕc inputs can be retrieved directly from the NCES data. Speciĕcally,
we use as education input all expenses that relate to activities that formpart of the instruction
program. Similarly, our research input contains all expenses related to activities speciĕcally
organized to produce research outcomes. As well the instruction expenses as the research
expenses consist for a substantial amount of salaries and wages. At this point it is worth to
note that many faculty members combine instruction and research. To allocate the salaries
and wages of those faculty members, one would ideally have data on the percentage of time
each faculty member devotes to instruction and to research. Since such detailed informa-
tion is not available, a second best option is to distinguish between instructional faculty and
research faculty on the basis of their primary function. Speciĕcally, the NCES asks the uni-
versities to classify instructional faculty as those members of the instruction/research staﬀ
whose major regular assignment is instruction, including those with released time for re-
search. Instructional faculty also include faculty for whom it is not possible to diﬀerentiate
between teaching, research and public service, because each of these functions is an inte-
gral component of his/her regular assignment. Research faculty are those members of the
instruction/research staﬀ whose primary function is research. e universities report the
instructional and research expenses based on this criterion. Note that we need to keep this
in mind when interpreting the coordination eﬃciency results.
Finally, we note that for these division-speciĕc inputs we work with expenses (so wages
times staﬀ), which avoids the discussion of the quality of staﬀ in the following sense. Uni-
17Our analysis implicitly assumes that GASB and FASB are comparable accounting standards. In this respect,
we also conducted several robustness checks to ensure that our conclusions with respect to public and private
universities cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in these accounting standards. In particular, we computed eﬃciency
results with numbers of staﬀ (instead of expenses) as inputs. Interestingly, these alternative exercises yielded the
same qualitative conclusions.
18In principle, alternative scenarios are possible. We could consider particular expenses as joint instead of
division-speciĕc and vice versa. Given the illustrative nature of the application we have chosen not to do so for
compactness.
2.6. APPLICATION: US UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 61
versities with better qualiĕed faculty will in general oﬀer higher salaries and wages, which
in turn leads to more expenses. As such our eﬃciency analysis will take this quality diﬀer-
ence (implicitly) into account. See, e.g., Camanho and Dyson (2005, 2008), Fukuyama and
Weber (2008) and Sahoo et al. (2014) for recent discussion on the relevance of taking the
quality of the inputs into account in a DEA analysis.
Next, our joint input contains expenses on institutional and academic support, which
are vital to the proper “overall” functioning of a university (including both education and
research). Institutional support includes, for example, the management, personnel admin-
istration and logistic activities. Academic support contains academic administration, li-
braries, museums and computer services.
We remark that our following analysis will not consider expenses on public services (e.g.
community service programs, radio, television and consulting) or student services (e.g. stu-
dent activities, newspapers, health services and athletics). Our motivation is that we believe
these expenses are not directly related to the education and research outputs that we se-
lected. However, it should be clear that these data could easily be included in the analysis if
deemed appropriate. Our choice not to use this information is purely an empirical one and
does by no means indicate a limitation of our methodology.
Data. Appendix 2.C contains our input and output data for each individual university.
Appendix 2.C also reports the number of universities in the dominating sets, for both in-
struction and research. Table 2.1 reports some summary statistics. Expenses are reported in
millions of dollars. We ĕnd substantial variation across our sample of universities for each
of the variables that we selected. See, for example, the high standard deviations and the large
diﬀerences between minimum and maximum values.
e last two columns of Table 2.1 report the mean values for the public and private uni-
versities. A main diﬀerence between these two categories of universities relates to the num-
ber of undergraduate enrollments. On average, public universities have 22551 undergrad-
uate enrollments, which is more than twice the average of 9177 enrollments for the private
universities. In this respect, a remarkable observation is that average expenses on instruction
for the public universities are nearly one third below those for their private counterparts.
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Variables Full sample Public Private
Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Mean
Instruction and research expenses 766 560 142 2774 690 921
! Instruction 458 343 88 1947 399 579
! Research 308 259 4 1291 291 342
Academic and institutional exp. 242 186 50 1434 205 318
Undergraduate enrollment 18127 10065 968 55016 22551 9177
Graduate enrollment 5318 3189 757 16373 5271 5413
Doctor’s degree 329 213 35 892 350 284
Publication 30 16 11 100 28 35
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of 130 US universities, including 87 public
and 43 private universities. Expenses are reported in millions of dollars.
On the basis of these ĕgures, public universities seem to be more eﬃcient than private
universities in the provision of (undergraduate) education. However, an important remark
is that student enrollments only measure the quantity but not the quality of this education
output. For example, it may well be that private universities specialize in “excellent” edu-
cation, while public universities rather focus on “standard” education. Unfortunately, we
could not ĕnd data on the educational quality for our sample of universities, and so we are
bound to ignore such quality considerations in our following eﬃciency analysis. While we
will not repeat it explicitly, this qualiĕcation must be kept in mind when interpreting our
eﬃciency results.
2.6.2 Eﬃciency results
We will ĕrst report summary statistics for our measures of decentralized, centralized and
coordination eﬃciency, deĕned over our sample of 130 universities. Subsequently, we will
consider eﬃciency diﬀerences between public and private universities. In a ĕnal step, we
will take a closer look at the allocation of university budgets across education and research.
In particular, starting from the observation that our sample is characterized by substan-
tial coordination ineﬃciency, we use the results of our linear programs to identify possible
strategies that can lead universities towards a more optimal input allocation.
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Full sample results. Table 2.2 provides summary results for our diﬀerent eﬃciency mea-
sures. Detailed information on the eﬃciency results of each university can be found in Ap-
pendix 2.C.
If we ĕrst consider centralized eﬃciency for the full sample of universities, we ĕnd
that about 40% of the universities is labeled as eﬃcient. e average centralized eﬃciency
amounts to 0:86, which suggests that the average university can reduce its expenses by 14%
for the given levels of education and research outputs.
As indicated above, centralized eﬃciency can be decomposed into decentralized eﬃ-
ciency and coordination eﬃciency. We ĕnd that the average decentralized eﬃciency equals
0.92. is indicates that the possible input reduction amounts to only 8% if input realloca-
tions over research and education are impossible.
e diﬀerence between centralized and decentralized eﬃciency is captured by our mea-
sure of coordination eﬃciency. e average coordination eﬃciency turns out to be 0:93,
which reveals that optimal input reallocations can yield an additional eﬃciency gain of 7%.
Interestingly, because the median coordination eﬃciency value is 0:98 (i.e. below unity), we
conclude that such input reallocations can be beneĕcial to more than half of the universities
in our sample. 19
Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
Centralized Eﬀ. 0.40 0.76 0.86 0.92 1.00 1.00
! public 0.45 0.80 0.89 0.97 1.00 1.00
! private 0.40 0.66 0.80 0.85 0.99 1.00
Decentralized Eﬀ. 0.50 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
! public 0.57 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
! private 0.50 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coordination Eﬀ. 0.62 0.90 0.93 0.98 1.00 1.00
! public 0.64 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
! private 0.62 0.84 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for our eﬃciency results
19As a robustness exercise, we have added the expenses on student services to the instruction expenses. e
average expenses on student services amount to 69 million dollar per year. Although this is a substantial category
of expenses for the universities, this category is relatively small compared to the instruction expenses, which is
on average 458 million dollar. Including the expenses on student service has little impact on the decentralized,
centralized and coordination eﬃciency scores. Remarkably, the average eﬃciency scores remain the same. Still,
the eﬃciency scores of the individual universities might vary a little bit.
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Public versus private universities. When distinguishing between the public and private
universities, we observe that the public universities operate on average more eﬃcient than
their private counterparts. is diﬀerence is more pronounced for our measures of decen-
tralized and centralized eﬃciency than for our measure of coordination eﬃciency. is sug-
gests that the better performance of public universities is not so much the result of a better
input allocation per se (i.e. coordination eﬃciency), but rather follows from amore eﬃcient
input use for the given allocation of expenses over education and research (i.e. decentralized
eﬃciency).
We also conducted Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to evaluate the statistical signiĕcance of
these observed eﬃciency diﬀerences. We ĕnd that the diﬀerence is signiĕcant for the cen-
tralized eﬃciency measure (the null hypothesis that both subsamples achieve the same eﬃ-
ciency level has a p-value of only 0.004) and the decentralized eﬃciency measure (p-value
of 0.024). By contrast, there is no signiĕcant diﬀerence in terms of coordination eﬃciency
(p-value of 0.109).
Generally, we may conclude that we ĕnd a rather substantial diﬀerence in centralized
eﬃciency between private and public universities, and decentralized eﬃciency seems to be
a more important explanation of this diﬀerence than coordination eﬃciency. Our outcome
that public universities perform better than private universities falls in line with the results
in Chapter 1, where we performed a similar analysis without imposing additional structure
on the production of education and research. Moreover, our outcome conforms with earlier
ĕndings of Ahn et al. (1988), who compared the relative eﬃciencies of public and private
doctoral-granting universities in the US. ese authors equally concluded that public uni-
versities prove to be more eﬃcient than private universities when managerial and program
ineﬃciencies are present in the data. However, it is worth to note there is no consensus in
the literature about the impact of public or private ownership on the eﬃciency of schools
in general (De Witte and López-Torres (2015)). It is sometimes argued that the level of
student performance would be higher in private institutions. However, studies taking into
account student performance ĕnd mixed results. For example, Duncombe et al. (1997) ĕnd
that eﬃciency of school districts is negatively associated with the relative number of pri-
vate school students. Similarly, Agasisti (2013) ĕnd that private schools perform worse than
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public ones. On the other hand, Cherchye et al. (2010a) and Ferrera et al. (2011) ĕnd that
the type of ownership does not seem to account for diﬀerences in student performance.
Reallocation strategies. Our above analysis indicates that only 49 of the 130 universities
achieve a centralized eﬃciency score of one. e remaining 81 universities have a score
below one, which means that eﬃciency improvements are possible. When zooming in on
these 81 universities, we ĕnd that 73 of them exhibit coordination ineﬃciency. For these
universities, reallocating the division-speciĕc inputs over the education and research divi-
sions eﬀectively leads to eﬃciency gains.
In this respect, we recall that a centralized eﬃciency score of  indicates that all expenses
(i.e. joint expenses as well as division-speciĕc expenses) can be reduced by a fraction (1 ).
However, and importantly, these savings need not be equally distributed across the educa-
tion and research divisions. It is even possible that one of the divisions receives additional
(division-speciĕc) budget as a consequence of the reallocation, at the expense of the other
division.
As explained above (when discussing (LP-2)), our linear programs not only deĕne an
empirical measure of centralized eﬃciency, but also provide speciĕc guidelines on how to
enhance the input allocation over output divisions. Speciĕcally, it returns reference values
for the division-speciĕc inputs that correspond to an optimal input allocation. Interestingly,
this information enables us to conclude whether a division needs to reduce or increase the
current (division-speciĕc) input, in order to remedy the observed coordination ineﬃciency.
In Appendix 2.C, we report for each university the changes in the budget directed to-
wards education or research that are necessary to eliminate its coordination ineﬃciency.
Figure 2.1 provides a schematic summary of the diﬀerent strategies that can be followed,
hereby also indicating to how many universities each strategy applies. In the ĕrst scenario,
both divisions need to reduce their inputs, but not in equal proportion. In percentage terms,
one of the divisions needs to save considerably more than the other division. is scenario
holds for 38 universities. For 20 universities, the education division needs to reduce the
division-speciĕc input more than the research division. For the remaining 18 universities,
the opposite conclusion holds.
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Figure 2.1: Possible strategies to achieve an optimal allocation of the budget.
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In the second scenario, which holds for 35 universities, one of the divisions receives
additional division-speciĕc input. Of course, in such a case the required input reduction
for the other division is particularly substantial, since the input use at the aggregate DMU
level (summed over the two divisions) needs to go down. For this scenario, we ĕnd that the
research division should receive extra budget (at the expense of the education division) in
26 of the 35 universities, while the opposite conclusion applies to the other 9 universities.
2.6.3 Shadow prices
Finally, we come back to the dual interpretation of the centralized and decentralized eﬃ-
ciency measures. As mentioned before, the dual interpretation in terms of cost eﬃciency
assigns a (division-speciĕc) shadow price to the inputs. In the application on university
education and research, we have expenses ĕguring as inputs. We denote the instruction ex-
penses with qI , the research expenses with qR and the academic and institutional expenses
withQ. ese categories of expenses have division-speciĕc shadow prices, with I indicating
the instruction division andR indicating the research division. In particular, the instruction
and research expenses, which ĕgure as division-speciĕc inputs, have shadow prices pI and
pR and the academic and institutional expenses, which ĕgure as joint input, have shadow
price P = P I + PR. Note that in the centralized model, the shadow prices pI and pR of
the instruction and research expenses are assumed to be equal.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the values of the shadow prices, computed for the decentral-
ized and centralized model. e reported shadow prices correspond to expenses which are
expressed in billions of dollars.20 We refer to table 2.8 in Appendix 2.C for the shadow prices
and corresponding weights for every university.
Furthermore, we also report wI and wR, the share of the total budget that is allocated
to the instruction division and the research division, when computing the cost eﬃciency of
the universities. Speciĕcally, we deĕne
wI =
pIqI + P IQ
pIqI + pRqR + PQ
;
20Note that the magnitude of the shadow prices depends on the scaling of the expenditure categories. However,
the relative shadow prices are independent of the scale and indicate the relative weight of one expenditure category
over the other, when cost eﬃciency is computed.
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Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
pI 0 0 2,08 0 3,68 16,67
Shadow pR 0 0 4,28 0 4,42 52,03
Prices P I 0 0 2,12 0 0 33,51
PR 0 0 3,62 0 3,49 38,95
Budget wI 0 0 0,41 0 1 1
Shares wR 0 0 0,59 1 1 1
Table 2.3: Summary shadow prices and budget shares for decentralized model
Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
Shadow p 0 0 1,56 0,63 2,46 11,11
Prices P I 0 0 3,56 0 4,08 38,34
PR 0 0 4,80 1,38 6,03 38,95
Budget wI 0 0 0,49 0,53 0,80 1,00
shares wR 0 0,2 0,51 0,47 1,00 1,00
Table 2.4: Summary shadow prices and budget shares for centralized model
wR =
pRqR + PRQ
pIqI + pRqR + PQ
:
We ĕnd that for the decentralized model, the share of expenditures allocated to the in-
struction output is always either 0 or 1 and vice versa for the share allocated to the research
output. is is the result of many shadow prices having a value equal to zero. e fact that
the beneĕt of the doubt measurement assigns all weight to only one of the two objectives of
the universities might be a very unrealistic scenario. For the centralized model, there are
more universities that have shadow prices diﬀerent form zero and the share of the total bud-
get that is allocated to the instruction and research division, is more balanced. Still, there
are many shadow prices estimated to be zero.
Shadow price restrictions It is a well-recognized problem that many DEA applications
obtain unrealistic shadow prices. We refer to Cook and Seiford (2009) for a nice overview
of the literature that addresses the problem of unacceptable shadow prices. ese method-
ologies usually impose shadow price restrictions, either in a direct or an indirect way. Such
shadow price restrictions may rule out extreme cases where the relative price of the inputs
approaches zero or inĕnity.
We will impose shadow price restrictions to make sure that the ‘beneĕt of the doubt’
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budget share of each expenditure category (computed with the shadow prices), does not
deviate too much from the real budget share. In particular, we impose that the beneĕt of the
doubt budget share of qI ; qR and Q has to be maximum twice as large and minimum half
as large as the real budget share:
1
2
qI
qI + qR +Q
 p
IqI
pIqI + pRqR + PQ
 2 q
I
qI + qR +Q
1
2
qR
qI + qR +Q
 p
RqR
pIqI + pRqR + PQ
 2 q
R
qI + qR +Q
1
2
Q
qI + qR +Q
 PQ
pIqI + pRqR + PQ
 2 Q
qI + qR +Q
:
Note that we do not impose any restrictions on the division-speciĕc price of the joint
expenses. In particular, it remains possible that the joint expenditures are fully borne by
one of the two divisions.
Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
TEd 0,41 0,74 0,84 0,88 0,97 1,00
pI 0,30 1,01 2,74 2,09 3,64 14,76
Shadow pR 0,30 1,32 3,09 2,13 3,96 12,59
Prices P I 0 0 1,34 0,35 1,94 9,09
PR 0 0,18 2,41 1,20 3,41 16,92
Budget wI 0,13 0,28 0,50 0,47 0,73 0,99
Shares wR 0,01 0,27 0,50 0,53 0,72 0,87
Table 2.5: Summary shadow prices and budget shares for decentralized model, with price
restrictions.
Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
TEc 0,35 0,70 0,80 0,84 0,95 1
Shadow p 0,30 1,21 2,40 2,23 3,27 8,62
Prices P I 0 0 2,06 0,69 2,86 16,70
PR 0 0,20 2,64 1,70 3,60 14,69
Budget wI 0,16 0,33 0,53 0,49 0,72 0,91
shares wR 0,09 0,28 0,47 0,51 0,67 0,84
Table 2.6: Summary shadow prices and budget shares for centralized model, with price re-
strictions.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the values of the shadow prices and budget shares, computed
70 2.7. CONCLUSION
for the decentralized and centralized model, taking into account the previously mentioned
shadowprice restrictions. Due to these price restrictions, there are no zero shadowprices for
the division-speciĕc inputs. e division-speciĕc shadow price of the joint inputs might still
be zero. is indicates that the willingness to pay for the public inputs may be zero. e ĕrst
line of the tables also reports summary statistics of the eﬃciency scores, taking into account
the shadow price restrictions. e decentralized eﬃciency score is now on average equal to
0:84, in contrast to an average score of 0:92 in a setting without price restrictions. Similarly,
the centralized eﬃciency score is now on average equal to 0:80, compared to 0:86 without
price restrictions. e diﬀerence between the decentralized and centralized eﬃciency scores
has become smaller, with the assumption of price restrictions. We refer again to Appendix
2.C for the results for all the universities. On average, the coordination eﬃciency is now
equal to 0.96, which is slightly higher than in the setting without price restrictions.
2.7 Conclusion
We have extended the DEA-based methodology of Cherchye et al. (2013) for multi-output
eﬃciency measurement. Our extension exploits the speciĕc feature of this methodology,
which includes information on joint and division-speciĕc inputs in the eﬃciency evaluation.
In particular, we use this input information to develop a method that investigates whether
input reallocations across output divisions can yield speciĕc eﬃciency gains. We propose
a measure of coordination eﬃciency to quantify these gains. Interestingly, for DMUs with
low coordination eﬃciency our method also provides concrete guidelines to achieve a more
optimal input allocation. At this point it is worth to note that the proposed methodology
is demanding in terms of data availability. If good data on the allocation of inputs to out-
puts is available, the methodology leads to a rich and powerful analysis. However, in many
settings, such detailed data is still not collected. In terms of future research, more attention
to the collection of detailed data would greatly advance the potential to apply multi-output
eﬃciency measurement. An interesting way to collect data on the internal production pro-
cesses is through activity based costing (ABC) systems (Cooper andKaplan (1988)). InABC
costing systems, the costs (or inputs) are ĕrst allocated to activities and, subsequently, these
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activity costs are allocated to the products (or outputs).
We have used our methodology to evaluate the productive eﬃciency of education and
research conducted at US universities. We believe our methodology is particularly well-
suited to analyze the joint production of education and research, as it can account for both
joint inputs and inputs speciĕcally allocated to education or research. Although our appli-
cation was mainly intended to serve illustrative purposes, it did clearly reveal the potential
of our new method. For example, our empirical results suggest that the universities under
study can considerably enhance their productive eﬃciency by adopting a more optimal in-
put allocation (over education and research outputs). In particular, we found thatmore than
half of the universities suﬀer from coordination ineﬃciency. Note that better data with re-
spect to the allocation of expenses to education and research would increase the reliability
of the coordination eﬃciency scores. However, our estimates on coordination eﬃciency are
consistent with how the universities themselves report their expenses.
2.A Dual formulations
In this section, we clarify the link between the primal anddual formulation of the LP-models.
In the decentralized setting, the linear programming problem (LP-3) is dual to problem (LP-
1). Similarly, in the centralized setting, problem (LP-4) is dual to problem (LP-2).
We start by considering the decentralized setting. e constraint (D-1) in (LP-1), which
constructs for every division m a reference vector for the joint inputs, corresponds to the
shadow price vector Pmt in the dual cost eﬃciency problem. Similarly, the constraint (D-2),
which constructs a benchmark vector for the division-speciĕc inputs, corresponds to the
shadow price vector pmt . Further, the constraint (D-3) corresponds to the (minimal) costs
variable cmt for every divisionm.
Next, we focus on the centralized setting. e only diﬀerence between (LP-3) and (LP-4)
is that (LP-4) uses the common price vector pt for the division-speciĕc inputs. To see that
(LP-4) is dual to the linear programming problem (LP-2), we ĕrst write the problem (LP-2)
in a slightly diﬀerent form. For this, we use lemma 2.1:
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Lemma 2.1. e statement
9 q1; : : : ; qM such that
X
m
qm = tqt and 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  qm (2.17)
is equivalent to the statement
X
m
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  tqt: (2.18)
As a consequence, the linear programming problem (LP-2) is equivalent to the following
problem (LP-2b):
(LP-2b) dTEct = min
t0;ms 0
t
s:t:
(D-1) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms Qs  tQt
(D-2)”
X
m
X
s2Dmt
ms qms  tqt
(D-3) 8m :
X
s2Dmt
ms = 1
Note that this linear programming problem (LP-2b) is very similar to (LP-1). e only
diﬀerence is that le hand side of constraint (D-2)” contains a sum over all divisions m
(whereas the constraint (D-2) speciĕes a separate constraint for every individual m). e
constraint (D-2)” corresponds to the shadow price vector pt in the dual problem. We con-
clude that problem (LP-4) is dual to problem (LP-2b) and, thus, also to the equivalent prob-
lem (LP-2).
2.B Proofs
Proposition 2.1. For qt =
P
m qmt we have
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f j 8m : (qmt ; Qt) 2 Im(ymt )g 
8<:  9 q1; : : : ; qM such that
P
m qm = qt
and 8m : (qm; Qt) 2 Im(ymt )
9=;
= f j (qt; Qt) 2 I(yt)g
Consequently,
minf j (qt; Qt) 2 I(yt)g  minf j 8m : (qmt ; Qt) 2 Im(ymt )g;
which obtains that TEc  TEd.
Proposition 2.2. We will prove that constraint (D-2) implies the constraints (D-0) and (D-
2)’. Suppose that (D-2) holds. Deĕne qm = tqmt . We have found values for q1; : : : ; qM
such that (D-0) and (D-2)’ hold. We conclude that the feasible region of (LP-1) is a subset
of the feasible region of (LP-2). Since (LP-1) and (LP-2) are both minimization problems,
the optimal objective function value for (LP-2) cannot exceed the optimal value for (LP-1).
We conclude that dTEc  dTEd.
Lemma 2.1. It is straightforward that (2.17) implies (2.18). Furthermore, suppose that (2.18)
holds. Deĕne
qm =
X
s2Dmt
ms qms ;
form = 1; : : : ;M   1, and
qM = tqt  
M 1X
m=1
qm:
en, by construction
P
m qmt = tqt and
P
s2Dmt 
m
s qms  qm, which implies that state-
ment (2.17) is satisĕed.
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Universities Inputs Outputs Dominating Eﬃciency Reallocation
Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research sets scores of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub jDij jDrj TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
Arizona State University 637 243 369 55016 10479 611 33,1 1 18 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Auburn University 264 131 121 19777 3137 247 14 50 71 0,92 0,78 0,85 0,71 0,93
Boston College 243 37 171 9525 3573 149 14,6 69 102 1,00 0,76 0,76 0,64 1,58
Boston University 838 194 264 20951 8692 507 35,9 11 22 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Brandeis University 133 47 51 3970 2644 82 15,3 108 108 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Brigham Young University-Provo 424 43 145 31364 2775 92 15,5 14 106 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,78 1,72
Brown University 254 124 180 6109 1864 232 34,5 109 44 1,00 0,76 0,76 0,46 1,38
California Institute of Technology 203 281 118 968 1286 172 56,1 124 12 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Carnegie Mellon University 337 221 199 5834 5048 284 27,5 57 49 0,75 0,62 0,83 0,46 0,86
Case Western Reserve University 270 395 113 4177 2469 186 26,6 110 60 0,82 0,82 1,00 0,72 0,89
Clemson University 211 144 76 16035 3297 220 16,5 65 79 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Colorado State University-Fort Collins 241 218 103 21891 4014 235 26,2 36 57 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Columbia University in the City of New York 1947 671 357 8163 14946 558 58,8 2 8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Cornell University 471 378 474 14887 5463 501 52,5 38 11 1,00 0,90 0,90 0,59 1,28
Dartmouth College 153 161 321 4237 1630 73 23,1 116 74 0,76 0,66 0,86 0,76 0,55
Drexel University 299 119 313 16433 5388 163 15,2 36 96 0,92 0,85 0,92 0,92 0,67
Duke University 901 899 464 8109 6159 450 50,4 35 14 0,74 0,62 0,83 0,31 0,93
Emory University 532 409 271 8495 5699 243 35,4 40 40 0,53 0,51 0,97 0,53 0,49
Florida State University 330 160 126 31800 6824 428 24,1 8 39 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
George Mason University 303 80 115 19594 6547 212 16 19 82 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
George Washington University 398 140 269 10206 8356 224 18,9 16 78 1,00 0,97 0,97 1,04 0,80
Georgetown University 416 172 288 7440 4911 116 17,1 58 98 0,50 0,41 0,82 0,37 0,50
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 282 658 137 14517 7076 483 29,8 22 28 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Harvard University 1064 769 1434 9515 13315 691 100 3 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Indiana University-Bloomington 530 113 205 32420 8514 468 29,1 5 31 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Indiana University-Purdue University-Ind. 399 180 229 18794 8311 35 15,9 14 111 1,00 0,91 0,91 1,31 0,02
Iowa State University 257 195 191 24128 3203 376 27,5 33 43 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Johns Hopkins University 1520 1254 438 6452 13979 479 53,9 3 11 0,92 0,85 0,93 1,14 0,50
Kansas State University 211 156 92 17593 2569 162 17,1 70 93 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Kent State University at Kent 180 23 106 20660 4709 142 15,2 37 101 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Lehigh University 130 34 87 5239 1227 101 14,1 115 111 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Louisiana State University 274 275 150 23195 4094 322 23,1 33 53 0,83 0,83 1,00 0,83 0,83
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 643 1291 618 4364 6398 573 66,4 36 4 0,58 0,58 1,00 0,58 0,58
Michigan State University 620 380 232 35003 5912 491 34,9 5 26 0,95 0,95 1,00 0,95 0,94
Montana State University 88 127 50 11314 1039 53 13,1 90 123 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
New York University 1202 644 417 24402 16373 417 46,3 1 17 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 386 267 162 24394 5993 446 27,3 20 35 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,78 1,26
Northeastern University 327 91 196 17934 6653 125 16,7 22 97 0,94 0,89 0,94 0,88 0,94
Northwestern University 631 426 476 9017 8331 378 48,2 18 17 0,97 0,86 0,90 0,63 1,21
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Universities Inputs Outputs Dominating Eﬃciency Reallocation
Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research sets scores of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub jDij jDrj TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
Ohio State University-Main Campus 922 490 402 45479 10545 756 41,8 1 7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Oregon State University 219 197 119 19003 3138 197 26,7 55 58 0,84 0,78 0,93 0,93 0,62
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 1170 766 618 41350 5612 629 45,5 4 9 0,82 0,52 0,64 0,24 0,96
Princeton University 381 273 312 5240 2839 351 50,4 98 16 1,00 0,94 0,94 0,41 1,69
Purdue University-Main Campus 620 268 231 31592 7276 649 35,1 8 14 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,85 1,23
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 142 117 83 5622 1165 136 17,7 115 92 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Rice University 251 89 90 3774 2614 190 25,3 110 62 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Rutgers University-New Brunswick 824 342 280 32676 6246 414 36 6 29 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,72 1,25
Saint Louis University-Main Campus 235 44 107 9175 2442 205 12,9 93 86 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,66 2,01
San Diego State University 190 4 92 23874 3294 48 18 34 95 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Southern Methodist University 153 22 142 6333 2759 67 10,7 100 122 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Stanford University 1200 1023 549 7485 6749 764 76,8 30 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Stony Brook University 426 123 225 16544 5515 263 25,9 35 55 0,92 0,72 0,78 0,65 0,94
SUNY at Albany 198 231 141 12475 2900 158 16,6 77 94 0,81 0,64 0,79 0,95 0,37
Syracuse University 312 73 197 16429 3776 150 15,9 58 98 1,00 0,67 0,67 0,58 1,08
Temple University 420 110 264 26598 3828 216 17,2 22 79 1,00 0,74 0,74 0,66 1,03
Texas A &M University-College Station 591 538 200 36801 7613 663 36,5 3 13 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Texas Tech University 202 137 125 23897 4232 254 14,9 31 69 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
e University of Montana 97 45 58 11645 1196 44 14,9 89 119 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
e University of Tennessee 554 289 252 19668 5289 461 24,7 31 33 0,70 0,64 0,91 0,51 0,89
e University of Texas at Austin 772 549 358 35361 9049 867 45,4 3 3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
e University of Texas at Dallas 155 86 82 10549 5487 181 17,1 40 88 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
e University of Texas at San Antonio 160 51 109 22898 3008 77 12,9 38 119 1,00 0,94 0,94 1,08 0,49
Tus University 212 137 288 4728 4442 143 24,5 72 70 0,73 0,70 0,95 0,73 0,65
Tulane University of Louisiana 258 157 104 8257 2642 120 17,8 93 93 0,84 0,84 1,00 0,83 0,85
University at Buﬀalo 390 146 244 20380 4730 305 20,5 37 55 0,80 0,74 0,91 0,69 0,86
University of Alabama at Birmingham 273 268 279 9915 4661 174 25 57 66 0,57 0,45 0,79 0,57 0,33
University of Alaska Fairbanks 104 145 69 5749 757 50 15,7 117 110 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Arizona 430 467 297 29451 5319 446 38,3 15 26 0,92 0,84 0,92 0,73 0,94
University of Arkansas 184 125 106 18154 2704 164 14,9 64 97 0,95 0,88 0,93 1,02 0,67
University of California-Berkeley 647 629 359 27737 9680 892 68,6 7 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-Davis 652 614 378 25315 4955 566 47,2 25 10 1,00 0,81 0,81 0,38 1,27
University of California-Irvine 507 317 261 23472 5013 413 37,6 29 28 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,68 1,40
University of California-Los Angeles 1451 833 670 27911 10929 725 60,5 4 3 0,76 0,54 0,71 0,41 0,76
University of California-Riverside 212 121 93 18182 2463 263 29,3 64 48 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-San Diego 631 829 459 24272 5306 523 59 27 8 0,78 0,78 1,00 0,78 0,78
University of California-Santa Barbara 235 203 108 19439 3392 346 38,4 49 30 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-Santa Cruz 144 132 87 16220 1607 172 31,4 76 49 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Central Florida 276 115 164 45446 5852 229 19,1 3 76 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
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Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research sets scores of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub jDij jDrj TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
University of Chicago 990 319 322 4988 7035 401 47,3 29 16 1,00 0,83 0,83 0,29 2,52
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 304 209 223 20875 7592 242 23,5 15 61 0,94 0,78 0,83 0,94 0,55
University of Colorado Boulder 378 321 145 25523 3423 344 41,2 25 29 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Colorado Denver 408 291 97 9746 5364 107 21,6 44 78 0,90 0,90 1,00 0,90 0,90
University of Connecticut 477 163 337 17998 4379 313 20,1 48 56 0,69 0,49 0,71 0,38 0,82
University of Delaware 346 135 141 18067 3510 228 22 54 66 0,88 0,74 0,84 0,68 0,89
University of Florida 708 609 288 32257 11226 696 39,3 2 11 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Georgia 286 352 173 25346 7599 453 29,7 12 31 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Hawaii at Manoa 295 350 92 13443 2811 196 29,5 78 51 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Houston 248 115 220 26555 5017 301 22,7 22 54 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,98
University of Illinois at Chicago 664 296 173 16024 7758 342 28,7 16 46 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 589 489 323 34331 12847 869 45,4 1 2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Iowa 389 338 235 22609 3471 437 32,6 36 32 0,96 0,89 0,94 0,52 1,32
University of Kansas 375 298 174 18874 4787 302 20,8 38 55 0,78 0,70 0,90 0,80 0,57
University of Kentucky 291 293 210 19363 3397 322 19,5 49 56 0,62 0,59 0,95 0,62 0,56
University of Louisville 272 161 135 13668 2847 185 13,3 77 92 0,68 0,66 0,96 0,70 0,58
University of Maryland-College Park 448 434 250 26510 6480 632 41,7 15 12 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Massachusetts Amherst 349 133 138 22330 4849 268 28,4 31 49 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,91 1,09
University of Miami 459 233 278 10556 2645 181 28,4 83 56 0,51 0,40 0,80 0,35 0,51
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 956 817 508 27287 13466 857 60,4 1 2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 668 739 609 30115 5621 734 49,9 13 5 0,85 0,64 0,76 0,41 0,85
University of Missouri-Columbia 319 161 137 24251 4532 367 20,1 30 48 0,98 0,98 1,00 0,99 0,97
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 206 197 118 17878 3216 246 21,9 63 62 0,88 0,79 0,89 0,96 0,62
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 155 147 71 13351 1690 58 16,2 84 105 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 260 191 107 19167 3796 202 21,8 47 68 0,97 0,97 1,00 0,97 0,97
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 723 505 254 18078 6143 495 43,2 26 18 1,00 0,99 0,99 0,40 1,84
University of Notre Dame 332 116 240 9212 2828 210 21,1 86 69 0,98 0,61 0,62 0,47 1,01
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus 275 115 142 18367 3843 218 16 50 80 1,00 0,77 0,77 0,66 1,04
University of Oregon 261 90 121 20118 3323 170 18,7 47 90 0,99 0,87 0,88 0,82 0,99
University of Pennsylvania 1085 704 944 11871 10413 514 58,4 10 10 0,89 0,68 0,76 0,54 0,89
University of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus 466 690 323 18426 8473 479 42,2 14 20 1,00 0,85 0,85 1,06 0,71
University of Rhode Island 117 99 97 13280 1929 89 16,6 84 102 1,00 0,98 0,98 1,08 0,86
University of Rochester 314 316 157 6461 3473 265 30,6 81 45 0,69 0,69 1,00 0,69 0,69
University of South Carolina-Columbia 295 133 133 22619 4784 279 20,8 31 58 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of South Florida-Main Campus 310 278 169 28780 7104 270 21,1 10 57 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Southern California 1436 392 460 18849 12851 634 38,3 3 13 1,00 0,91 0,91 0,84 1,15
University of Utah 342 285 183 21657 6114 339 34,3 20 41 0,87 0,81 0,93 0,90 0,70
University of Vermont 190 101 116 10987 861 62 15,6 91 108 0,83 0,68 0,83 0,46 1,10
University of Virginia-Main Campus 376 345 230 15513 6915 393 36 22 32 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,76 1,17
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University of Washington-Seattle Campus 1053 890 516 29247 12081 708 59,2 2 5 0,71 0,70 0,99 0,63 0,77
University of Wisconsin-Madison 512 931 252 27872 6270 813 52 13 3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Wyoming 165 90 83 9300 1462 72 14,6 96 115 0,90 0,85 0,94 0,94 0,69
Utah State University 167 134 87 20080 2015 94 13,7 52 113 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Vanderbilt University 843 439 191 6814 3880 273 35,1 73 40 0,57 0,57 1,00 0,57 0,57
Virginia Commonwealth University 338 148 137 21703 5080 333 21 28 53 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,94 1,03
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State U. 306 330 138 24847 5887 469 25,1 20 31 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Wake Forest University 184 171 619 4639 1625 57 17,4 115 97 0,63 0,58 0,91 0,63 0,52
Washington State University 234 226 151 21399 4487 203 21 36 71 1,00 0,89 0,89 1,24 0,52
Washington University in St Louis 1254 495 269 6934 3565 251 44,9 77 25 1,00 0,94 0,94 0,45 2,17
Wayne State University 316 187 167 15873 4821 229 19,2 46 75 0,90 0,81 0,91 0,92 0,63
Yale University 1288 506 513 6863 6370 390 60 34 7 1,00 0,70 0,70 0,45 1,35
Yeshiva University 221 257 159 2593 1463 129 21,1 122 80 0,55 0,55 1,00 0,55 0,55
Table 2.7: Data on US universities in 2012
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Shadow prices Weights Shadow prices Weights
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Arizona State University 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,42 3,12 0,78 0,00 0,61 0,39 1,89 0,78 0,00 0,76 0,24
Auburn University 0,84 0,78 0,94 1,89 7,54 1,30 2,52 0,34 0,66 3,99 2,76 0,30 0,71 0,29
Boston College 0,85 0,76 0,90 3,43 8,63 0,00 4,62 0,43 0,57 5,24 0,00 2,80 0,65 0,35
Boston University 0,99 0,95 0,96 0,75 2,71 3,01 0,00 0,73 0,27 1,12 3,01 0,00 0,89 0,11
Brandeis University 1,00 1,00 1,00 6,71 4,23 0,00 16,92 0,46 0,54 6,06 16,70 0,22 0,85 0,15
Brigham Young University-Provo 0,89 0,85 0,95 1,77 6,36 2,50 3,85 0,57 0,43 2,19 4,90 1,46 0,84 0,16
Brown University 0,88 0,76 0,87 1,74 6,98 0,00 3,54 0,23 0,77 3,38 0,00 3,72 0,44 0,56
California Institute of Technology 0,93 0,89 0,96 1,62 3,04 0,00 6,46 0,17 0,83 2,44 0,00 6,46 0,25 0,75
Carnegie Mellon University 0,69 0,62 0,90 1,29 3,73 0,00 3,47 0,22 0,78 2,62 0,00 2,44 0,45 0,55
Case Western Reserve University 0,58 0,53 0,92 3,29 1,25 0,11 4,89 0,46 0,54 2,08 0,07 4,94 0,29 0,71
Clemson University 1,00 1,00 1,00 4,42 2,26 4,53 4,52 0,66 0,34 3,55 3,63 5,41 0,53 0,47
Colorado State University-Fort Collins 0,91 0,87 0,95 3,54 1,73 6,79 0,13 0,80 0,20 2,68 6,72 0,20 0,69 0,31
Columbia University in the City of New York 0,89 0,81 0,91 0,33 1,26 1,31 0,00 0,57 0,43 0,57 1,31 0,00 0,81 0,19
Cornell University 0,93 0,90 0,97 0,74 2,94 0,00 1,03 0,18 0,82 1,03 0,00 2,26 0,25 0,75
Dartmouth College 0,59 0,57 0,96 6,14 3,22 1,53 0,00 0,73 0,27 4,64 1,53 0,00 0,62 0,38
Drexel University 0,82 0,78 0,96 4,58 1,33 1,33 0,00 0,92 0,08 3,66 1,33 0,00 0,78 0,22
Duke University 0,65 0,62 0,95 0,43 0,85 0,00 1,72 0,20 0,80 0,64 0,00 1,72 0,30 0,70
Emory University 0,52 0,51 0,98 2,63 0,80 0,75 0,05 0,82 0,18 1,84 0,69 0,12 0,60 0,40
Florida State University 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,72 1,58 0,00 6,32 0,46 0,54 2,35 4,93 1,39 0,72 0,28
George Mason University 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,95 5,69 0,58 7,24 0,34 0,66 2,74 7,82 0,00 0,89 0,11
George Washington University 0,98 0,97 0,99 3,65 1,21 1,21 0,00 0,91 0,09 1,77 3,69 0,00 0,87 0,13
Georgetown University 0,41 0,39 0,95 2,08 4,45 0,00 1,11 0,44 0,56 2,77 0,00 1,11 0,59 0,41
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 0,99 0,86 0,87 3,04 0,90 0,00 3,61 0,44 0,56 1,54 0,00 3,61 0,22 0,78
Harvard University 0,98 0,98 1,00 0,30 0,30 0,00 0,98 0,16 0,84 0,30 0,00 0,98 0,16 0,84
Indiana University-Bloomington 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,15 4,59 0,00 4,00 0,31 0,69 1,56 4,59 0,00 0,91 0,09
Indiana University-Purdue University-Ind. 0,89 0,87 0,97 3,65 1,21 1,21 0,00 0,89 0,11 1,46 4,82 0,00 0,86 0,14
Iowa State University 0,98 0,97 0,99 1,93 1,51 0,63 5,42 0,32 0,68 1,75 0,57 5,48 0,29 0,71
Johns Hopkins University 0,78 0,74 0,95 0,68 0,30 1,21 0,00 0,80 0,20 0,51 1,21 0,00 0,67 0,33
Kansas State University 0,88 0,85 0,97 3,97 2,12 8,48 0,00 0,83 0,17 3,18 8,48 0,00 0,74 0,26
Kent State University at Kent 1,00 1,00 1,00 3,15 12,59 0,00 10,27 0,29 0,71 7,94 3,15 0,00 0,91 0,09
Lehigh University 1,00 1,00 1,00 6,24 3,86 9,09 2,36 0,83 0,17 5,64 8,20 3,44 0,75 0,25
Louisiana State University 0,75 0,73 0,98 2,65 1,39 2,15 3,42 0,54 0,46 2,02 0,60 4,97 0,33 0,67
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 0,53 0,52 1,00 0,38 0,59 0,00 1,53 0,13 0,87 0,52 0,00 1,53 0,17 0,83
Michigan State University 0,93 0,91 0,98 1,47 0,79 0,00 3,16 0,47 0,53 1,21 0,00 3,16 0,39 0,61
Montana State University 0,85 0,77 0,90 8,49 3,67 0,00 14,69 0,38 0,62 5,64 0,00 14,69 0,25 0,75
New York University 0,97 0,95 0,98 1,06 0,43 0,00 0,94 0,66 0,34 0,67 0,27 1,45 0,47 0,53
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 0,89 0,87 0,98 2,11 1,34 0,00 4,78 0,42 0,58 1,80 0,00 4,78 0,36 0,64
Northeastern University 0,90 0,89 0,99 2,68 6,35 2,53 0,00 0,70 0,30 3,92 1,59 0,00 0,82 0,18
Northwestern University 0,90 0,86 0,96 0,64 1,06 0,00 2,31 0,21 0,79 0,93 0,00 2,03 0,30 0,70
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Ohio State University-Main Campus 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,59 0,54 0,54 0,00 0,87 0,13 0,77 2,15 0,00 0,81 0,19
Oregon State University 0,80 0,76 0,95 5,22 1,82 3,60 0,14 0,81 0,19 2,60 1,79 5,49 0,40 0,60
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 0,65 0,52 0,81 0,38 1,52 0,00 0,54 0,23 0,77 0,53 0,00 1,49 0,32 0,68
Princeton University 0,88 0,88 0,99 1,01 4,03 0,00 1,49 0,20 0,80 1,05 0,00 4,03 0,21 0,79
Purdue University-Main Campus 0,96 0,94 0,98 0,87 3,48 0,00 2,06 0,28 0,72 1,29 0,00 3,48 0,41 0,59
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 0,90 0,89 0,99 2,85 5,12 0,00 11,38 0,21 0,79 3,87 0,00 11,38 0,28 0,72
Rice University 0,86 0,80 0,93 2,27 9,08 0,00 6,38 0,29 0,71 3,34 0,00 9,08 0,43 0,57
Rutgers University-New Brunswick 0,92 0,87 0,95 0,67 2,69 0,01 1,67 0,29 0,71 1,05 0,02 2,56 0,45 0,55
Saint Louis University-Main Campus 0,90 0,87 0,97 2,52 10,10 0,00 8,52 0,30 0,70 3,11 0,00 10,10 0,38 0,62
San Diego State University 1,00 1,00 1,00 8,53 3,41 3,41 0,00 0,99 0,01 3,59 0,00 13,64 0,35 0,65
Southern Methodist University 0,95 0,95 1,00 8,10 12,27 0,28 2,79 0,66 0,34 8,62 0,29 2,77 0,70 0,30
Stanford University 0,83 0,75 0,90 0,35 1,30 0,00 0,35 0,22 0,78 0,53 0,00 1,40 0,33 0,67
Stony Brook University 0,76 0,72 0,95 2,27 5,03 1,23 0,37 0,64 0,36 2,83 1,54 0,21 0,80 0,20
SUNY at Albany 0,71 0,64 0,90 6,61 1,71 1,71 0,00 0,80 0,20 3,00 4,69 0,00 0,64 0,36
Syracuse University 0,71 0,66 0,93 3,62 6,70 0,62 1,06 0,64 0,36 4,20 1,01 0,66 0,78 0,22
Temple University 0,76 0,72 0,95 2,58 4,91 0,96 0,26 0,69 0,31 3,07 1,06 0,16 0,80 0,20
Texas A &M University-College Station 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,64 0,73 2,64 0,29 0,77 0,23 1,21 0,00 2,93 0,37 0,63
Texas Tech University 0,98 0,98 0,99 6,93 2,10 1,94 0,16 0,84 0,16 2,65 8,21 0,20 0,80 0,20
e University of Montana 0,98 0,98 1,00 14,76 4,86 0,00 5,08 0,74 0,26 5,75 13,45 6,01 0,69 0,31
e University of Tennessee 0,63 0,62 1,00 1,33 1,09 0,00 3,56 0,38 0,62 1,25 0,00 3,56 0,36 0,64
e University of Texas at Austin 0,94 0,93 0,99 0,58 1,22 2,32 0,00 0,66 0,34 0,85 2,32 0,00 0,76 0,24
e University of Texas at Dallas 1,00 1,00 1,00 4,53 3,02 0,00 12,08 0,36 0,64 3,99 12,08 0,00 0,82 0,18
e University of Texas at San Antonio 0,96 0,94 0,98 9,13 3,04 3,04 0,00 0,92 0,08 4,32 7,70 1,83 0,78 0,22
Tus University 0,63 0,61 0,97 6,11 1,53 0,00 1,53 0,67 0,33 4,31 0,00 1,53 0,47 0,53
Tulane University of Louisiana 0,70 0,70 1,00 3,39 1,88 0,00 7,52 0,45 0,55 2,82 0,00 7,52 0,37 0,63
University at Buﬀalo 0,77 0,74 0,96 1,25 4,78 0,63 2,49 0,33 0,67 2,47 1,25 1,29 0,65 0,35
University of Alabama at Birmingham 0,49 0,43 0,88 4,75 1,20 0,00 1,19 0,67 0,33 2,99 0,00 1,19 0,42 0,58
University of Alaska Fairbanks 0,93 0,91 0,97 6,32 3,07 0,00 12,27 0,34 0,66 4,42 0,00 12,27 0,24 0,76
University of Arizona 0,87 0,82 0,94 0,82 2,90 0,00 0,82 0,18 0,82 1,09 0,00 3,26 0,24 0,76
University of Arkansas 0,91 0,88 0,97 4,34 2,35 7,73 0,37 0,83 0,17 3,79 6,75 0,60 0,72 0,28
University of California-Berkeley 0,98 0,97 0,99 0,60 2,14 0,00 0,60 0,20 0,80 0,86 0,00 2,38 0,28 0,72
University of California-Davis 0,88 0,81 0,92 0,59 2,18 0,00 0,59 0,20 0,80 0,84 0,00 2,35 0,28 0,72
University of California-Irvine 0,88 0,84 0,95 0,90 3,59 0,00 1,36 0,23 0,77 1,23 0,00 3,59 0,32 0,68
University of California-Los Angeles 0,63 0,53 0,85 0,33 1,32 0,00 0,55 0,25 0,75 0,47 0,00 1,32 0,35 0,65
University of California-Riverside 0,97 0,96 0,99 2,28 8,94 4,06 0,00 0,44 0,56 3,29 5,86 3,27 0,64 0,36
University of California-San Diego 0,72 0,70 0,97 0,51 0,84 0,00 2,03 0,16 0,84 0,70 0,00 2,03 0,23 0,77
University of California-Santa Barbara 0,95 0,92 0,97 1,78 6,57 0,00 1,78 0,22 0,78 2,68 0,00 7,12 0,32 0,68
University of California-Santa Cruz 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,68 10,07 0,00 2,68 0,20 0,80 3,67 0,00 10,73 0,27 0,73
University of Central Florida 1,00 1,00 1,00 3,09 7,01 1,14 0,61 0,53 0,47 4,24 1,39 0,37 0,72 0,28
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University of Chicago 0,78 0,67 0,86 0,60 2,39 0,00 1,85 0,30 0,70 0,90 0,00 2,39 0,46 0,54
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 0,86 0,78 0,91 4,52 1,32 1,22 0,10 0,85 0,15 3,22 1,08 0,24 0,63 0,37
University of Colorado Boulder 0,96 0,93 0,97 1,15 2,63 1,63 2,98 0,35 0,65 1,83 2,59 2,02 0,55 0,45
University of Colorado Denver 0,50 0,49 0,98 2,74 1,22 0,00 4,89 0,57 0,43 2,11 0,00 4,89 0,44 0,56
University of Connecticut 0,57 0,49 0,86 1,00 3,99 0,00 2,44 0,24 0,76 2,39 0,00 1,25 0,58 0,42
University of Delaware 0,75 0,68 0,91 1,57 6,26 3,51 0,47 0,53 0,47 2,22 6,10 0,16 0,83 0,17
University of Florida 0,93 0,93 1,00 1,24 0,61 2,43 0,00 0,81 0,19 0,95 0,00 2,43 0,34 0,66
University of Georgia 1,00 1,00 1,00 4,07 1,20 0,00 2,09 0,60 0,40 2,08 0,00 3,61 0,30 0,70
University of Hawaii at Manoa 0,72 0,72 0,99 1,32 3,06 1,92 3,36 0,29 0,71 2,26 2,79 2,49 0,48 0,52
University of Houston 1,00 1,00 1,00 5,60 1,67 1,67 0,00 0,90 0,10 4,10 2,08 0,00 0,76 0,24
University of Illinois at Chicago 0,79 0,77 0,98 1,65 0,86 3,44 0,00 0,87 0,13 1,41 3,44 0,00 0,79 0,21
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,69 2,69 0,00 0,69 0,21 0,79 1,60 0,00 0,69 0,48 0,52
University of Iowa 0,83 0,81 0,98 1,01 1,78 0,00 4,05 0,20 0,80 1,37 0,00 4,05 0,27 0,73
University of Kansas 0,73 0,70 0,95 2,98 1,15 1,62 1,15 0,72 0,28 1,70 0,93 3,67 0,41 0,59
University of Kentucky 0,60 0,59 0,98 4,57 1,23 0,00 1,23 0,68 0,32 1,77 0,00 4,35 0,26 0,74
University of Louisville 0,66 0,65 0,98 3,29 1,71 5,15 0,58 0,82 0,18 2,35 3,69 3,16 0,58 0,42
University of Maryland-College Park 0,94 0,91 0,97 0,86 3,10 0,00 0,86 0,20 0,80 1,23 0,00 3,44 0,28 0,72
University of Massachusetts Amherst 0,97 0,95 0,99 1,57 4,01 2,97 3,31 0,49 0,51 2,25 4,25 2,03 0,70 0,30
University of Miami 0,44 0,40 0,91 1,04 4,01 1,63 0,30 0,48 0,52 2,41 0,82 0,18 0,69 0,31
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 0,96 0,94 0,98 1,45 0,43 0,43 0,00 0,82 0,18 0,61 1,71 0,00 0,74 0,26
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 0,74 0,64 0,86 0,48 1,80 0,00 0,48 0,17 0,83 1,18 0,00 0,48 0,40 0,60
University of Missouri-Columbia 0,98 0,98 1,00 2,71 1,58 5,13 0,93 0,80 0,20 2,38 4,50 1,41 0,71 0,29
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 0,83 0,78 0,94 5,44 1,87 3,76 0,14 0,80 0,20 2,64 1,83 5,65 0,39 0,61
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 0,98 0,93 0,95 5,33 2,61 0,00 10,45 0,42 0,58 4,00 0,00 10,45 0,32 0,68
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 0,80 0,79 0,99 3,34 1,74 6,85 0,13 0,82 0,18 2,67 6,78 0,20 0,73 0,27
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 0,85 0,77 0,90 0,66 1,59 0,00 2,63 0,24 0,76 1,04 0,00 2,63 0,39 0,61
University of Notre Dame 0,65 0,58 0,89 2,87 5,66 0,00 1,41 0,49 0,51 3,59 0,00 1,41 0,61 0,39
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus 0,85 0,77 0,90 1,83 7,33 3,27 0,97 0,50 0,50 4,33 1,26 0,57 0,70 0,30
University of Oregon 0,87 0,82 0,95 2,07 8,27 5,52 0,00 0,62 0,38 2,71 8,27 0,00 0,88 0,12
University of Pennsylvania 0,70 0,63 0,90 0,56 1,42 0,00 0,36 0,31 0,69 0,90 0,00 0,36 0,50 0,50
University of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus 0,92 0,85 0,92 2,63 0,66 0,44 0,38 0,70 0,30 1,28 0,69 0,74 0,42 0,58
University of Rhode Island 0,98 0,98 1,00 11,44 3,11 3,11 0,00 0,84 0,16 3,42 12,45 0,00 0,83 0,17
University of Rochester 0,63 0,62 0,98 1,24 2,48 0,00 4,95 0,20 0,80 1,86 0,00 4,95 0,30 0,70
University of South Carolina-Columbia 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,74 6,94 1,89 1,95 0,39 0,61 2,40 1,45 5,49 0,46 0,54
University of South Florida-Main Campus 0,91 0,87 0,96 2,33 1,29 4,39 0,76 0,75 0,25 1,84 4,06 1,09 0,64 0,36
University of Southern California 0,92 0,89 0,96 0,43 1,41 1,15 0,56 0,58 0,42 0,64 1,70 0,00 0,87 0,13
University of Utah 0,84 0,81 0,96 3,09 1,20 2,93 0,08 0,82 0,18 2,40 2,27 0,15 0,63 0,37
University of Vermont 0,72 0,66 0,91 2,40 9,59 0,00 4,55 0,23 0,77 2,88 0,00 9,59 0,28 0,72
University of Virginia-Main Campus 0,95 0,94 0,98 1,02 1,80 0,00 4,10 0,20 0,80 1,39 0,00 4,10 0,27 0,73
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University of Washington-Seattle Campus 0,67 0,66 0,97 0,40 1,49 0,00 0,40 0,21 0,79 0,58 0,00 1,58 0,31 0,69
University of Wisconsin-Madison 0,89 0,88 0,99 0,57 1,15 0,00 2,30 0,15 0,85 0,95 0,00 2,30 0,25 0,75
University of Wyoming 0,83 0,80 0,96 5,58 2,87 7,98 1,22 0,81 0,19 3,88 9,85 1,64 0,75 0,25
Utah State University 0,87 0,82 0,94 4,43 2,51 1,39 8,65 0,44 0,56 3,57 1,12 8,92 0,36 0,64
Vanderbilt University 0,41 0,35 0,86 0,66 2,02 0,00 2,64 0,29 0,71 1,13 0,00 2,64 0,49 0,51
Virginia Commonwealth University 0,98 0,97 0,99 1,56 3,79 2,96 3,29 0,48 0,52 2,24 4,24 2,00 0,69 0,31
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State U. 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,73 1,26 3,66 1,37 0,69 0,31 1,97 2,88 2,14 0,51 0,49
Wake Forest University 0,45 0,44 0,99 3,99 3,46 1,00 0,00 0,70 0,30 3,74 1,00 0,00 0,67 0,33
Washington State University 0,91 0,88 0,97 5,75 1,59 1,47 0,12 0,81 0,19 2,14 6,21 0,16 0,74 0,26
Washington University in St Louis 0,58 0,49 0,84 0,48 1,66 0,00 1,93 0,31 0,69 0,82 0,00 1,93 0,53 0,47
Wayne State University 0,86 0,81 0,95 4,07 1,45 2,22 0,11 0,85 0,15 3,21 1,75 0,24 0,67 0,33
Yale University 0,78 0,59 0,76 0,42 1,69 0,00 1,07 0,28 0,72 0,60 0,00 1,69 0,40 0,60
Yeshiva University 0,51 0,50 0,97 2,63 1,53 0,91 5,20 0,37 0,63 2,04 0,70 5,41 0,29 0,71
Table 2.8: Shadow prices for models with price restrictions .
Chapter 3
Is there a prison size dilemma?
An empirical analysis of
output-speciĕc economies of scale
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Abstract
We advocate a nonparametric multi-output framework to estimate output-
speciĕc economies of scale and we apply this model to male prisons in Eng-
land andWales over the sample period 2009-2012. To estimate output-speciĕc
returns to scale in prisons, we consider not only the cost-per-place, but also
qualitative outputs such as purposeful out-of-cell activity and successful rein-
tegration. Furthermore, we introduce environmental heterogeneity using the
characteristics of the prisoners. England and Wales oﬀers a unique example to
study economies of scale in prisons as the UK has started to build new super-
size prisons in order to replace the most outdated prisons.1
1is chapter is based on joint work with Marijn Verschelde (IÉSEG School of Management) and Richard Sim-
per (University of Nottingham). We would like to thank Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock, Victor Podinovski, the
participants of the 14th European Workshop on Eﬃciency and Productivity Analysis and of the 5th workshop on
eﬃciency and productivity analysis for their insightful comments and suggestions.
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3.1 Introduction
Prisoner numbers are on the rise for decades in the US and many European countries.2
e increasing prisoner population puts the existing United Kingdom (UK) Criminal Jus-
tice System (CJS) under stress and forces policy makers to reconsider the limits both from
a cost-per-place and from social perspectives (i.e. providing humane incarceration with
prospects for reintegration into society when released). Current public policy mainly con-
sists of building new prisons, reshaping existing prisons and putting less convicts behind
bars.3
is chapter focuses on what we call the potential ‘prison size dilemma’. Public policy
makers could consider returns to scale from either a cost-per-place or a social viewpoint,
but these viewpoints lead to conĘicting opinions on the optimal scale size. We empirically
test whether the optimal scale size of a prison diﬀers when the focus is either on costs-per-
place, quality of life in prison or successful reintegration.4 In particular, we study economies
of scale of a sample of male prisons in England and Wales, by using publicly available data
collected by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ).
Our empirical analysis is timely and warranted as the building of the ĕrst titan prison
in the UK has started.5 e Labour government in 2007 was forced to abandon 3 titan
prisonswhichwould provide up to 2,500 places in ĕve units of approximately 500 oﬀenders6.
2See Levitt (1996) and Campbell et al. (2015) for a discussion on US mass incarceration and e.g. the National
Audit Oﬃce (2013, p. 14) for prisoner ĕgures for England and Wales.
3e latter has been considered both from an operational and a deterrence point of view. See for example
the National Audit Oﬃce (2013, p. 14). for the operational point of view. For the deterrence point of view, a
well-established literature, inspired by the seminar work of Becker (1968), shows positive, but highly accelerating
diminishing returns from more incarcerations to reduce crime (See e.g. Levitt (1996), Buonanno and Raphael
(2013), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013), Vollaard (2013), Hansen (2015) and references therein).
4While there is evidence for a deterrence eﬀect of harsh prison conditions (e.g. Katz et al. (2003)), we consider
eﬀorts to foster reintegration and quality of prison life as ‘goods’. A large criminological literature studies violence
in prison and shows both eﬀects from importation of violence (e.g. Mears et al. (2013)) and deprivation due to
among others poor prison management (e.g. Sykes (1958) and McCorkle et al. (1995)). In England and Wales, it
is now fully acknowledged that the high proportion of oﬀenders that re-oﬀend aer discharge is costly to the tax
payers and society (see e.g. Ministry of Justice (2011)and Ministry of Justice (2013)).
5e name titan refers to not just a single large prison but one consisting of hubs. “Hub prisons would be large
establishments of between 2,500 - 3,000 places. eywould be designed to be operated as a number of semi-autonomous
units sharing a common site and set of services; provide operational Ęexibility to respond to changes in the size and
proĕle of the prison population” Lockyer (2013, page 6)
6is was due to political pressure and against the main recommendations to go ahead by the Carter Review
(2007). However, Lord Carter did note that “there are some operational challenges associated with large prisons,
including the possibility of large scale disturbance, the diﬃculty in meeting the needs of speciĕc groups of prisoners
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However, the rejection of building these titan prisons was reversed in 2011 under the next
UK government - a Conservative/Liberal coalition - where the building of the ĕrst titan
prison based in Wrexham, Wales was agreed to begin.7 Renewing and rescaling the prison
estate is part of the strategy of the National Oﬀender Management Service (NOMS), which
covers both the prison and probation systems in England and Wales, to reduce costs. e
modernization of the prison estate includes the closure of old and ineﬃcient prisons, which
will be replaced by new large prisons and housing blocks.8
e cost reduction strategy of the NOMS, initiated in 2010, also involved a reduction of
input waste within the system. Furthermore, the NOMS aimed to introduce more compe-
tition by privatization and re-tendering of prisons that were already tendered to the private
sector. Rogge et al. (2015) document that there is little empirical support for large cost sav-
ings contracting-out prison service to private-run organizations. In our study, we analyze
the optimal scale size of prisons.
From a methodological perspective, we advocate a framework that is specially tailored
to analyze the multidimensional prison production process. In particular, we propose a
DEA-based methodology that fully acknowledges that returns to scale can diﬀer between
the diﬀerent (qualitative) dimensions of production.
We build on the work of Cherchye et al. (2013), who introduce a multi-output method-
ology that recognizes that each output is characterized by its own production technology.
Starting from this multi-output methodology, we will be able to estimate output-speciĕc
returns to scale.
An attractive feature of the methodology is that it is nonparametric: there is no need to
assume a speciĕc functional representation of the production technology. is is warranted
for public sector applications as public ĕrms operate in non-competitive markets and can
(e.g. female and young oﬀenders) and the management complexities associated with a large staﬀ complement and
challenges of managing a number of potentially diﬀerent prisoner segments on the same site” page 38.
7e ĕrst titan prison would cost £212 million and would be operated by Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS)
where it is to outsource up to 34% of services to private and voluntary sector.
8On January 10, 2013,eMinistry of Justice announced the closure of four prisons and partial closure of three
prisons. In total, 2,614 places were closed. An announcement on September 4, 2013 showed an even more drastic
change of the prison landscape as in the period 2010-2014, the prison (planned) closures consist in total of 6,382
places and total gained places in micro-prisons (housing blocks) or new large prisons are up to 5,945. For more
information, see URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/modernisation-of-the-prison-estate.
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have a complex structure of public production. Consequently, the imposition of a paramet-
ric functional relationship can be intricate. Instead, a minimum set of production axioms is
used to test for output-speciĕc economies of scale.
In the context of prisons, we argue that it is crucial to consider output-speciĕc returns
to scale. We take three output objectives into account. Naturally, we consider the incarcer-
ation of convicts as one of the main outputs of a prison. Besides incarcerating convicts, we
consider in our study also qualitative outputs including the provision of a humane prison
environment and successful reintegration. In the empirical analysis, we select proxies that
in our opinion best reĘect these output objectives.
A commonmotivation for large prisons is a reduction of the cost-per-place. Meanwhile,
opponents fear little prospects for reintegration and low quality of life in large-scale prisons.9
In fact, the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2009) and e National Audit Oﬃce (2013)
provide support in England andWales for a better performance in smaller prisons. Surveys
show that prisoners tend to be more engaged in smaller establishments.10 Moreover small
prisons do on average better in independent inspections and in the NOMS’s performance
ratings, which take reintegration and quality of life in prison into account. By contrast,
Lockyer (2013) argues that the age and not the size of a prison determines the performance
of a prison. In our opinion there is a need for further research on the relation between prison
size and the multiple facets of performance.
e above-mentioned studies do not control for prison(er) characteristics. However,
Ruggiero (2000) emphasizes that environmental variables have a considerable impact on
the provision of public services and that without controlling for these environmental factors
the estimates of returns to scale will be biased. We advocate a methodology that explicitly
takes into account environmental heterogeneity. For example, we control in our study for the
inĘow of prisoners in particular establishments. Speciĕcally, we include the predicted rate
of re-oﬀending in an establishment. e rate of re-oﬀending is estimated at prison level by
9For example, Liebling (2004) questions the moral performance of the so called ‘Titan’ prisons that could hold
over 2,500 prisoners.
10In particular, prisoners in small prisons (lower than 400 prisoners) in comparison to large prisons (over 800
prisoners) have signiĕcantly higher agreement that the prison addresses well drugs problems, prisoner safety, qual-
ity of policing and security, levels of organization and consistency, staﬀ professionalism, quality for the vulnerable
and relationships with staﬀ.
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the Ministry of Justice, based on prisoner-level data on social background, ethnicity, crime
type, etc. We assume that prisons with a higher predicted rate of re-oﬀending operate in a
harsher production environment.
Furthermore, the proposed methodology distinguishes between discretionary and non-
discretionary output variables. We therefore measure the performance of prisons only with
respect to the output variables that the prison management controls and actually wants to
maximize. Examples of non-discretionary variables in our application are the size of the
average prison population and the yearly number of discharges.
To our knowledge, we posit an original estimation strategy that adequately models the
multidimensional prison production process. e advocated methodology is tailored to all
speciĕcities of the prison production process and enables us to meaningfully answer the
prison size dilemma, by using publicly available data. Moreover, we discuss in detail how
public policy makers can further reĕne the analysis by adding information on the allocation
of expenses to particular outputs.
e remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the nonpara-
metric multi-output methodology. Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical model
and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Basic concepts
To set the stage, we ĕrst intuitively introduce our ideas and discuss some relevant literature.
Next, we formalize the methodology in Section 3.2.2 to 3.2.5.
Returns to scale e concept of returns to scale is directly related to the most productive
scale size. A Decision Making Unit (DMU) that is situated on the constant returns to scale
technology, is considered to operate on its most productive scale size (Banker, 1984). A
DMU which is not situated on its most productive scale size, can improve its productivity
by resizing the scale of its operations. e type of returns to scale can be interpreted as the
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direction of change necessary to achieve its most productive scale size.11 In particular, in a
constant returns to scale technology, a proportional increase in inputX gives a proportional
increase in output y. Consequently, a property of the constant returns to scale technology is
that the average productivity remains constant, for a given input and output mix. Increasing
returns to scale indicate that the most productive scale size of a DMU is situated at a larger
size. Similarly, decreasing returns to scale indicate that the DMU should decrease the scale
of its operations to achieve the optimal scale size. e type of returns to scale is therefore
very useful information for the operational manager, indicating how rescaling the operation
can improve average productivity and reduce the average cost.12
Output-speciĕc production technology To estimate output-speciĕc returns to scale, we
build on the work of Cherchye et al. (2013), who introduce amulti-outputmethodology that
recognizes that each output is characterized by its own production technology. e output-
speciĕc production technologies remain linked through the use of joint inputs. In Sections
3.2.3 and 3.2.4wewill focus on the production process of one particular output, to comeback
to the multi-output production process in Section 3.2.5. We extend Cherchye et al. (2013)
by including alternative returns to scale assumptions in the methodology. Furthermore, we
include output-speciĕc environmental variables in the methodology. Since we are able to
workwith output-speciĕc production technologies, we can estimate output-speciĕc returns-
to-scale, controlling for output-speciĕc environments.
At this point, it might be worth to note that our approach bears some analogy to Cook
and Zhu (2011), who also allow returns to scale type behavior to be diﬀerent for one output
subgroup than for another, by using the notion of component technologies. However, we
11We estimate global returns to scale. Podinovski (2004a) and Podinovski (2004b) make the distinction between
local and global returns to scale. In a convex production technology, these concepts are identical. In non-convex
technologies there is a diﬀerence. e type of local returns to scale is indicative of the type of resizing that should
lead to immediate improvements of the average productivity. e type of global returns to scale is indicative of the
direction of change necessary to achieve maximum average productivity. Since we work in a setting with relaxed
convexity assumptions, we are only able to estimate global returns to scale.
12We estimate qualitative characterizations of returns to scale, such as increasing, decreasing or constant returns
to scale. ere is a diﬀerent strand of DEA literature which is directed to quantitative directions of returns to
scale. For example Podinovski and Forsund (2010) and Atici and Podinovski (2012) analyze a class of mixed partial
elasticitymeasures. esemeasures indicate the elasticity of response of a subset of outputs with respect tomarginal
changes of a subset of inputs. is approach applies to polyhedral technologies. However, since wework in a setting
which is very non-smooth because of the relaxed convexity assumptions, we do not pursue the study of marginal
changes.
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oﬀer an axiomatic approach to the estimation of output-speciĕc returns to scale.
Returns to scale estimation To estimate returns to scale, we follow a method discussed
by Podinovski (2004a) and Podinovski (2004b), based on Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut
(1999).13 ismethod is based on the principle of goodness-of-ĕt. e goodness-of-ĕt with
respect to a particular production technology is measured as the distance of an observed
input-output combination to the boundary of the technology. To determine the most ap-
propriate returns to scale assumption, we asses the goodness-of-ĕt of several production
technologies, each based on an alternative returns to scale assumption.
Scale eﬃciency Finally, to estimate scale eﬃciency, we follow Banker (1984) in comparing
the distance of an observation to the constant returns to scale technologywith the distance to
the variable returns to scale technology. e constant returns to scale technology consists of
DMUs that operate on theirmost productive scale size. In contrast to the constant returns to
scale technology, the variable returns to scale technology makes no assumption at all on the
prevailing returns to scale. e distance between the two respective technologies indicates
scale eﬃciency.
Robust methodology Since the estimation of returns to scale is sensitive to outliers, we
combine our methodology with the robust order-mmethod, as introduced by Cazals et al.
(2002), discussed in Daraio and Simar (2007a) and elaborated for convex technologies in
Daraio and Simar (2007b). In particular, we repeatedly draw a sample of size m (with re-
placement) among the DMUs in the environment of DMU n. For each random draw, we
estimate the eﬃciency and the returns to scale of DMU n on the basis of the sample of po-
tential comparison partners for DMU n. Finally, the robust eﬃciency measure is computed
as the average over all draws. is procedure allows us to report the statistical signiĕcance
of the estimations, which is based of the percentage of draws that leads to a particular re-
turns to scale estimate. However, for ease of notation, we describe the methodology without
order-m robustiĕcation.
13Both for observations on the production frontier and below the frontier, it is possible to determine the returns
to scale. In the second case, we actually estimate the returns to scale of the projection of the (ineﬃcient) observation
on the production frontier.
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3.2.2 Notational preliminaries
We observe data for N DMUs. Suppose that each DMU n (1  n  N ) uses input
xn = (x1n; : : : ; xLn) to produce output yn = (y1n; : : : ; yRn ) and is situated in environment
zn = (z1n; : : : ; zKn ). Note that output yrn can be a set of outputs having a common produc-
tion technology.
Following Cherchye et al. (2013) and Cherchye et al. (2015b), we consider a separate
production technology for each output. Importantly, we account for interdependencies be-
tween the diﬀerent technologies through jointly used inputs.
In particular, we distinguish between output-speciĕc, joint and subjoint inputs. Output-
speciĕc inputs can be allocated to the production of particular outputs. We use rl , withPR
r=1 
r
l =1, to represent the fraction of input l that is used to produce output r. Next,
joint (or public) inputs simultaneously beneĕt the production of all outputs. Subjoint in-
puts also ĕgure as joint inputs, but only for a subset of outputs. e use of joint and subjoint
inputs therefore makes the output-speciĕc production processes interdependent. Note that
the methodology can also be applied when all inputs are joint (as is the case in our empirical
analysis).
We summarize the information on how inputs are allocated to outputs by means of a
vectorAr for each output r. Speciĕcally, (Ar)l = rl if input l is output-speciĕc and used to
produce output r. Next, (Ar)l = 1 if input l is joint or sub-joint and used to produce output
r. Finally, (Ar)l = 0 otherwise. e element-by-element product Xr = Ar  x captures the
input quantities used in the production process of output r.
Next, some environmental variables can inĘuence only a part of the outputs, not all. e
vector Br captures the environmental variables that are relevant for output r. In particular,
(Br)k = 1 if environmental variable k is relevant for output r and (Br)k = 0 otherwise.
Summarizing, the element-by-element product Zr = Br  z captures the environmental
variables that are controlled for in the speciĕcation of the technology of output r.
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Taken together, the empirical analysis starts from the following data set:
S = f(y1n; : : : ; yRn ;X1n; : : : ;XRn ;Z1n; : : : ;ZRn ) j n = 1; : : : ; Ng: (3.1)
3.2.3 Output-speciĕc production technology
In this section, we focus on the production technology of output r. For output r, we observe
for each DMU n the inputs Xrn that are used to produce output yrn, in environment Zrn. We
adopt an output-oriented approach14 and characterize the production technology of output
r by output sets P r(Xr;Zr), which contains the amount of output yr that can be produced
with input Xr , in environment Zr :
P r(Xr;Zr) = fyrjXr can produce yr; given Zrg: (3.2)
In practice, the true output sets P r(Xr;Zr) are not observed. A solution is to construct
empirical approximations of these output sets on the basis of some standard production
axioms.
Axiom 3.1 (Monotone output sets).
yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr) and yr  yr ) yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr)
Axiom 3.2 (Nested output sets).
Xr  Xr ) P r(Xr;Zr)  P r(Xr;Zr)
Axiom 3.3 (Convex output sets).
yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr) and yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr)
) 8 2 [0; 1] : yr + (1  )yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr)
14In this respect we deviate fromCherchye et al. (2013), who follow an input oriented approach and characterize
the production technology by input requirement sets.
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Axiom 3.4 (Observability means feasibility).
(yr;Xr;Zr) 2 S ) yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr)
Axiom 3.5 (Environmental eﬀect).
Zr  Zr ) P r(Xr;Zr)  P r(Xr;Zr)
Essentially, the ĕrst two axioms say that inputs and outputs are freely disposable. Axiom
3.1 states that, if input Xr can produce output yr , then it can also produce any lower output
yr. Likewise Axiom 3.2 indicates that more input does not reduce the output. Further, Ax-
iom 3.3 states that, if inputXr can produce both output yr and yr, then it can also produce
any convex combination of these outputs.15 Axiom 3.4 states that the observed input-output
combinations are certainly feasible. Following Ruggiero (1996) we control for environmen-
tal variables that aﬀect production. Here we assume that the larger Zr , the less favorable the
production environment. Consequently, Axiom 3.5 implies that a DMU in a more favor-
able environment should be able to produce at least as much output as any DMU in a less
favorable environment.16
We add one ĕnal axiom, which includes returns to scale in themethodology. We assume
either variable returns to scale (vrs), non-increasing returns to scale (nirs), non-decreasing
returns to scale (ndrs) or constant returns to scale (crs). We include rtsr in the notation of
the output set, indicating which returns to scale assumption we make for output r.
Axiom 3.6 (Output-speciĕc returns to scale).
yr 2 P r(Xr;Zr; rtsr)) kyr 2 P r(kXr;Zr; rtsr) for k 2 K(rtsr)
15We work in a setting with relaxed convexity assumptions: we assume convex output sets, but we do not im-
pose convexity in the input-output space. A growing strand of literature assumes a weaker form of convexity, see
Podinovski and Kuosmanen (2011) for an overview. e motivation is that a fully convex production set is not
well suited for modeling economies of scale (Petersen (1990) and Bogeto (1996)).
16In the absence of information on the direction of inĘuence of environmental factors, a kernel weighting ap-
proach can be used as discussed in detail in Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007). An alternative approach to account
for environmental variables in a nonparametric eﬃciency evaluation, is to conduct a two-step procedure. e ĕrst
step then computes the nonparametric eﬃciency estimates, and the second step regresses these nonparametric
estimates on the environmental variables. However, this approach involves implicit assumptions that are oen
problematic. See Simar and Wilson (2007) for an insightful discussion.
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where rtsr=‘vrs’, ‘nirs’, ‘ndrs’, or ‘crs’ and
whereK(vrs) = f1g,K(nirs) = [0; 1],K(ndrs) = [1;1) andK(crs) = R.
e returns to scale assumption describes the change in output resulting from a pro-
portional change in inputs, in a particular environment. If input Xr can produce output
yr in environment Zr , then kXr can produce kyr for k 2 K(rtsr). Depending on which
returns to scale assumption that is made, the potential to scale up or down diﬀers. Variable
returns to scale is the weakest assumption, under which the input-output combinations can
not be scaled. Under the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale, we can scale down
the observations. Similarly, the assumption of non-decreasing returns to scale enables us to
scale up the observations. Constant returns to scale is the strongest assumption and allows
to scale both up and down.
We deĕne the empirical approximation P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) of the output set as the small-
est set that is consistent with Axioms 1-5. is is an application of the minimum extrapola-
tion principle which is commonly used in DEA, see Banker et al. (1984).
Illustrative example Before giving a formal deĕnition of the empirically constructed out-
put set, we illustrate the construction with a single input, single output example, which is
depicted in Figure 3.1.
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crs
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Figure 3.1: Production technology under variable, non-increasing, non-decreasing and con-
stant returns to scale.
We observe the input-output combinations of DMU A, B and C. Assume for simplicity
that each DMU is situated in the same environment. e grey area displays the technology
set. e relation between the technology set T r(rtsr) and the output sets P r(Xr;Zr; rtsr)
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is the following: T r(rtsr) = f(Xr;Zr; yr; rtsr)jyr 2 P r(Xr;Zr; rtsr)g. Along a vertical
line we can therefore read an output set, for a particular input level.
In a ĕrst step in the construction, we apply Axiom 3.4, observability means feasibility.
is axiom indicates that the technology set is constructed on the basis of the observed
input-output combinations A, B and C. In a second step, Axioms 3.1 and 3.2 imply that the
input-output combinations to the bottom right of A, B andC are feasible. Since we only have
one output in our example, Axiom 3.3 adds no additional information here.17 In a ĕnal step,
we include the returns to scale assumption. Figure 3.1 shows the technology sets under the
four alternative returns to scale assumptions.
is example consists of three DMUs in the same environment. If this is not the case,
only the DMUs which operate in a less favorable environment than DMU n should be used
to construct the output set P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). e construction of the output set therefore
starts from the DMUs s with Zrn  Zrs.
Formal construction Petersen (1990) and Bogeto (1996) deĕne a scaling function rs ,
which brings the production of DMU s on a similar scale as the production of DMU n:
rs (; rtsr) : R0 ! R0 [ f 1g
where
rs (Xr; rtsr) = supf j Xrs  Xr;  2 K(rtsr)g:
e scaling parameter rs (Xrn; rtsr) relates the amount of input of DMU n to the input
of DMU s and implies that rs (Xrn; rtsr)yrs 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) for Zrn  Zrs. e scaling
parameter therefore determines towhat extentwe should scale the output produced byDMU
s for the scaled output ofDMU s to ĕgure as a benchmark forDMUn. We let sup(;) =  1.
In the case that rs (Xrn; rtsr) equals 1, it is not possible to compare the output of DMU s
with the output of DMU n. We now deĕne the setCrn(rtsr)which captures the comparison
17In a setting with one output, our technology corresponds to a free disposal hull technology. e free disposal
hull (FDH) model (see Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993)) does not require convexity, in contrast to the
popular Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models. We do assume convexity in output space, but not in input-
output space.
3.2. METHODOLOGY 95
partners for DMU n with respect to output r as follows:
Crn(rts
r) = fsjZrn  Zrs and rs (Xrn; rtsr) > 0g:
In particular, this set consist of all DMUs swhich are situated in a less favorable environment
as DMU n and which can be rescaled to be compared with DMU n. e empirical output
sets P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) are then constructed on the basis of the scaled observations:
P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) =
8<:y
 y 
P
s2Crn(rtsr) 
r
s
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yrsP
s2Crn(rtsr) 
r
s = 1; 
r
s  0
9=; :
is empirical construction satisĕes the minimum extrapolation principle, under Axioms
3.1 to 3.6.
Proposition3.1. P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) satisĕesAxioms 3.1 - 3.6. Moreover, for anyP r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)
that satisĕes Axioms 3.1 - 3.6, we have that P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)  P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr).
e set P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) thus gives an inner bound approximation of the true output
set P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr), under the given technology axioms.
Now thatwe have constructed empirical approximations of the output sets, we can deĕne
output-speciĕc eﬃciency. e output-speciĕc eﬃciency of DMU n can be interpreted as the
ĕt of a particular technology for observation n.
Output-speciĕc technical eﬃciency Following Banker and Morey (1986), we allow for
both discretionary and non-discretionary outputs.18 We therefore divide the vector yrn in a
discretionary and a non discretionary part: yrn = (yDrn; yF rn).
We deĕne the following Farrell (1957) - Debreu (1951) eﬃciency measure for the pro-
duction of output r:
18We assume that the non-discretionary outputs can be scaled down or up. Although the original Banker and
Morey model does not allow scaling, a commonly used version of the model does allow scaling. Syrjänen (2004)
extensively discusses that some models require non-discretionary factors to be scale independent, i.e. indices, and
some require them to be scale dependent, i.e. volume measures. Syrjänen (2004) proposes a generalized model in
which both scale-dependent and scale-independent non-discretionary factors are included. However, we assume
in our model that the non-discretionary factors are scale dependent.
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'^rn(rts
r) = maxf'j('yDrn; yF rn) 2 P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)g: (3.3)
e measure '^rn(rtsr) captures the distance of DMU n to the boundary of the empir-
ically constructed output set. Stated diﬀerently, '^rn(rtsr) indicates the equiproportionate
expansion of discretionary output that is certainly feasible, under Axioms 3.1 - 3.6. In gen-
eral, 1  '^rn(rtsr) with '^rn(rtsr) = 1 indicating full output-speciĕc technical eﬃciency.
Since P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)  P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr), the measure '^rn(rtsr) deĕnes a lower bound
for the true, but unobserved measure 'rn (with respect to the true, but unobserved output
set P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)).
e measure '^rn(rtsr) is straightforward to compute by a two-step procedure. In a ĕrst
step, compute the values of the functions rs (Xrn; rtsr) and the DMUs in the set Crn(rtsr).
In a second step, the measure '^rn(rtsr) can be computed by solving the following linear
programming problem (LP-1):
'^rn(rts
r) = max
'n0;rs0
'n
s:t:
(D-1)
X
s2Crn(rtsr)
rs
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yDrs  'nyDrn
(D-2)
X
s2Crn(rtsr)
rs
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yF rs  yF rn
(D-3)
X
s2Crn(rtsr)
rs = 1:
Note that linear programming problem (LP-1) also has an intuitive interpretation in
terms of revenue eﬃciency. We refer to Appendix 3.C for the dual formulation.
3.2.4 Output-speciĕc returns to scale
Since each output has its own production technology, we can estimate returns to scale for
every individual output. Traditionally, returns to scale are said to be either constant, in-
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creasing or decreasing. In a setting of relaxed convexity assumptions, Podinovski (2004a)
and Podinovski (2004b) introduce a fourth option, namely sub-constant returns to scale.
Sub-constant returns to scale indicate that the most productive scale size can be achieved by
either reducing or increasing its scale. e identiĕcation of the returns to scale is based on
the deĕnition of the variable, non-increasing and non-decreasing returns to scale technolo-
gies:
• Constant returns to scale, '^rn(vrs) = '^rn(nirs) = '^rn(ndrs)
• Decreasing returns to scale, '^rn(vrs)  '^rn(nirs) < '^rn(ndrs)
• Increasing returns to scale, '^rn(vrs)  '^rn(ndrs) < '^rn(nirs)
• Sub-constant returns to scale, '^rn(vrs) < '^rn(ndrs) = '^rn(nirs).
For example in Figure 3.2, we estimate that DMU A and D exhibit increasing returns to
scale, DMU B constant returns to scale and DMU C decreasing returns to scale.19
Output-speciĕc scale eﬃciency ADMUoperating under constant returns to scale is con-
sidered to operate on its optimal scale size. e output-speciĕc technical eﬃciency measure
under the assumption of constant returns to scale thus takes into account deviations from
the optimal scale size. By contrast, the output-speciĕc technical eﬃciency measure under
variable returns to scale gives eachDMU the beneĕt of the doubt with respect to its scale size.
Comparing these eﬃciency measures therefore gives an indication of the extent to which a
DMU deviates from the point of optimal scale of operation. We deĕne a measure of scale
eﬃciency as the ratio of the output-speciĕc technical eﬃciency measure under constant re-
19We could incorporate the information about the estimations of the returns to scale in the eﬃciency analy-
sis. e idea is to use the intersection of the non-decreasing and the non-increasing returns to scale technology
as benchmark technology. Doing so, we give each DMU the beneĕt of the doubt with respect to its scale size.
However, this benchmark technology has more power to identify ineﬃcient behavior than the variable returns to
scale technology. Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut (1998) use the intersection of the increasing returns to scale and
decreasing returns to scale technology in a free disposal hull (fdh) technology. e fdh technology imposes strong
disposability of inputs and outputs, but without any convexity assumption. We work in a setting with relaxed
convexity assumptions: we only assume convex output sets. When convexity in input-output space is imposed,
P (vrs) = P (ndrs) \ P (nirs). Without this assumption, P (vrs)  P (ndrs) \ P (nirs). erefore, the
intersection of these technologies is particularly interesting in a setting with relaxed convexity assumptions.
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Figure 3.2: Estimation of returns to scale
turns to scale and the measure under variable returns to scale:
SErn = '^
r
n(c)='^
r
n(v):
3.2.5 Multi-output technical eﬃciency
Until now we focused on the production process of the individual outputs. However, the
production of the individual outputs is linked through the use of joint (and subjoint) inputs.
Following Cherchye et al. (2013) we deĕne in this section multi-output eﬃciency measures
that consider the production of all the outputs. An interesting feature of this methodol-
ogy is that it allows for returns to scale that are speciĕc to individual outputs. e vector
rts = (rts1; : : : ; rtsR) captures the returns to scale assumptions rtsr for every output r.
We deĕne
'^n(rts) = maxf'j8r : ('yDrn; yF rn) 2 P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)g: (3.4)
In practice, this multi-output technical eﬃciency measure is computed as follows:
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'^n(rts) = minf'^1n(rts1); : : : ; '^Rn (rtsR)g: (3.5)
3.3 Empirical prison production model
For the empirical analysis of the prison size dilemma, we collected publicly available data
on 34 local male prisons in England and Wales, over the book years 2009/10, 2010/11 and
2011/12.20 We pool the data over the years and obtain 102 observations. By pooling the
data, we impose that all observations operate under the same technology, but still allow they
can vary with respect to returns to scale, scale eﬃciency and technical eﬃciency.
Figure 3.3 shows the empirical prison model we advocate to approximate the true con-
duct in local prisons in England andWales, which is by nature multi-dimensional and com-
plex. We presume the local prisons use resources — that come from diﬀerent sources — to
maximize three outputs: (1) Keeping convicts outside society, which we label as “incarcer-
ation”, (2) Providing a humane prison environment and prepare prisoners for reintegration
mainly by organizing purposeful and outside-cell activities, (3) Successfully reintegrating
discharged prisoners into society. As prisons do not operate in vacuum, we control for
both regional and prisoner characteristics, which we allow to be output-speciĕc. As not
all aspects of production are controllable for prison management, we distinguish between
‘discretionary’ and ‘non-discretionary’ output variables. Non-discretionary output variables
are non-discretionary for the prison management, but are discretionary for higher-level de-
cision makers. is implies the non-discretionary outputs, in contrast to environmental
variables, can be re-scaled to improve scale eﬃciency.21
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for each of the included variables. To approximate
the inputs, outputs and environmental heterogeneity, we use proxies that are used in policy
making and in our opinion best reĘect the true production process:
20e data is provided by the MoJ. In England and Wales, prisons are divided into categories (A,B,C and D)
based on the severity of crime committed by inmates and the risk posed should the person escape. In order to
obtain a sample that is suﬃciently comparable, we focus on local male category B and C prisons. ese categories
hold prisoners who do not require maximum security, but who can not be trusted in open conditions.
21See Banker and Morey (1986) for a detailed analysis of including exogenous inputs and outputs in DEA.
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Figure 3.3: Empirical prison production model
• We include in the model overall expenditures as joint input (tabulated in Table 3.1
per prisoner). e overall expenditures include security and rehabilitation costs, as
well as accommodation and infrastructure related costs such as buildings and Infor-
mation Technology, and food and utilities. e expenditures are deĘated to allow for
comparison over time.22 Note that the overall expenditures include outside-prison
expenditures of collaborating agencies. We thus fully acknowledge that prisons in
England and Wales are not stand alone institutions. ey closely collaborate with in-
stitutions that strife for improving reintegration and reducing reoﬀending risk (i.e.,
MAPPA, the Probation Service and Primary Care Trusts). Furthermore, a substantial
part of the expenditures is payroll. Prison oﬃcers traditionally keep inmates secure
and maintain order. However, prison oﬃcers also promote anti-bullying and suicide
prevention policies, take part in programmes to help prisoners reĘect on their oﬀend-
ing behavior and prepare inmates for release through rehabilitation programmes. We
therefore consider the expenditures by prison as a joint input, which simultaneously
contributes to the production of all outputs.
Nevertheless, there is room for reĕning the analysis and increasing the discrimina-
tory power of the proposedmodel by allocating resources to outputs. In principle, the
22We used the GDP deĘator at market prices for ĕnancial years as provided by the HMTreasury and use restated
versions of the overall expenditures that improve comparability over time.
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methodology allows to include both joint and output-speciĕc expenses in the analy-
sis. For this to be possible, the MoJ could construct a data set – which is consistent
over time and over prisons – that breaks down the overall prison costs. For particular
costs, allocation to outputs is straightforward. For example, the costs of food provision
(which is frequently outsourced) can be allocated to the incarceration output. Costs
of lecturers, workshop places, material and leaders can be attributed to the provision
of activities. Administrative costs related to the discharges and re-integration into
society could be attributed to the particular output on successful re-integration. Fur-
ther, as many prisons collaborate with outside-prison organizations to provide out-
of-cell activities and re-integration programs, the contractual agreements can be used
to allocate resources to the outputs concerning purposeful activities and successful
re-integration. However, for a substantial part of costs, allocation is less straightfor-
ward. To structure the input allocation to the multiple outputs, we advocate the use
of ‘activity based costing’ (ABC, see Cooper and Kaplan (1988)). e distinguishing
feature of ABC is that costs are ĕrst attributed to activities and subsequently, these
activity costs are allocated to the outputs. In comparison to other costing method-
ologies, which oen are based on the produced output quantities, ABC gives a much
clearer and more accurate picture of the production model of the multi-output de-
cision making unit, see Cherchye et al. (2013). As such, ABC oﬀers a framework to
allocate expenses to particular outputs.
• To approximate the daily operations and administrative work that are needed to keep
convicts outside society, we consider the places the prison oﬀers to incarcerate pris-
ons. In particular, we consider the Certiĕed Normal Accommodation (CNA). By the
PrisonAct 1952, conĕning prisoners is only allowed in accommodationwhich is certi-
ĕed by an inspector that considers amongothers size, lighting, heating, communication-
possibilities. Certiĕed Normal Accommodation reĘects the number of places the
prison should not exceed (Prison Rules, 1999; rule 26). e respective cells are avail-
able for immediate use. Damaged cells, cells aﬀected by buildingworks and cells taken
out of use due to staﬀ shortages are excluded.23
23estudy of the discretionary andnon-discretionary aspects of overcrowding goes beyond this chapter. Results
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• We simplify the provision of a humane prison environment and preparation for rein-
tegration to organizing purposeful and outside-cell activities. e average prison pop-
ulation is included as non-discretionary output (which is non-discretionary to prison
management but can be rescaled by higher-level decision makers) to control for the
quantity of inmates for which purposeful and outside-cell activities can be provided.
We include the total hours of purposeful activity per week24 as an indicator of the
eﬀort during imprisonment that is taken to ‘break the cycle’ by getting the prison-
ers to work and train outside their cell (see Ministry of Justice (2011)). In addition,
we include time outside-cell25 to fully acknowledge the beneĕcial aspects of other
outside-cell activities such as sports and recreation.
• Successful reintegration is proxied by focusing on employment at discharge. Employ-
ment at release is a direct indicator of successful reintegration. Promoting employ-
ment at release is challenging. At most, 44 percent of prisoners have employment at
release date. e number of discharges is included as non-discretionary output to
control for the quantity of oﬀenders that are released. Local prisons hold oﬀenders
with short sentences resulting in more discharges than the yearly average prison pop-
ulation. In 2009/10, the number of discharges was on average 1,310 while the average
prison population in the sample was 880. In 2011/12, this average number increased
to 1,526 while the number of average prison population held foot at 876. Success-
ful reintegration also highly depends on the socio-economic environment in which
prisoners are reintegrated. As this study deals with local prisons, we include the re-
gional male unemployment rate26 as output-speciĕc environmental variable. We as-
sume that the higher the regional male unemployment rate, the more diﬃcult it is to
ĕnd a job and thus to have employment at discharge.
• e three aspects of prison operation are highly conditioned by the heterogeneity in
available upon request show that however that inclusion of the overcrowding rate as environmental variable does
not alter the results.
24is is calculated as the average number of hours purposeful activity per prisoner per week times the average
prison population.
25is is calculated as 24 minus the average time within cell per prisoner, times the average prison population.
26e unemployment rates were retrieved from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is the largest household
survey in the UK and provides the oﬃcial measures of unemployment.
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prisoner inĘow. To take heterogeneity into account, we include the ‘predicted rate
of reoﬀending’ in an establishment as an environmental variable. e probability of
reoﬀending is estimated at prison level by the Ministry of Justice (2011), based on
prisoner-level data on social background, ethnicity, crime type, etc. We consider pris-
ons with an inĘow of prisoners which are more likely to re-oﬀend as having a more
diﬃcult operating environment.27 Note that it is possible to test for the direction of
the environmental eﬀect by following an approach suggested by Daraio and Simar
(2005, 2007a) (see Appendix 3.D). We assume that the inĘow of prisoners is beyond
control of the prison management.
Only considering observations with the same z can lead to a dramatic loss of com-
parison partners. To overcome this issue we assume monotonicity in the sense that
DMUs that can produce a given output in a more disadvantageous environment can
also produce the same output in a similar environment as the DMU in question. As
such, DMUs that operate in a less or equally advantageous environment can be used
to construct the output-speciĕc output sets.28
27It is sometimes argued that the quality of the socio-economic environment represents an input that is non-
discretionary for the management. In fact, the environmental variables in our approach could be considered as
undesirable inputs, which can not be scaled up or down. See Olesen et al. (2015) for a reference on how in general
to include ratio measures, which are oen used as contextual variables, as input and output data in DEA models.
28We followRuggiero (1996) to include environmental variables in the analysis, by including axiom3.5 in Section
3.2.3.
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Year Mean St.Dev. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Prison inputs
DeĘated overall resource expenditure per prisoner 2009/10 36601.76 7321.32 27248.38 32391.31 34962.52 38092.25 63691.60
(overallres) 2010/11 36697.52 8020.31 24938.20 32185.38 34627.37 39343.51 65503.96
2011/12 34556.44 7150.36 23736.67 30400.02 32253.57 36836.95 59392.22
Daily operations and administrative work related to incarceration
Certiĕed Normal Accommodation 2009/10 666.21 291.94 145.00 449.25 646.67 872.75 1186.00
(CNA) 2010/11 688.76 299.74 146.00 464.50 682.00 938.00 1187.00
2011/12 679.00 299.86 162.00 466.00 642.50 906.00 1187.00
Purposeful and outside-cell activities
Average prison population 2009/10 879.63 351.71 232.92 638.02 843.92 1165.77 1653.58
(avpop) 2010/11 881.38 349.07 228.00 621.00 891.50 1170.25 1621.00
2011/12 875.53 336.36 223.00 660.75 845.00 1121.75 1544.00
Average hours purposeful activity per week per prisoner 2009/10 20.63 3.72 16.29 18.09 19.91 22.29 34.98
(avpurp) 2010/11 21.32 3.83 16.90 18.68 20.48 23.30 35.20
2011/12 20.99 3.61 16.81 18.52 20.05 22.11 33.73
Average hours outside-cell per day per prisoner 2009/10 8.16 1.30 5.60 7.30 7.90 9.20 12.10
(outcell) 2010/11 8.40 1.30 5.80 7.80 8.10 9.00 12.90
2011/12 8.46 1.37 5.50 7.80 8.15 9.10 12.40
Successful reintegration of discharged oﬀenders
Number of Discharges 2009/10 1309.71 558.38 419.00 898.50 1207.00 1593.00 2933.00
(discharges) 2010/11 1417.60 519.15 460.00 1086.38 1376.50 1771.50 2575.50
2011/12 1525.50 576.55 417.00 1169.25 1421.00 1973.50 2839.00
Percentage of discharges with employment 2009/10 24.89 6.68 12.80 19.93 23.60 28.80 41.70
(emprate) 2010/11 27.68 7.37 14.00 22.00 28.00 31.00 44.00
2011/12 27.18 7.10 14.00 22.25 27.00 31.00 44.00
Prison characteristics
Predicted rate of reoﬀending 2009/10 62.76 2.84 54.16 61.61 63.00 65.05 67.17
(predreof) 2010/11 62.54 5.52 51.00 58.88 62.27 67.33 77.28
2011/12 62.09 4.76 53.40 58.87 61.20 65.91 74.18
Regional characteristics
Regional male unemployment rate 2009/10 8.61 1.53 6.30 7.10 9.10 9.80 11.20
(regunemp) 2010/11 9.39 1.85 6.70 7.70 10.10 10.50 13.00
2011/12 8.19 1.42 6.20 6.60 8.30 9.40 10.30
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
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overallres 1.00 0.83 0.84 0.27 0.26 0.59 0.14 0.45 -0.40
cna 0.83 1.00 0.94 0.14 0.14 0.72 -0.07 0.47 -0.40
avpop 0.84 0.94 1.00 0.23 0.22 0.77 -0.12 0.54 -0.30
avpurp 0.27 0.14 0.23 1.00 0.71 0.39 0.29 -0.00 -0.05
outcell 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.71 1.00 0.36 0.32 0.06 -0.11
discharges 0.59 0.72 0.77 0.39 0.36 1.00 -0.01 0.44 -0.31
emprate 0.14 -0.07 -0.12 0.29 0.32 -0.01 1.00 -0.31 -0.37
regunemp 0.45 0.47 0.54 -0.00 0.06 0.44 -0.31 1.00 0.09
predreof -0.40 -0.40 -0.30 -0.05 -0.11 -0.31 -0.37 0.09 1.00
Table 3.2: Correlogram
Table 3.2 shows the correlation between outputs, input and environmental variables.
Output variables that relate to qualitative aspects of prison production are scaled per pris-
oner as in Table 3.1. ere is modest correlation between input and outputs (even if not
scaled per prisoner), indicating there can be deviations fromoptimal conduct or eﬀects from
the heterogeneity in the operating environment. Overall resources are positively associated
with higher numbers of purposeful activity per prisoner (avpurp) and with time outside-cell
(outcell). e correlation between input and the predicted rate of reoﬀending, is -0.4, indi-
cating that prison characteristics are related to the size of the prison. Conditioning on the
operating environment is thus needed to meaningfully analyze returns to scale.
As expected, the regional unemployment rate is negatively related to employment at dis-
charge. Overall, Table 3.2 indicates a single output analysis cannot capture the production
process of prisons as it would imply an omitted variable bias. We need an empirical anal-
ysis that includes multi-output structure and environmental heterogeneity to meaningfully
estimate output-speciĕc returns to scale in prison production.
3.4 Results
e methodology allows for a simultaneous analysis of output-speciĕc scale eﬃciency and
technical eﬃciency. We ĕrst discuss the results on scale eﬃciency in Subsection 3.4.1 and
subsequently turn to technical eﬃciency in Subsection 3.4.2. As discussed in the method-
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ology section, the order-m subsample bootstrapping routine (withm=50 and 1000 random
draws)29 is applied to lower the sensitivity of the eﬃciency estimates to potential outliers
and extreme noise. In particular, the order-m eﬃciency measure is computed as the aver-
age over all draws. e order-m eﬃciency score can be interpreted as the expected eﬃciency
score relative to a subsample ofm = 50 prisons. Furthermore, this procedure allows us to
report the statistical signiĕcance of the returns-to-scale estimations, which is based of the
percentage of draws that leads to a particular returns to scale estimate. e most frequently
estimated returns to scale is the one we report.
3.4.1 Output-speciĕc returns to scale and scale eﬃciency
By applying the advocated framework on the empirical prison production model, we can
examine whether output-speciĕc returns to scale estimates diﬀer considerably over outputs,
implying a prison size dilemma for the public policy maker.
Incarceration Figure 3.4 shows returns to scale estimates and scale eﬃciency when the
focus is solely on incarceration. e higher the values above 1, the more room for improve-
ment. Scale eﬃciency estimates for the small and large prisons have values surpassing 1.5,
indicating potential eﬃciency gains of over 50% by rescaling these prisons. ese results are
not surprising, since the cost per place varies between 31200 and 65500 pounds per year.
Given that the estimates are conditional upon the environment, it is possible for exam-
ple that a particular prison is characterized by increasing returns to scale and that an even
smaller prison is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. e reason is that the former
prison is situated in a harsher environment than the latter. Although there is overlap be-
tween the returns to scale estimates, Figure 3.4 shows a clear pattern. Smaller prisons are
generally characterized by increasing returns to scale and larger prisons are characterized
by decreasing returns to scale.
Over the three book years, we ĕnd that 33 observations are characterizedwith decreasing
returns to scale and 62 with increasing returns to scale. For respectively 25 and 56 obser-
29evalue ofm is chosen on the basis of visually inspecting the relation between the proportion of observations
with 'm(v) < 1 and the value ofm as in Daraio and Simar (2007a).
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vations the returns to scale estimates are signiĕcant at the 95% conĕdence level (see Table
3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). We ĕnd 7 prisons characterized by constant returns to scale, whereof 4
signiĕcant at the 95% conĕdence level. e returns to scale estimates show no year- speciĕc
patterns.30
e optimal scale size in terms of resources is around 30 to 40 million pounds. In terms
of Certiĕed Normal Accommodation, the prisons characterized by constant returns to scale
provide between 606 and 1187 places. We therefore conclude that the optimal scale size of
a prison with respect to incarceration is medium to large scale, depending on the environ-
ment. For the smallest prisons we do not ĕnd any prison that is scale eﬃcient.
Figure 3.4: Returns to scale and scale eﬃciency with respect to incarceration, in function of
overall resource expenditure.
Purposeful and outside-cell activities Figure 3.5 shows the estimates for the models that
include the output variables that proxy purposeful and outside-cell activities to promote
30We did not ĕnd sub-constant returns to scale in our sample.
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humane incarceration and to prepare inmates for reintegration into society. With this focus,
we characterize 33 observations with drs, 63 with irs and 6 with crs. For respectively 22, 51
and 4 observations this is signiĕcant at the 95% conĕdence level. Overall, we ĕnd a similar
pattern of returns to scale and scale eﬃciency as for themodel focusing on keeping prisoners
outside society. Focusing on purposeful and outside-cell activities, the prisons characterized
by constant returns to scale provide between 606 and 1073 places. In terms of resources, the
optimal scale size to provide activities is a little more spread than before. Still, we do not
ĕnd supportive evidence for smaller prisons to be more scale eﬃcient in terms of providing
purposeful and outside-cell activities.31
Figure 3.5: Returns to scale and scale eﬃciency with respect to purposeful and outside-cell
activities, in function of overall resource expenditure.
Successful reintegration For successful reintegration we characterize respectively 32, 48
and 22 observations with respectively drs, irs and crs. For respectively 21, 22 and 18 ob-
31is result is robust for taking only one of the two proxies into the analysis.
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servations the rts estimates are signiĕcant. Figure 3.6 shows a pattern of returns to scale
and scale eﬃciency which highly diﬀers in terms of optimal scale size over the considered
environmental variables. e most productive scale size is in the broad interval of 10 to
50 million pounds and corresponds to prisons with a number of places between 221 and
1109.32 Although smaller prisons can be optimal to provide reintegration, we ĕnd just as
well medium and large prisons with an optimal scale size. Most probably, successful rein-
tegration is highly dependent on unobserved heterogeneity in the eﬀectiveness of reinte-
gration programmes which is given the sample of observations diﬃcult to disentangle from
economies of scale.
Figure 3.6: Returns to scale and scale eﬃciency with respect to successful reintegration, in
function of overall resource expenditure.
32ehigh number of prisons exhibiting constant returns to scale is a consequence of the fact that we include the
regional male unemployment rate as an additional environmental variable for the output successful reintegration.
As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis by only controlling for prisoner characteristics, but not for regional
characteristics. is results into only six prisons that exhibit constant returns to scale, however the technical and
scale eﬃciency of some prisons is unrealistically high. Still, the optimal scale sizes remain equally scattered and no
conclusions can be drawn about the optimal scale size with respect to successful reintegration.
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In sum, our results over the three considered outputs reject the idea that public man-
agers are faced with a prison size dilemma, which implies a choice between cost-per-place
performance and social performance. We cannot reject medium to large scale to be optimal.
Of course, the optimal scale size depends on the operating environment. For both incarcer-
ation and providing purposeful and outside-cell activities, we ĕnd supportive evidence that
a medium to large scale size is optimal. For successful reintegration, we ĕnd no supportive
evidence for drastic productivity gains by moving towards a very small prison scale.
Prison-speciĕc estimates eoverall ĕnding that there is no prison size dilemma requires
further prison-level consideration. Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 in appendix shows that for 12 ob-
servations, we do ĕnd a prison size dilemma in the sense we estimate a prison with output-
speciĕc technologies to be simultaneously characterized by drs and irs, both signiĕcant at
the 95% conĕdence level. For example, for HMP Bristol in book years 2009/10 and 2011/12,
we ĕnd it is optimal to scale down prison scale to improve successful reintegration and scale
up prison scale to improve the provision of purposeful and outside-cell activities and keep-
ing convicts outside society by incarceration. From an operational viewpoint, allowing for
output-speciĕc and environment-speciĕc returns to scale can be a valuable tool to provide
policy advice on re-scaling prison conduct, taking the complexity of multi-output produc-
tion into account.
3.4.2 Technical eﬃciency
Table 3.3 shows robust order-m technical eﬃciency estimates for the variable returns to
scale model ('m(v)) and the constant returns to scale model ('m(c)). Order-m eﬃciency
is reached when 'm = 1. Note that the prison under evaluation is not necessarily included
in the randomly drawn subsamples. Consequently, the order-m eﬃciency scores might be
smaller than one. If the eﬃciency score is smaller than one, a prison is called super eﬃcient.
Overall, values of'm larger than one indicate that, on the basis of a subsample ofm prisons,
we estimate that there is room to proportionally increase the production, given the input and
environment.
e ĕrst two columns show the respective vrs and crs results for the three outputs an-
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alyzed simultaneously, but allowing for output-speciĕc technologies. e other columns
show the results for the models that include only one output next to the input and output-
speciĕc environment.
With the exception of successful reintegration, Table 3.3 shows the technical eﬃciency of lo-
calmale prisons in England andWales is improving over time. Considering themulti-output
model, on average, the room for increasing production went from 2 percent in 2009/10 to
less than 0 percent (thus indicating super eﬃciency) in 2011/12. Stated diﬀerently, our es-
timates support the idea that the public policy of the coalition at place since 2010 was, at
least partly, successful in reducing ineﬃciencies.33 Still, some prisons considerably and per-
sistently underperform (see Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 in appendix). For example, technical ef-
ĕciency of HMP Belmarsh is estimated to be respectively 1.36, 1.45 and 1.37 in the three
consecutive book years considered. For HMP Manchester this is respectively 1.10,1.18 and
1.17.
In sum, using the advocated framework to consider multi-output prison production, we are
able to pinpoint low performers in terms of both scale eﬃciency and technical eﬃciency.
e persistent low performers require further attention from public managers. Are there
additional prison characteristics that could explain the low ĕgures?
Multi-Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Year '(v) '(c) '1(v) '2(c) '2(v) '2(c) '3(v) '3(c)
2009/10 1,02 1,30 1,09 1,48 1,15 1,59 1,34 1,78
(0,12) (0,29) (0,15) (0,31) (0,48) (0,68) (0,26) (0,39)
2010/11 1,00 1,19 1,07 1,41 1,14 1,54 1,08 1,34
(0,11) (0,31) (0,18) (0,34) (0,21) (0,47) (0,28) (0,45)
2011/12 0,97 1,19 1,04 1,36 1,09 1,48 1,21 1,55
(0,11) (0,26) (0,17) (0,29) (0,68) (0,89) (0,26) (0,41)
Table 3.3: Mean (standard deviation) of order-m eﬃciency scores
A common argument is that the age of the prison, rather than size alone is a determinant
of the performance outcome. In our sample, 23 prisons have been opened before 1900 and
33By pooling the three book years to perform the analysis, we assume that the prisons in the three consecutive
years operate under the same technology. We therefore assume that the cost savings simply forced the prisons to
operate in a more eﬃcient manner and did not lead to a shi in technology.
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9 prisons have been opened aer 1990. However, many of the oldest prisons have been ren-
ovated. e most recently built prisons are on average larger than the older establishments.
To separate the age eﬀect from size, we compared the new prisons only with the largest
older prisons.34 We performed Wilcoxon ranksum tests for the null hypothesis that new
and old prisons achieve the same eﬃciency level. Remarkably, the results indicate that the
new prisons are not signiĕcantly more eﬃcient in providing incarceration, nor in providing
purposeful and outside cell activities nor in reintegrating prisoners35.
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis shows that our results are robust to altering the speciĕcation of the prison
production model. e main ĕndings are robust to altering the proxies for the three out-
puts. For example, our main ĕndings are robust to including information on the number of
assaults (for which data reliability can diﬀer across prisons) or to extending the model to in-
clude accommodation at release, which is a necessary condition of successful reintegration.
Next, we have tested whether there might be a time lag on the prison production process.
To be concrete, we linked the inputs of a particular year to the output of the following year.
However this did not result into better eﬃciency scores. Results from the sensitivity analysis
are available upon request.
3.5 Conclusion
ere is little reason to expect public ĕrms to operate on their optimal scale size in the ab-
sence of competitive pressure. For prisons in England and Wales, there is a widespread
policy debate concerning whether very small housing blocks or very large, so called ‘titan’
prisons are the solution to improve the productivity of prisons. e general belief is that
small prisons can provide a safe and humane environment wherein prisoners can be well
34We only compared prisons with a certiĕed normal accommodation of at least 660 places.
35In total, we performed 9Wilcoxon ranksum tests, for each of the three outputs and for several eﬃciency mea-
sures. For the outputs incarceration, activities and reintegration, the p-value for the order-m eﬃciency score under
the assumption of variable returns to scale is respectively 77%, 25% and 85%. e p-value for the order-m ef-
ĕciency score under constant returns to scale is respectively 53%, 40% and 41%. Moreover, the p-value for the
scale eﬃciency is respectively 36%, 71% and 32%.
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prepared to reintegrate into society and large prisons are especially eﬀective when the focus
is on expenditures-per-prisoner. If indeed the case, publicmanagers would face a prison size
dilemma. However, it is unclear whether the observed data support the idea of a prison size
dilemma, as the policy debate does not go beyond an anecdotal discussion atmost supported
with partial indicators of reintegration and costs.
We provide a thorough examination of economies of scale using a completemulti-output
assessment that allows for interlinkages between the output of incarcerating convicts and
qualitative outputs (i.e., purposeful and outside-cell activity, successful reintegration) and
allows that economies of scale can diﬀer between the diﬀerent qualitative dimensions of
production.
Although our focus is on economies of scale in prisons, it is worth to note that the advo-
cated methodological framework is more generally applicable to multi-output public sector
organizations and multi-output manufacturing plants. For example Duncombe and Yinger
(1993) study economies of scale in diﬀerent dimensions of public production, with an ap-
plication to ĕre protection.36
With respect to prisons in England and Wales, we do not ĕnd supportive evidence for
the idea that public managers are confronted with a prison size dilemma. We cannot re-
ject medium to large scale to be optimal. Depending on the operating environment, we
ĕnd that medium to large scale size is optimal for both incarceration and providing pur-
poseful and outside-cell activities. For successful reintegration, the results are mixed, but
we do not ĕnd indications for drastic productivity gains by moving towards a very small
prison scale. Our results are therefore supportive for a policy oriented towards ‘titan’ pris-
ons, which are operated as a number of semi-autonomous units sharing a common site and
set of services. However, it is worth noting that our results are based on a given set of obser-
vations of prison production. e building of very small and very large prisons can coincide
with the introduction of new technologies, making extrapolation from the observed set of
prison production diﬃcult. Further research is needed to examine the optimal scale size to
introduce productivity enhancing technological innovations.
Furthermore, the pillar of the UK 2010 coalition concerning the reduction of technical
36Duncombe and Yinger (1993) use a parametric translog cost function framework to study economies of scale.
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ineﬃciencies within-prison is estimated to be, at least partly, successful. e technical eﬃ-
ciency is improving over the considered period 2009/10-2011/12 with the exception of the
output successful reintegration.
We demonstrate the value of themulti-output production framework to analyze and test
for output-speciĕc scale (dis-)economies, using publicly available local prison data provided
by the Ministry of Justice. As such, we provide a framework to test the success of recent
policies to lower average costs by changing the scale of prisons.
Still, theMinistry of Justice could further increase the discriminatory power of themethod-
ology by applying the advocatedmethodologywith detailed information on the allocation of
expenses to outputs and obtain evenmore detailed insight into the multi-output production
process of local male prisons.
3.A Proofs
Proof of proposition 3.1. We ĕrst verify that P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) satisĕes Axioms 3.1 - 3.6.
Axiom 3.4 follows from the deĕnition of rn and P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). Since rn(Xrn; rtsr) = 1
and n 2 Crn(rtsr), we have that yrn 2 P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). Moreover, Axioms 3.1 and 3.3
follow directly from the construction of P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) as the convex-monotone hull of
the scaled output vectors of the DMUs in the set Crn(rtsr). To verify Axiom 3.2, suppose
that Xr  Xr. By deĕnition of rs , we have that rs (Xr; rtsr)  rs (Xr; rtsr) and conse-
quently Crn(rtsr)  Crn (rtsr). is implies that P^ r(Xr;Zr; rtsr)  P^ r(Xr;Zr; rtsr).
To verify Axiom 3.5, suppose that Zr  Zr . If Zr  Zrs, then also Zr  Zrs, which implies
that Crn(rtsr)  Crn (rtsr). Consequently, P^ r(Xr;Zr; rtsr)  P^ r(Xr;Zr; rtsr). Lastly,
Axiom 3.6, is satisĕed since rs (krXr; rtsr) = krrs (Xr; rtsr) for all kr 2 K(rtsr):en
yr 2 P^ r(Xr;Zr; rtsr) implies that kryr 2 P^ r(krXr;Zr; rtsr) for kr 2 K(rtsr). We con-
clude that P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) satisĕes Axioms 3.1 - 3.6.
It remains to prove that for any P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) that satisĕes Axioms 3.1 to 3.6, we
have that P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)  P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). Take any yr 2 P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). We
need to prove that yr 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr). By the deĕnition of P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr), we have
3.B. PRISON-SPECIFIC ESTIMATES 115
given that
yr 
X
s2Crn(rtsr)
rs
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yrs
for some rs  0 such that
P
s2Crn(rtsr) 
r
s = 1.
We can now prove that yr 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) by using that P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) satisĕes
Axioms 3.1 to 3.6. First, Axiom 3.4 implies that
yrs 2 P r(Xrs;Zrs; rtsr)8s:
Using Axiom 3.6 we have that
rs (Xrn; rtsr)yrs 2 P r(rs (Xrn; rtsr)Xrs;Zrs; rtsr):
By deĕnition of rs we have that rs (Xrn; rtsr)Xrs  Xrn. Together with Axiom 3.2 this
implies that
rs (Xrn; rtsr)yrs 2 P r(Xrn;Zrs; rtsr) 8s:
Due to Axiom 5
rs (Xrn; rtsr)yrs 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) if Zrn  Zrs:
Combining the deĕnition of P^ r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr) with Axiom 3.3, this results into
yr 
X
s2Crn(rtsn)
rs
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yrs 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr)
forrs  0 such that
P
s2Crn(rtsr) 
r
s = 1. Finally, Axiom3.1 implies that yr 2 P r(Xrn;Zrn; rtsr).
3.B Prison-speciĕc estimates
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Year 2009/10 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison '(v) '(c) '1(v) '1(c) SE1 RTS '2(v) '2(c) SE2 RTS '3(v) '3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse 0,91 0,96 1,33 1,80 1,35 d*** 0,91 0,99 1,09 c 0,92 0,96 1,04 c
Bedford 0,97 1,45 0,97 1,66 1,72 i*** 0,98 1,60 1,64 i*** 0,97 1,45 1,51 i+
Belmarsh 1,36 2,05 1,36 2,05 1,51 d*** 2,17 2,98 1,37 d*** 3,28 3,73 1,14 d***
Birmingham 0,98 1,00 0,98 1,15 1,17 d*** 1,19 1,42 1,20 d 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Bristol 1,00 1,33 1,17 1,43 1,23 i** 1,00 1,33 1,34 i*** 1,28 1,66 1,30 d*
Brixton 1,00 1,38 1,00 1,38 1,37 i** 1,35 1,97 1,46 i*** 1,48 2,67 1,80 i
Bullingdon 1,06 1,14 1,06 1,14 1,08 c 1,06 1,31 1,23 d 1,43 2,41 1,69 i
Cardiﬀ 0,99 1,41 0,99 1,54 1,57 i*** 0,99 1,41 1,43 i** 1,28 1,44 1,13 i*
Chelmsford 0,99 1,08 0,99 1,35 1,36 i*** 1,08 1,50 1,38 i*** 1,04 1,08 1,04 d
Doncaster 0,94 1,00 0,98 1,18 1,20 i*** 0,94 1,05 1,11 i* 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Dorchester 0,99 1,76 1,10 2,13 1,95 i*** 1,01 2,44 2,42 i*** 0,99 1,76 1,79 i***
Durham 1,20 1,62 1,20 1,62 1,34 i*** 1,23 1,71 1,39 i*** 1,91 2,13 1,11 d***
Exeter 0,97 1,35 1,02 1,71 1,67 i*** 0,97 1,35 1,40 i*** 1,12 1,71 1,53 d
Forest Bank 0,93 0,99 1,12 1,16 1,04 d 0,93 0,99 1,06 c 1,07 1,29 1,21 d+
Gloucester 1,00 1,20 1,00 1,56 1,56 i*** 1,00 1,77 1,78 i*** 1,14 1,20 1,05 d*
High Down 1,00 1,10 1,02 1,10 1,08 d 1,42 1,68 1,18 i 1,00 1,90 1,91 i
Holme House 0,98 1,15 0,98 1,15 1,17 i*** 1,22 1,74 1,43 i*** 1,52 1,72 1,13 d***
Hull 0,99 1,34 1,00 1,34 1,34 i*** 0,99 1,38 1,39 i** 1,28 1,35 1,05 d***
Leeds 1,00 1,03 1,21 1,29 1,07 d 1,27 1,62 1,28 i* 1,00 1,03 1,03 d***
Leicester 0,94 1,01 1,07 1,84 1,72 i*** 0,99 1,80 1,82 i*** 0,94 1,01 1,07 i*
Lewes 0,91 1,11 0,91 1,11 1,22 i** 1,06 1,55 1,46 i*** 1,30 2,11 1,62 i
Lincoln 0,93 1,36 1,09 1,44 1,33 i*** 1,11 1,59 1,44 i*** 0,93 1,36 1,46 i
Liverpool 0,97 1,00 0,97 1,00 1,02 d 1,20 1,36 1,13 d+ 1,64 2,48 1,51 d
Manchester 1,10 1,49 1,10 1,53 1,38 d*** 1,11 1,49 1,34 d** 1,42 2,52 1,78 i
Norwich 0,97 1,32 0,97 1,32 1,36 i*** 1,03 1,49 1,44 i*** 1,20 1,51 1,26 i
Nottingham 1,26 1,84 1,29 1,91 1,48 i*** 1,26 1,84 1,46 i*** 2,32 3,03 1,31 i+
Parc 1,05 1,29 1,27 1,62 1,27 d*** 1,05 1,29 1,23 d* 1,38 2,28 1,66 i+
Pentonville 1,16 1,41 1,16 1,41 1,21 d*** 1,60 1,87 1,17 d*** 1,39 1,47 1,05 d***
Preston 1,00 1,00 1,09 1,75 1,60 i*** 1,00 1,49 1,49 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c**
Swansea 0,94 1,35 0,97 1,82 1,88 i*** 0,94 1,67 1,78 i*** 0,94 1,35 1,44 i***
Wandsworth 0,99 1,37 0,99 1,37 1,38 d*** 1,10 1,47 1,34 d*** 1,51 1,99 1,32 d***
Winchester 0,96 1,26 0,99 1,33 1,33 i*** 0,96 1,26 1,31 i** 1,40 1,71 1,22 i+
Woodhill 1,39 2,02 1,62 2,02 1,25 d*** 1,77 2,23 1,26 d* 1,39 2,24 1,61 i
Wormwood Scrubs 0,99 1,10 0,99 1,10 1,11 d* 1,30 1,53 1,18 d* 2,11 2,81 1,33 i+
Mean 1,02 1,30 1,09 1,48 1,36 1,15 1,59 1,39 1,34 1,78 1,33
(Standard Deviation) (0,12) (0,29) (0,15) (0,31) (0,24) (0,26) (0,39) (0,26) (0,48) (0,68) (0,28)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value,  indicates 95%,  indicates 99% and    indicates 99:9%.
Table 3.4: Order-m eﬃciency scores and returns to scale estimates (2009/10)
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Year 2010/11 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison '(v) '(c) '1(v) '1(c) SE1 RTS '2(v) '2(c) SE2 RTS '3(v) '3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse 0,92 0,99 1,37 1,92 1,40 d*** 0,92 1,10 1,19 d* 0,98 0,99 1,01 c*
Bedford 0,87 1,10 0,95 1,51 1,59 i*** 0,91 1,30 1,42 i*** 0,87 1,10 1,27 i+
Belmarsh 1,45 2,17 1,45 2,17 1,49 d*** 2,17 3,21 1,48 d*** 1,63 2,18 1,34 d***
Birmingham 0,99 1,22 1,04 1,22 1,17 d*** 1,08 1,32 1,22 d* 0,99 1,34 1,35 i
Bristol 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,44 1,44 i*** 1,00 1,30 1,30 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Brixton 1,00 1,57 1,20 1,57 1,30 i** 1,41 2,10 1,48 i*** 1,00 1,86 1,86 i***
Bullingdon 0,95 1,16 0,95 1,16 1,22 i** 1,00 1,22 1,21 d 1,56 2,34 1,50 d
Cardiﬀ 0,97 1,06 0,99 1,49 1,50 i*** 0,97 1,34 1,39 i** 1,00 1,06 1,06 i***
Chelmsford 0,95 1,00 0,99 1,34 1,35 i*** 0,97 1,30 1,34 i*** 0,95 1,00 1,05 c
Doncaster 0,78 0,93 0,93 1,11 1,20 i* 0,78 0,93 1,18 i 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Dorchester 1,00 1,49 1,00 1,90 1,90 i*** 1,00 2,18 2,18 i*** 1,00 1,49 1,49 i***
Durham 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Exeter 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,15 1,15 i*** 1,00 1,09 1,09 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Forest Bank 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Gloucester 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,50 1,50 i*** 1,00 1,76 1,76 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c**
High Down 0,99 1,09 0,99 1,09 1,10 i 1,37 1,57 1,15 d 1,00 1,09 1,09 i*
Holme House 0,98 1,00 0,98 1,00 1,02 i+ 1,00 1,67 1,67 i** 1,07 1,22 1,14 d***
Hull 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,22 1,22 i*** 1,00 1,45 1,45 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Leeds 1,00 1,00 1,19 1,27 1,06 d 1,20 1,50 1,25 i+ 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Leicester 0,99 1,00 1,07 1,83 1,72 i*** 1,00 1,78 1,77 i*** 0,99 1,00 1,01 i
Lewes 0,88 1,04 0,88 1,04 1,18 i* 1,29 1,87 1,45 i*** 0,89 1,16 1,30 i
Lincoln 0,92 1,43 1,09 1,45 1,32 i*** 1,21 1,71 1,42 i*** 0,92 1,43 1,56 i*
Liverpool 0,95 0,99 0,96 0,99 1,02 d 1,22 1,38 1,13 d+ 0,95 1,23 1,29 i
Manchester 1,18 1,62 1,22 1,67 1,37 d*** 1,18 1,62 1,38 d* 1,67 2,83 1,69 i
Norwich 0,89 1,13 0,95 1,13 1,19 i** 0,91 1,19 1,32 i*** 0,89 1,34 1,50 i*
Nottingham 1,05 1,21 1,18 1,43 1,22 i** 1,05 1,21 1,15 i* 1,22 1,59 1,31 d*
Parc 1,05 1,46 1,15 1,63 1,42 d*** 1,05 1,46 1,39 d*** 1,52 1,90 1,25 d***
Pentonville 1,00 1,00 1,17 1,36 1,16 d*** 1,47 1,65 1,12 d*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Preston 1,00 1,01 1,00 1,60 1,59 i*** 1,00 1,45 1,45 i*** 1,00 1,01 1,01 i***
Swansea 0,94 1,00 0,99 1,83 1,86 i*** 0,94 1,57 1,67 i*** 0,99 1,00 1,01 c*
Wandsworth 1,06 1,38 1,06 1,38 1,30 d*** 1,33 1,62 1,22 d** 1,30 1,51 1,17 d***
Winchester 0,99 1,21 0,99 1,21 1,22 i*** 0,99 1,29 1,30 i*** 1,00 1,28 1,28 d*
Woodhill 1,26 2,14 1,79 2,20 1,23 d*** 1,85 2,49 1,35 d* 1,26 2,14 1,70 d
Wormwood Scrubs 1,00 1,09 1,00 1,09 1,09 d* 1,44 1,71 1,19 d* 1,19 1,53 1,28 i*
Mean 1,00 1,19 1,07 1,41 1,31 1,14 1,54 1,35 1,08 1,34 1,22
(Standard Deviation) (0,11) (0,31) (0,18) (0,34) (0,23) (0,28) (0,45) (0,24) (0,21) (0,47) (0,24)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value,  indicates 95%,  indicates 99% and    indicates 99:9%.
Table 3.5: Order-m eﬃciency scores and returns to scale estimates (2010/11)
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Year 2011/12 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison '(v) '(c) '1(v) '1(c) SE1 RTS '2(v) '2(c) SE2 RTS '3(v) '3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse 0,94 1,07 1,34 1,78 1,33 d*** 0,94 1,11 1,18 d* 0,94 1,07 1,13 i
Bedford 0,85 1,13 0,87 1,41 1,62 i*** 0,85 1,32 1,55 i*** 0,86 1,13 1,32 i*
Belmarsh 1,37 1,92 1,37 1,92 1,41 d*** 2,10 2,92 1,39 d*** 2,82 3,03 1,07 d***
Birmingham 0,85 0,92 1,10 1,34 1,22 i* 1,08 1,43 1,32 i** 0,85 0,92 1,08 c
Bristol 0,99 1,22 0,99 1,33 1,34 i*** 0,99 1,31 1,33 i*** 0,99 1,22 1,23 d*
Brixton 1,04 1,50 1,04 1,50 1,44 i*** 1,26 1,87 1,49 i*** 1,56 1,89 1,21 d**
Bullingdon 0,91 1,14 0,91 1,14 1,26 i** 1,07 1,30 1,21 d 1,02 1,66 1,63 i
Cardiﬀ 0,98 1,18 0,98 1,48 1,52 i*** 1,00 1,53 1,54 i** 1,13 1,18 1,04 d+
Chelmsford 0,89 1,15 0,95 1,24 1,31 i*** 0,89 1,15 1,29 i** 0,94 1,42 1,51 i
Doncaster 0,72 0,87 0,94 1,08 1,16 i 0,72 0,87 1,20 i 0,99 1,32 1,33 d*
Dorchester 0,98 1,39 0,98 1,64 1,68 i*** 0,99 2,21 2,23 i*** 0,98 1,39 1,41 i***
Durham 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Exeter 1,00 1,05 1,00 1,46 1,46 i*** 1,00 1,48 1,48 i*** 1,00 1,05 1,06 d*
Forest Bank 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,34 1,34 i***
Gloucester 0,98 0,99 0,99 1,45 1,46 i*** 0,99 1,74 1,76 i*** 0,98 0,99 1,01 c*
High Down 0,86 1,02 0,86 1,02 1,19 i 1,22 1,51 1,23 d 0,90 1,49 1,65 i**
Holme House 0,97 0,99 0,97 0,99 1,03 c 0,98 1,25 1,27 i** 1,20 1,64 1,36 i**
Hull 0,99 1,00 0,99 1,15 1,16 i** 0,99 1,39 1,40 i** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Leeds 0,99 1,00 1,19 1,23 1,03 d 0,99 1,14 1,16 i+ 1,00 1,00 1,00 c**
Leicester 0,90 1,57 1,06 1,72 1,62 i*** 0,97 1,61 1,66 i*** 0,90 1,57 1,75 i***
Lewes 0,86 1,04 0,89 1,04 1,17 i+ 1,07 1,65 1,54 i*** 0,86 1,08 1,25 i
Lincoln 0,92 1,38 1,03 1,39 1,34 i*** 0,96 1,52 1,59 i*** 0,92 1,38 1,50 i*
Liverpool 0,91 0,95 0,91 0,95 1,05 c 1,10 1,32 1,20 d 0,92 1,16 1,26 i*
Manchester 1,17 1,53 1,22 1,59 1,31 d*** 1,17 1,53 1,31 d** 2,24 3,67 1,64 d
Norwich 0,90 1,09 0,97 1,09 1,13 i+ 0,90 1,18 1,32 i*** 0,96 1,12 1,17 i
Nottingham 0,97 0,99 1,05 1,35 1,28 i*** 0,97 1,05 1,09 i+ 0,98 0,99 1,01 c+
Parc 0,99 1,43 0,99 1,57 1,59 d*** 1,08 1,43 1,33 d*** 4,31 5,29 1,23 d***
Pentonville 0,87 1,08 1,15 1,23 1,07 d* 1,37 1,49 1,09 d 0,87 1,08 1,25 i
Preston 1,00 1,14 1,00 1,52 1,52 i*** 1,00 1,44 1,44 i*** 1,00 1,14 1,14 i***
Swansea 0,93 1,30 0,99 1,89 1,92 i*** 0,94 1,63 1,74 i*** 0,93 1,30 1,39 i*
Wandsworth 1,06 1,32 1,06 1,32 1,25 d*** 1,18 1,57 1,33 d* 1,26 1,91 1,51 i+
Winchester 0,97 1,06 0,97 1,20 1,24 i*** 0,99 1,43 1,45 i*** 0,97 1,06 1,10 d
Woodhill 1,22 1,95 1,78 2,08 1,17 d*** 1,76 2,38 1,35 d* 1,22 1,95 1,61 d
Wormwood Scrubs 0,99 1,04 0,99 1,04 1,04 d+ 1,44 1,71 1,19 d+ 1,60 2,37 1,48 d
Mean 0,97 1,19 1,04 1,36 1,30 1,09 1,48 1,37 1,21 1,55 1,28
(Standard Deviation) (0,11) (0,26) (0,17) (0,29) (0,22) (0,26) (0,41) (0,24) (0,68) (0,89) (0,22)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value,  indicates 95%,  indicates 99% and    indicates 99:9%.
Table 3.6: Order-m eﬃciency scores and returns to scale estimates (2011/12)
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3.C Dual formulation
In this section we discuss the dual formulation of the linear programming problem (LP-1) in
terms of revenue eﬃciency. We categorize each output as either discretionary, and assign it
to an index set Ird , or ĕxed, and assign it to an index set Irf , such that Ird[Irf = f1; : : : ;Mrg.
We obtain as dual problem (LP-2):
RErn(rts
r) = min
o0;P rm0
o 
X
m2Irf
yrmnP
r
m
s:t:
(R-1) o 
X
m2Ird
P rm
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yrms +
X
m2Irf
P rm
r
s (Xrn; rtsr)yrms 8s 2 Crn(rtsr)
(R-2)
X
m2Ird
yrmnP
r
m = 1:
To explain the revenue eﬃciency interpretation, we need to interpret the variables P rm
as shadow prices, which are used to value the outputs. In particular, P rm is the shadow
price of output yrm for m 2 f1; : : : ;Mrg. Next, the variable o can be interpreted as the
maximal (total) revenue that can be achieved, conditional on the level of input and the en-
vironment of DMU n. In particular, constraint (R-1) speciĕes that the maximal revenue
level can not be lower than the revenue level associated with any other DMU s which be-
longs to the comparison partners of DMU n (s 2 Crn(rtsr)). Note that the total revenue
consists of a discretionary part and a ĕxed part. Since a DMU has no control over the ĕxed
outputs, only the discretionary outputs should be taken into account to determine the rev-
enue eﬃciency. Constraint (R-2) deĕnes a normalization of the discretionary revenue for
the evaluated DMU n. Because DMU n’s discretionary revenue level is normalized to 1,
this makes that the objective function value o  Pm2Irf yrmnP rm can be interpreted as the
ratio of the maximum discretionary revenue, over the DMU’s actual discretionary revenue.
e above presented linear programming problem then selects the shadow prices such that
the ratio of the maximum discretionary revenue over the actual discretionary revenue is
minimized.
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3.D Robustness analysis environmental variables
We followed Ruggiero (1996) to control for environmental variables that aﬀect production.
Following this approach, we need information on the direction of the inĘuence of the envi-
ronmental factors. However, there are other possibilities to include environmental variables
in the analysis, which do not need such information. For example, Daraio and Simar (2005,
2007a) follow a probabilistic approach to include environmental variables. e authors in-
troduce a robust DEA estimator which conditions on external environmental factors, using
a kernel weighting approach. With this approach, prisons in a similar environment as the
prison under evaluation will have a larger probability to be drawn as a reference prison. In
particular, the samples of sizem are constructed by drawing with replacement among those
Yrs such that Xrs  Xr and such that the probability of drawing a prison corresponds to
K((Zr   Zrs )=h)PN
t=1K((Z
r   Zrt )=h)
;
whereK denotes a Kernel function and h an appropriate bandwidth. An advantage of
this method is that it is also possible to investigate the direction of the impact of the environ-
mental variables on the production process. As a robustness check, we test in this section
the direction of the environmental eﬀect by using the approach suggested by Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007a). ese papers suggest to plot the ratio of the conditioned to the un-
conditioned eﬃciency score, in function of the environmental aﬀect. An increasing pattern
reveals a favorable eﬀect of the environmental variable, a decreasing pattern reveals an unfa-
vorable eﬀect. To compute the conditioned eﬃciency score, we have used an Epanechnikov
kernel and estimated the bandwidth using the Sheater Jones rule of thumb. Since our anal-
ysis on the optimal scale size has shown that the prison production process does not exhibit
constant returns to scale, we apply the approach of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007a) for the
variable returns-to-scale model. Note that we test the eﬀect of one environmental variable
at a time, however it is perfectly possible investigate the impact of a multivariate vector of
environmental variables (see Daraio and Simar (2007a)).
First, we consider the eﬀect of the predicted rate of reoﬀending on each of the three out-
puts. We ĕnd that the predicted rate of reoﬀending indeed has a negative impact on the
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outputs incarceration (see Figure 3.7) and successful reintegration (see Figure 3.8), which
conĕrms our assumption that the predicted rate of reoﬀending has an unfavorable impact
on the prison production process. However, the eﬀect of predicted rate of reoﬀending on
the provision of purposeful and outside cell activities is less clear. In particular, the eﬀect
of the predicted rate of reoﬀending seems to have an inverted u-shaped function, indicating
that there is ĕrst a (small) favorable eﬀect of predicted rate of reoﬀending and consequently
a (small) unfavorable eﬀect. In principle, we could repeat the analysis on the optimal scale
size employing the approach suggested by Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007a) to control for
predicted rate of reoﬀending. is method allows the predicted rate of reoﬀending to have
a non-monotone eﬀect on the provision of purposeful and outside cell activities. For ease
of application for the practitioner, we have chosen to maintain the assumption of an unfa-
vorable impact of predicted rate of reoﬀending, and employ Ruggiero (1996) to control for
environmental variables. We argue that it might be interesting to take a closer look at three
of the observations with the lowest predicted rate of reoﬀending. ese three observations
seem to be much less eﬃcient if they are benchmarked against the whole sample. Since it is
counter intuitive that the predicted rate of reoﬀending has a favorable eﬀect, there might be
other confounding factors which led to this result.
Further, we consider the eﬀect of the regional male unemployment rate on the reinte-
gration output. We ĕnd - as expected - that the regional male unemployment rate has an
unfavorable impact on successful reintegration.
In principle, the age of the prison could also be seen as an environmental variable. We
check with the approach of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007a) what the impact is on the three
outputs, when controlling for the construction year of the prison. In particular, we ĕnd that
the most recently built prisons (aer 1990) have an advantage for the output incarceration.
We also ĕnd a positive eﬀect of construction year for the output activities. Finally, for the
output reintegration, we ĕnd almost no eﬀect of the construction year of the prison. In prin-
ciple, we could also have conditioned on the construction year of the prisons, to perform the
analysis on the most productive scale size. However, if we would condition on an additional
environmental variable, we would end up with a very small sample of comparison partners
for most prisons (the curse of dimensionality). Remember that in Section 3.4.2, we did not
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ĕnd signiĕcant diﬀerences between the average eﬃciency of old versus new (large) prisons.
is indicates that, once we condition on the predicted rate of reoﬀending and the regional
male unemployment rate, we ĕnd little eﬀect of the age of the prison.
Figure 3.7: Eﬀect of predicted rate of reoﬀending on eﬃciency ratio with respect to incar-
ceration
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Figure 3.8: Eﬀect of predicted rate of reoﬀending on eﬃciency ratio with respect to activities
Figure 3.9: Eﬀect of predicted rate of reoﬀending on eﬃciency ratio with respect to reinte-
gration
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Figure 3.10: Eﬀect of regional male unemployment rate on eﬃciency ratio with respect to
reintegration
Figure 3.11: Eﬀect of construction year on eﬃciency ratio with respect to incarceration
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Figure 3.12: Eﬀect of construction year on eﬃciency ratio with respect to activities
Figure 3.13: Eﬀect of construction year on eﬃciency ratio with respect to reintegration
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Revealed preferences for time with
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Abstract
We study a labor supply model with home production of child well-being.
In this model, child well-being is produced by means of parental time and ex-
penditures. e distinguishing feature of our study is that we allow for process
beneĕts. We take into account that part of the parent’s time spent with children
is also a substitute for the caring parent’s leisure. Our approach to modeling
process beneĕts is novel in the sense that it does not require a parametric spec-
iĕcation of the household’s utility function and of the household’s production
technology. Moreover, the output of the home production need not be ob-
served. is makes our test particularly useful to investigate nonmarketable
goods such as child well-being. We apply our model to a data set on consump-
tion and time use choices of Dutch households. We ĕnd that process beneĕts
signiĕcantly improve the goodness-of-ĕt of our labor supply models. We also
recover the distribution of process beneĕts in the sample. For robustness, we
apply our methodology both to a unitary and a collective labor supply model.1
1is chapter is based on joint work with SamCosaert (KU Leuven). We thank Bart Capéau, Laurens Cherchye,
Pierre-André Chiappori, Bram De Rock, François Maniquet and Frederic Vermeulen for many helpful comments.
We are also grateful for the referee reports from the reading group on collective models of household consumption
at ULB. Our thanks also goes to themembers of the research center of Public Economics Leuven and participants of
the EEA conference in Mannheim. Finally, the LISS panel data were collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University,
e Netherlands) through its MESS project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientiĕc Research
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4.1 Introduction
Spending time in more or less enjoyable ways has an impact on our well-being. ere is
no doubt that leisure-activities, such as relaxing and socializing, are enjoyable. However
many people also derive pleasure from non-leisure activities. Juster (1985) designed a set
of questions to investigate the extent to which various activities are enjoyable. In particular,
Juster (1985) asked respondents in a US time survey, to rate how much they generally enjoy
a given type of activity, such as cleaning the house, cooking, taking care of the children
and so forth. Juster (1985) speciĕcally asked the respondents to keep in mind that he was
interested inwhether they liked the activity, irrespective ofwhether they think it is important
to do. To capture the utility that accrues during particular activities, Dow and Juster (1985)
and Juster et al. (1985) introduce the notion of process beneĕts. Similarly, Hallberg and
Klevmarken (2003) used Swedish data to rank activities on the basis of the reported process
beneĕts. e authors found that households perceive spending time with their children as
one of the most enjoyable activities. It is more enjoyable than watching TV, market work
and reading books or magazines, on average. Schwarz et al. (2009) and Krueger et al. (2009)
argue that asking people about how they feel about activities in general provides a diﬀerent
ranking than when their actual experiences are used to guide their reported feelings during
those activities. An alternative to the set of questions designed by Juster (1985), is a time
use diary to measure process beneĕts (Gershuny and Halpin (1996), Robinson and Godbey
(1997) and Krueger et al. (2009)). For example, Krueger et al. (2009) work with a time use
diary in which individuals can indicate the nature of the activity and the extent to which
various emotions (happy, tired, stressed, sad, interested and pain) were present or absent.
Still, Krueger et al. (2009) also ĕnd that child care belongs to the more enjoyable activities,
more than housework and working.
e above mentioned studies attempt to directly measure process beneĕts. However, we
will followGraham andGreen (1984), Kerkhofs andKooreman (2003) andGørtz (2011) and
apply a structural labor supply model to analyze process beneĕts, on the basis of consump-
tion and time use data. Doing so, there is no need to directly observe the process beneĕts.
Instead, we test whether models with varying degrees of process beneĕts can describe the
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observed behavior.
We focus in particular on process beneĕts related to child care. We explicitly model
the fact that parents may enjoy caring for the children by assuming that child care time is
to some extent a substitute for leisure. In line with existing models, parents of course also
invest time in their children because they care about the well-being of the children. Child
care time therefore ‘jointly’ produces child well-being and leisure for the caring parent. e
challenge is that child well-being is neither observed nor marketable. For this reason, we
follow a nonparametric - revealed preference - approach which requires no information on
the output or price associated with child well-being. Moreover, our approach is independent
of functional restrictions on the parents’ preferences.
Literature e theory of time allocation, initiated by Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977),
typically assumes that household members allocate their time to either market work, leisure
or some domestic production activity. Indeed, households can produce certain ‘domestic’
commodities by allocating their time and resources to the corresponding activity. Notable
examples include the cleaning of the house, cooking, or caring for the household’s own chil-
dren. In the latter case, child well-being is treated as a domestic commodity which is pro-
duced by a combination of time spent with children and consumption goods allocated to
children.
Remarkably, the models by Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977) do not allow joint produc-
tion. However, it seems reasonable that time allocated to the production of a commodity also
‘directly’ impacts on utility, when household members enjoy spending time in that particu-
lar way. Pollak and Wachter (1975) even argue that when time is an input in the household
production process, joint production is the rule and not an exception.2 Graham and Green
(1984), Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) and Gørtz (2011) extended Gronau (1977)’s model
by implementing process beneĕts. ey allow time spent on a particular commodity to gen-
erate both indirect utility, through the commodity which is produced, and direct utility in
2Pollak and Wachter (1975) provide a critique on the household production function approach. ey argue
that only in the absence of joint production and under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the demand for
commodities should be analyzed in terms of commodity prices. If not, the implicit commodity prices depend on
the commodity bundle consumed. At the same time, the authors argue that joint production is a realistic scenario.
Although allowing for joint production thus complicates the estimation of the demand for commodities, it is still
perfectly possible to analyze the allocation of goods and time among household activities.
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terms of leisure. Speciĕcally, the authors treat some part of the time input as a substitute to
pure leisure time.
In this chapter, we present a revealed preference test for rational consumption and time
use that takes into account that parents enjoy process beneĕts related to child care. is
methodology enables us to identify process beneĕts for mothers and fathers. e contribu-
tion of this chapter to the literature is three-fold.
Contributions First, we propose an empirical test to verify whether we can explain the
observed child care behavior of parents by a household labor supply model with home pro-
duction and process beneĕts. In contrast toGraham andGreen (1984), Kerkhofs andKoore-
man (2003) and Gørtz (2011) who focus on estimating a parametric version of the model
with and without process beneĕts, this chapter aims at testing whether models with varying
degrees of process beneĕts can describe the observed behavior. Given this focus, we de-
velop a characterization in which neither the household’s objective function nor the intra-
household production technology are speciĕed. is nonparametric approach avoids a so
called ‘dual hypothesis’. Indeed, in a parametric framework, a rejection of rationality might
indicate irrational behavior on behalf of the household, but also an incorrect speciĕcation of
the household’s utility function and/or production function. By following a revealed prefer-
ence approach, we can rule out the issues corresponding to the dual hypothesis. Although
we do not impose a functional speciĕcation for the utility function nor for the household
production function, we will do so for the process beneĕts. In particular, we follow Gra-
ham and Green (1984), Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) and Gørtz (2011) for a functional
speciĕcation of the process beneĕts which is fully determined by a single parameter i. is
parameter i will allow us to quantify the degree of process beneĕts in a straightforward
manner.
e revealed preference approach enables us to study smaller samples and allows us to
vary the process beneĕts across individuals. is gives insight in the distribution of pro-
cess beneĕts across the sample. We build on the revealed preference characterizations by
Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). e revealed prefer-
ence conditions in the context of home production are closely related to revealed preference
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conditions that characterize data sets that are consistent with the maximization of a weakly
separable utility function (Varian (1983) and Cherchye et al. (2015c)). However, a crucial
diﬀerence is that we allow for joint production and thereby relax the assumption of perfect
weak separability.3
Moreover, we use this methodology to compute the eﬃciency of households’ consump-
tion and time use decisions in monetary terms. Towards this end, we adopt an idea put
forward by Afriat (1973) and Varian (1990), i.e. the Critical Cost Eﬃciency index. e Crit-
ical Cost Eﬃciency index computes the amount by which each observed budget set must
be perturbed in order for the observed decisions to be optimal. We employ the critical cost
eﬃciency index as a measure of goodness-of-ĕt, indicating how well the theoretical model
ĕts the observed data.
Second, our speciĕc focus on the domestic production of child well-being requires us to
follow a diﬀerent approach thanGraham andGreen (1984), Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003)
andGørtz (2011). Because these authors build on the original model (without process bene-
ĕts) by Gronau (1977), they implicitly assume perfect substitutability betweenmarket goods
and the corresponding domestically produced goods. We acknowledge that this assumption
is reasonable for most domestically produced goods, however it seems unrealistic to assume
that child well-being can be purchased in itself. For this reason, we no longer assume perfect
substitutability for the domestically produced commodity in our setting. Moreover, Pollak
and Wachter (1975) argue that it is diﬃcult to measure child well-being as the output of a
production technology. One could use diﬀerent metrics as a proxy for child well-being, or
combine several single metrics in an aggregate measure for child well-being. However, since
it is hard to identify what ‘deĕnes’ child well-being, and since the relevant evaluation criteria
also depend on the preferences of the parents, both approaches are debatable. e advan-
3Note that latent separability, introduced by Blundell and Robin (2000), is another generalization of weak sep-
arability. Latent separability also weakens the assumption of mutually exclusive commodity groupings. In house-
hold production theory, latent separability corresponds to the case where consumption goods are used to produce
more than one intermediate good. Each intermediate good is then produced by a part of the total amount of con-
sumption goods. Blundell and Robin (2000) give the example of electricity, which may be used for cooking and
for lighting. However, latent separability does not capture joint production. When time is an input in the house-
hold production process, it simultaneously produces a home produced good and a substitute to pure leisure. In
fact, latent separability is analogous to a production setting with output-speciĕc inputs (see Chapters 2 and 3). By
contrast, the notion of process beneĕts corresponds to a setting with joint inputs.
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tage of our approach is that neither prices nor the outputs related to child well-beingmust be
observed. e revealed preference conditions are well-suited to deal with unknown shadow
prices and domestic commodities, while it is still possible to impose restrictions on the do-
mestic production technology. We apply our model to data that is drawn from the LISS
(Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel administered by CentERdata
(Tilburg University, e Netherlands). Our test only requires information on the time use
of both partners, their individual wages, and the allocation of (market) goods among the
household members. is information is readily available in the LISS panel.
ird, we extend our nonparametric test of process beneĕts to a collective setting, devel-
oped by Chiappori (1988, 1992). By now, the collective model has become a standardmodel
to analyze decisions of households on time use and consumption. In contrast to the unitary
setting, which assumes that households behave as if they were a single decision maker, the
collective setting explicitly recognizes that households consist of multiple decision makers,
each having their own preferences. In the ĕrst part of the chapter, we develop a unitary test
of the household labor supply model with home production and process beneĕts. Conse-
quently, we extend our test to a collective setting. In a collective setting, we consider the
well-being of the children as a public good in the household (Blundell et al. (2005) and
Cherchye et al. (2012)).
Outline In Section 2, we present a labor supply model that incorporates home production
and process beneĕts related to child care. Although our model can, in principle, deal with
process beneĕts associated with all possible household activities (or even market work), we
focus on child care. In Section 3, we derive a revealed preference test for consistencywith the
newly proposed model, in a unitary setting. We show that the conditions have an intuitive
interpretation. Section 4 presents our data sample from the LISS panel and gives summary
statistics for all relevant variables, including expenditures, individual wages and time use
information. In Section 5 we identify the level of process beneĕts necessary to maximize
the goodness-of-ĕt of our general model. In Section 6, we introduce process beneĕts in the
collective model, as a ĕnal robustness check. Section 7 concludes.
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4.2 eory
In this section, we demonstrate how process beneĕts can be incorporated in a (unitary)
labor supply model. We ĕrst present a baseline labor supply model with home production
but without process beneĕts. Next, we formally introduce process beneĕts and their eﬀect
on the household’s preference ordering.
Unitary labor supply with domestic production Households decide on how to allocate
the available time and goods within the household. In ourmodel, parents allocate their time
among market workmi, child care hi and leisure li. For each parent i the time constraint is
therefore equal to
hi + li +mi = T i:
Each hour of market work yields a wage wi. Hence, the amount of market work of both
parents determines the household budget constraint:
q +X = w1m1 + w2m2 + y:
e diﬀerence between total expenditures and total labor income is the (residual) non-
labor income y; which can be positive or negative. e parents in the household consume a
Hicksian composite good q, with a price normalized to one. Next to their own consumption,
the parents invest a partX of the household budget in the children. Following Becker (1960)
and Becker (1965), wemodel these expendituresX and the time invested in children h1 and
h2 as inputs in a household technology that produces child well-beingQ(h1; h2; X).
Finally, we assume that parents also value their leisure. is gives the following house-
hold level utility function
U(q;Q(h1; h2; X); l1; l2);
in which the ĕrst argument is the Hicksian composite good q, the second argument Q
is child well-being, and the ĕnal arguments are leisure.
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Note that we assume separability between the decisions on private consumption, private
leisure and child well-being on the one hand and other household-related decisions on the
other hand. We assume that some exogenous amount of time is allocated over market work,
leisure and child care, and that this allocation is independent of other categories of time use.
As a result, the total amount of time T i is individual speciĕc.
Moreover, we implicitly assume that households maximize the above objective function
as if theywere a single decisionmaker. In Section 6, wewill relax this assumption by building
on the collective model by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988).
Although the above expression nests a production functionwithin the household’s utility
function, it is still a fairly typical representation of a household’s preference ordering in a
classical labor supply setting. We will extend this setting by allowing for process beneĕts.
Process beneĕts Speciĕcally, we take into account that parents can ‘enjoy’ spending time
with their children. In such case, each unit of time hi invested in child care jointly produces
indirect utility (through the utility of the child) and direct utility in terms of leisure. In-
deed, we will add a speciĕc fraction of hi to the pure leisure li of parent i. We express this
relationship between total leisure Li; pure leisure li and child care hi as follows:
Li(li; hi) = li + gi(hi);
where gi(hi) gives the additional leisure-equivalent time that enters the utility function
as a result of child care time hi. Towards this end, we follow Graham and Green (1984) and
Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) and propose the following functional form:
gi(hi) = hi   1
(T i)i
(hi)1+
i
1 + i
: (4.1)
e attractive feature of the functional speciĕcation gi is that the shape of this function
is fully determined by the parameter i. Figure 4.1 provides insight in the evolution of gi()
conditional on i: A setting without process beneĕts corresponds to a i equal to 0: child
care is not valued as leisure. By contrast, for i approaching to inĕnity, each hour of child
care is almost fully valued as leisure.
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Figure 4.1: Leisure-equivalent function for diﬀerent speciĕcations of i
e function gi satisĕes the following properties:
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e intuition behind these properties is the following. For a positive value of i, the ĕrst
hour of child care is fully valued as an hour of leisure, whereas each additional hour of child
care is valued less so. e extent to which this decreases is determined by the parameter i:
the parameter i captures the intensity of the process beneĕts. We can now set up a new
household objective function
U(q;Q;L1; L2) = U(q;Q(h1; h2; X); l1 + g1(h1); l2 + g2(h2));
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in which the leisure arguments are augmented with process beneĕts g1(h1) and g2(h2),
respectively. We could also allow for multiple kinds of process beneĕts. For example child
care hi gives process beneĕts gi(hi) andmarket workmi gives process beneĕts ki(mi) such
that total leisure Li = li + gi(hi) + ki(mi): In such a framework, it is possible that mar-
ket work is more enjoyable than child care. However, let us focus on the process beneĕts
associated with child care in this chapter.
At this point, it might be worth noting that in the original work by Becker (1965), dif-
ferent time uses have diﬀerent values. In practice, the value of a person’s diﬀerent time uses
is not observed. A typical solution is to assume that an individual’s diﬀerent time uses have
a uniform price, which is equal to the individual’s market wage. is is also the way we han-
dle the opportunity cost of child care and leisure. However, as Cherchye et al. (2015a) and
Chiappori and Lewbel (2015) argue, this leads to a fundamental identiĕcation problem and
it is impossible to disentangle preferences from technologies. is would bring us back to
the traditional labor supply model, in which all non-market time can be aggregated into a
single composite ‘leisure’. However, by the way we include household production and pro-
cess beneĕts into themodel, we impose additional structure on the opportunity cost of child
care time. As we will show in the empirical application, diﬀerent speciĕcations of process
beneĕts do not lead to observationally equivalent models.
Unitary labor supplywithdomestic productionandprocess beneĕts We focus onhouse-
holds with two parents (i = 1; 2) and one or more children. According to the (unitary) la-
bor supply model, households maximize a joint objective function, subject to the household
budget constraint.
Problem 4.1. Optimization problem U   PB
max
q;h1;h2;l1;l2;X
U(q;Q(h1; h2; X); l1 + g1(h1); l2 + g2(h2))
s.t. q +X + w1s(h1 + l1) + w2s(h2 + l2)  w1sT 1s + w2sT 2s + ys
To optimize Problem 4.1, households decide on q; h1; h2; l1; l2 andX . Suppose we have
a data set S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg in which we observe these deci-
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sions. We consider the observed decisions to be rational if there exists a utility function
U and a production functionQ such that the observations (qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s) solve op-
timization problem U   PB. Alternatively to the notion rationality, we will also use the
notion of consistency with a particular model, to make explicit which behavioral model we
have in mind when discussing rationality. e data set S is said to be consistent with the
unitary labor supply model with home production and process beneĕts.
Deĕnition 4.1. Consider a data set S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg. We say
that the data set S is consistent with the unitary labor supply model with home production
and process beneĕts gi if there exist a concave utility function U and a concave production
functionQ such that the observed decisions solve optimization problem U   PB.
We assume that the observed choices inS are the results of the decisionmaking process
of households with the same preferences and the same household production function. In
the empirical application, we work with a cross section of households. To test consistency
of observed choices, we will divide households in the sample into household types, on the
basis of observable characteristics. We then assume that households belonging to the same
household type have the same preferences and household production function.
4.3 Revealed preference
In this section, we introduce necessary and suﬃcient conditions to test whether the deci-
sions of a number of households s 2 S can be described as rational choices, conditional
on some speciĕcation of the process beneĕts g1 and g2: Towards this end, we use revealed
preference methodology and we impose no structure on the household’s utility function U
and production function Q. We simply test the joint hypothesis of rational behavior and
process beneĕts captured by g1 and g2:e results will be independent of any parametric
speciĕcation of preferences or the household’s production technology.
is leads to a sharp test of rationality: behavior is either rational or not rational. Next,
we relax our conditions to test whether household behavior is ‘nearly’ optimizing under the
assumption of some level of process beneĕts. In particular, we allow households to make a
small optimization error and thereby waste a small fraction of the household budget. We
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use an adaptation of Afriat’s Critical Cost Eﬃciency Index, which has an intuitive monetary
interpretation.
e tests that we discuss allow us to verify consistency of a model with the data. We
will use these methods in Section 5 to test the rationality (eﬃciency) of the households’
decisions given some speciĕcation of process beneĕts. To be more speciĕc, we assume that
themodel with the largest eﬃciency index ĕts the data best. is allows us to examine which
speciĕcation of process beneĕts is the most appropriate. Furthermore, we also discuss the
discriminatory power of the tests in Section 5.
4.3.1 Setting the stage: individual labor supply
Before we derive testable revealed preference conditions for Deĕnition 4.1, we present the
more simple revealed preference conditions associatedwith an individual labor supplymodel
(without home production and without process beneĕts). Consider for instance a setting
where an individual chooses to allocate her time over market workm and leisure l. Utility
is derived from leisure l and from a good q (with price p) purchased with the labor income
w m. By choosing (qs; ls) the individual solves
max
q;l
U(q; l) s.t. psq + wsl  wsTs:
Suppose there exist s 2 S observations of price-quantity pairs (ps; ws; qs; ls): ese
jSj observations can correspond to the individual’s labor supply in jSj diﬀerent time pe-
riods (under the assumption of stable preferences) or to the labor supply decisions of jSj
diﬀerent individuals with homogeneous preferences. To investigate whether there exists a
utility functionU(; ) that rationalizesS = f[qs; ls]; [ps; ws]js 2 Sg4, one can use Afriat’s
eorem.5
Proposition 4.1. For a given data set S = f[qs; ls]; [ps; ws]js 2 Sg; the following state-
ments are equivalent:
4We assume that the setS is a ĕnite set. For inĕnite data sets, we refer to Reny (2015) for equivalent conditions.
In particular, there not necessarily exists a utility function which is concave and continuous, if the data set satisĕes
GARP. Concavity and continuity are in the inĕnite case replaced by weaker assumptions.
5We refer to seminal contributions by Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982).
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1. ere exists a locally non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data setS .
2. ere exists a continuous, concave and monotone utility function that rationalizes the
dataS .
3. ere exist s 2 R++ and us 2 R+ such that 8s; v 2 S :
us   uv  v(pv(qs   qv) + wv(ls   lv)):
4. e data setS satisĕes GARP.
Conveniently, this equivalence theorem provides us with two practical tests for the ex-
istence of a (continuous, concave and monotone) utility function that rationalizes the data.
First, rationality requires that there exist strictly positive variables s and positive utility
numbers us such that the so called Afriat inequalities hold. e inequalities combine the
ĕrst-order conditions (where Uqv and Ulv are the marginal utilities from private consump-
tion and leisure, respectively),
Uqv = vpv and Ulv = vwv
with concavity of the utility function.
Alternatively, rationality requires thatS = f[qs; ls]; [ps; ws]js 2 Sg satisĕes the Gen-
eralized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Essentially, the GARP constructs combi-
natorial restrictions by which rationality can be tested. First, GARP requires that if psqs +
wsls  psqv + wslv then bundle (qs; ls) is directly revealed preferred over bundle (qv; lv)
(or formally, (qs; ls)R0 (qv; lv)). Indeed, (qv; lv) was aﬀordable at prices s but yet not cho-
sen. Second, GARP imposes that the (direct) revealed preference relations are transitive. If
(qs; ls)R0 (qv; lv)R0 (qz; lz) then (qs; ls)R (qz; lz) because bundle (qs; ls) is (indirectly)
revealed preferred over bundle (qz; lz): Finally, GARP states that when (qs; ls)R (qz; lz), it
should not be the case that pzqs +wzls < pzqz +wzlz because when bundle s is preferred
to bundle z there is no reason to purchase bundle z at prices (pz; wz).
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4.3.2 Revealed preference analysis of labor supply with home produc-
tion and process beneĕts
In this paragraph, we derive the revealed preference conditions for a (unitary) labor supply
model with home production and process beneĕts. ese conditions allow to test whether
households behave as rational agents given that the household members experience certain
levels of process beneĕts. At this point, it is worth to emphasize that the test is conditional
on a particular speciĕcation of the process beneĕts. We have chosen to do so for practical
reasons. When the function gi is speciĕed, one can compute the values gi(his) and @g
i
@h (h
i
s).
Otherwise, the testable conditionswould always remain nonlinear andhard to check in prac-
tice. In the empirical application, wewill check a variety of parameter values for the function
gi and select the values that give the best empirical ĕt of the model to the data.
Before presenting the testable conditions, we ĕrst compute the ĕrst-order conditions
associated with Problem 4.1. A more extensive discussion is available in Appendix 4.B. e
ĕrst-order conditions associated with q and l simply impose that
Uqs = s and ULis = Ulis = sw
i
s;
with s the Lagrange multiplier. Let us then focus on the ĕrst-order conditions associated
with home production. We obtain that
UQsQhis + ULis
@gi
@his
= sw
i
s and UQsQXs = s:
In these conditions, Uqs , UQs , ULs and Uls give the marginal utility with respect to qs,
Qs, Ls and ls. Qhis is the marginal productivity of child care by parent i and QXs is the
marginal productivity of money spent on children. In words, the latter condition shows
that the marginal willingness to pay for child well-being UQs=s is equal to the price of an
additional unit of child well-being (1=QXs) in equilibrium. Rewriting these equations gives
Qhis
QXs
= wis(1 
@gi
@his
): (4.2)
is is exactly the condition for an optimal (i.e. cost minimizing) allocation of inputs
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applied to our setting. e only diﬀerence with respect to a labor supply model without
process beneĕts is the (1  @gi=@his) factor. is factor decreases the relative input price of
child care to the extent that the parent i enjoys child care. In the limit, when process beneĕts
are maximal (@gi=@his ! 1), it may be rational to care for children even if this is almost not
productive (i.e. ifQhis ! 0).
We ĕnally combine these restrictions with concavity of the utility function and concavity
of the production function. is gives the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For a given data set S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg, the
following statements are equivalent:
1. e data setS is consistent with the unitary labor supply model with home production
and process beneĕts g1 and g2.
2. ere exist shadow prices }s 2 R++; production levels Qs 2 R+; utility numbers
us 2 R+ and multipliers s 2 R++ such that 8s; v 2 S :
(a) uv   us  s
 
(qv   qs) + }s(Qv  Qs) + w1s(L1v   L1s) + w2s(L2v   L2s)

(b) }s(Qv Qs)  w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v h1s)+w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v h2s)+ (Xv Xs)
with Lis = Li(lis; his) = lis + gi(his).
3. ere exist shadow prices}s 2 R++ and production levelsQs 2 R+, such that 8s; v 2
S :
(a) the data set f(1; }s; w1s ; w2s ; qs; Qs; L1s; L2s)g satisĕes GARP
(b) }s(Qv Qs)  w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v h1s)+w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v h2s)+ (Xv Xs)
with Lis = Li(lis; his) = lis + gi(his).
is gives a necessary and suﬃcient test of consistency with Deĕnition 4.1. e set of
conditions (2a) is formally similar to the standard Afriat inequalities. It results from com-
bining concavity (of the utility function) and the ĕrst-order conditions of the optimization
problem. e set of conditions (2b) stems from concavity of the production function. We
refer to Appendix 4.A for a proof.
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In contrast to the standard Afriat inequalities in Proposition 4.1, the second set of condi-
tions is not easily veriĕed. e diﬃculty is that the prices }s and corresponding quantities
Qs of child well-being are both unobserved. is problem is inherent to the ‘child well-
being’ good under consideration because it is nonmarketable (its ‘price’ is unobserved) and
hard to measure (its ‘quantity’ is unobserved). We have already discussed in the introduc-
tion that the parametric approach to home production, as initiated by Gronau (1977), is less
useful for studying nonmarketable goods. An attractive feature of our nonparametric ap-
proach is that prices or outputs of the domestically produced good need not be observed.
However, this leads to a set of nonlinear conditions due to the factors }s(Qv  Qs).
To obtain testable conditions, we useAfriat’s theorem to translate condition (2a) in terms
of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (see supra) and obtain condition (3a). We
indicate in Appendix 4.B how conditions (3a) and (3b) can be tested by solving a mixed
integer linear programming problem. e revealed preference relations are then captured
by binary variablesRsv which have a value equal to one if and only if us  uv .
4.3.3 Empirical issues
To end this section, we discuss three empirical issues which are relevant for the interpreta-
tion of our results in Section 4.5: the goodness-of-ĕt of ourmodel, shadow price restrictions
and the non-nestedness of diﬀerent speciĕcations of process beneĕts.
Goodness-of-ĕt e test in Proposition 4.2 is a ‘sharp’ test of rationality: a data set is ei-
ther rationalizable or not. However, such a sharp test is not always informative. Following
Afriat (1973) and Varian (1990) we allow ‘nearly’ rational decision makers to make small
optimization errors. We therefore relax the conditions in Proposition 4.2 such that a house-
hold is allowed to waste a part of the household budget. Before relaxing Proposition 4.2,
note that the inclusion of process beneĕts into the model has consequences for the oppor-
tunity cost of time. Intuitively, in a situation in which process beneĕts are present, a choice
of child care time his and pure leisure lis, at price wis and process beneĕts gi, could be inter-
preted as if the parent chose the combination of child care time his and equivalent leisure
Lis, with the opportunity cost of time respectively equal to (1   @g
i
@his
)wis and wis. To al-
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low households to waste a part of the budget, we will relax the conditions in Proposition
4.2 by replacing the chosen bundle (qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; L1s; L2s) by the adjusted quantity bundle
(eqs; eXs; eh
1
s; eh
2
s; eL
1
s; eL
2
s). Note that we keep prices, and therefore also the opportu-
nity cost wis(1  @g
i
@his
) of child care time for the production of child well-being, ĕxed to the
original level. A household is said to be rationalizable at eﬃciency level e if the household
wastes not more than a fraction (1  e) of the budget by making irrational choices.
Deĕnition 4.2. e dataset S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg is consistent with
the unitary labour supply model with home production and process beneĕts g1 and g2; at
eﬃciency level e; if there exist shadow prices }s 2 R++; production levels Qes 2 R+ and
Qs 2 R+ (Qes  Qs), utility numbers us 2 R+ and multipliers s 2 R++ such that the
following conditions hold for all s; v in S:
uv   us  s
 
(qv   eqs) + }s(Qv  Qes) + w1s(L1v   eL1s) + w2s(L2v   eL2s)

}s(Qv  Qes)  w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v   eh1s) + w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v   eh2s) + (Xv   eXs)
with Lis = lis + gi(his)
A small technical remark is in order. We introduce an additional variable Qes, which
corresponds to Q(eXs; eh1s; eh2s). We impose that Qes  Qs, since we assume that Q is
an increasing function. Although Deĕnition 4.2 is rather technical, the eﬃciency level e has
an intuitive interpretation in terms of money waste. For an eﬃciency level of e = 1, the
conditions are equivalent to the original consistency conditions in Proposition 4.2. If the
original consistency conditions are satisĕed, the behavior is fully rational and no money is
wasted due to suboptimal decisionmaking. If a dataset can be rationalized at eﬃciency level
e, with 0  e  1, an implication of Deĕnition 4.2 is that if uv  us, then
qv + w
1
s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)h1v + w
2
s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)h2v + w
1
sL
1
v + w
2
sL
2
v +Xv
 e

qs + w
1
s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)h1s + w
2
s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)h2s + w
1
sL
1
s + w
2
sL
2
s +Xs

:
Suppose that a household prefers the bundle (qv; q2v ; Xv; h1v; h2v; L1v; L2v) over the bundle
(qs; Xs; h
1
s; h
2
s; L
1
s; L
2
s) (uv  us). If bundle v would have been aﬀordable at time s, then
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choosing bundle s would not be a fully rational choice, since bundle v results into a higher
utility and was even cheaper. Consequently, money would have been wasted by choosing
bundle s. In line with Deĕnition 4.2, the households are allowed to waste a small part of the
budget bymaking irrational choices. In particular, if the dataset is rationalizable at eﬃciency
level e, then the condition is that bundle v is not more than (1   e)  100 % cheaper than
bundle s.
We deĕne the critical cost eﬃciency ec as the largest eﬃciency e at which the household
behavior is rationalizable. To determine the critical cost eﬃciency ec in practice, we ĕrst
test whether the conditions are satisĕed for e = 1. If not, we test smaller and smaller values
of e, until we ĕnd ec for which the conditions are satisĕed. e critical cost eﬃciency ec
provides us with an attractive measure of how well the model ĕts the data. If the critical
cost eﬃciency is low, the households seem to have wasted a large part of the budget. is
indicates that the observed decisions are not in line with the theoretical model we have in
mind. Stated diﬀerently, the theoretical model does not ĕt the data very well in that case.
In the remainder of the chapter, we use the critical cost eﬃciency as our goodness-of-ĕt
measure. is goodness-of-ĕt measure quantiĕes if the model under study is a reasonable
model to study the observed behavior.
Shadow price restrictions We have already argued that the price of child well-being is
unobserved. is domestically produced good is nonmarketable, whichmakes it impossible
to attach a price to one ‘unit’ of child well-being. We use shadow price }s to measure the
willingness to pay for an additional unit of child well-being. is }s is only restricted by
the conditions in Proposition 4.2 because utility functions remain unspeciĕed. However,
we argue that ‘extreme’ variation in this shadow price is unrealistic. First of all, we assume
that households care for the well-being of the children and therefore }s 6= 0. If households
would not care at all, this would mean that the home production channel is trivial and that
it provides no natural benchmark for our extension with process beneĕts. Second, in the
application we will select households which are similar in terms of observed characteristics.
For these reasons, we restrict the variation in }s:emaximum value of }max in a pool of
households can not exceed twice the size of the minimum value }min in the same pool. is
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restriction is similar in spirit to the revealed preference restrictions on the variation in the
intrahousehold distribution of bargaining power across (non-unitary) households, see e.g.
Bruyneel et al. (2012).
Non-nestedness Wewant to emphasize thatmodels with varying levels of process beneĕts
are not nested. Raising the level of process beneĕts does not necessarily leads to conditions
that are easier to satisfy. e reason is that process beneĕts impact on our conditions in
two (opposite) ways. In particular, if  increases, then both gi(hi) and @g
i
@hi
increase. On
the one hand, increasing gi(hi) increases the total amount of equivalent leisure Li in the
ĕrst condition. On the other hand, increasing @g
i
@hi
reduces the opportunity cost of child
care (1   @g
i
@hi
)wi in the second condition. Consequently, if a larger  tightens the ĕrst
condition, the second condition is strengthened and vice versa.
4.4 Data
We apply our nonparametric methodology to data from the (Dutch) Longitudinal Internet
Studies for the Social sciences (LISS). e LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch
individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys.6 is data source contains infor-
mation on household characteristics, wages, private expenditures, expenditures on children,
and the allocation of time over leisure, home production (child care) and market work. e
relevant data is organized in diﬀerent modules. We use data from the Background Vari-
ables, Family and Household, Work and Schooling and Time Use and Consumption. Note
that the latter module was speciĕcally added to investigate consumption and time use de-
cisions within the household. e information in this module is collected in three waves:
2009, 2010 and 2012. Cherchye et al. (2012) constructed their sample from the same mod-
ules. Because wages are not directly available, we re-construct the wages by dividing the
monthly net labor income by the (average) number of hours worked.
6epanel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register. Households
that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. A longitudinal survey
is ĕelded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing,
time use, political views, values and personality.
4.4. DATA 147
Let us ĕrst explain how we selected the sample. We started by selecting all households
with 1, 2 or 3 children.7 Consequently, we dropped all households with missing household
head and/or wedded or unwedded partner and all households with members other than
parents or children. Moreover, observations with missing values for wages, consumption
decisions or time use choices were withdrawn. We end up with a total of 470 households.
Our sample, collected from the LISS panel, consists of couples with children, for which
both partners participate in the labor market. We therefore have a sample with very speciĕc
characteristics. In 2013, the average number of children in the Netherlands is equal to 1:68.
is is slightly less than the average of two children in our sample, however this may not be
a surprise, since we only selected couples with at least one child. Furthermore, our sample
only consists of couples. Statistics Netherlands reports that about 20% of the households
with children living at home is a one-parent family. e strongest selection criteria might be
the fact that both parents need to participate in the labor market. We need both parents to
participate, since we need the market wage as an indication for the opportunity cost of time.
Statistics Netherlands (cbs) reports ĕgures of women with children who have paid work
in the Netherlands. Cloïn (2013) reports that the percentage of married (or cohabiting)
mothers with underage children, that has paid work has been increasing over time, from
60% in 2002 to 72% in 2013. Furthermore, the percentage of mothers that work, depends
on the number of children in the household. In 2013, 82% of themothers with 1 child work,
78% of the mothers with 2 children and 61% of the women with three children. When
interpreting our results on process beneĕts, we need to keep in mind that our results are
conditional on labor market participation. Although we restricted our analysis to couples
for which both partners work, the situation in which the mother works part time and the
father works full time is the most commonly observed in the Netherlands. In Section 4.5,
we take a closer look at the number of hours that mothers and fathers on average work.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the (nondurable) expenditures, the time use and
the socioeconomic background of the households in the sample. Private expenditures con-
sist of expenditures on eating at home, food and drinks outside the house, cigarettes and
7ere are households with 4 or 5 children present in the LISS data. However, we did not include those in our
ĕnal sample. Aer cleaning the data, there were too little observations to do a sound analysis of process beneĕts
for those household types.
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Husband Wife Household
Mean (Std.) Mean (Std.) Mean (Std.)
Expenditures (EUR per week)
Private Expenditures 79,7 (56,0) 89,4 (70,4)
Expenditures on Children 142,6 (124,6)
Time use (hours per week)
Market labor (incl commuting time) 46,9 (11,7) 30,3 (11,7)
Child Care 11,8 ( 9,2) 17,8 (13,8)
Leisure 25,7 (13,7) 24,0 (13,4)
Socioeconomic variables
Wage rate (EUR per hour) 12,6 ( 4,0) 11,6 ( 3,8)
Age 42,6 ( 6,6) 40,4 ( 6,6)
Mean age children 9,5 ( 5,9)
Age variation children 1,3 ( 1,2)
Number of children 2 ( 0,7)
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of sample of 470 households, with 1, 2 or 3 children.
other tobacco products, clothing, personal care products and services, medical care and
health costs not covered by insurance, leisure time expenditures, (further) schooling, dona-
tions and gis, and other personal expenses. e expenditures on children consist of all the
expenditures discussed above, but now on behalf of the children. We also add expenditures
on children’s daycare to the child expenditures. Finally, we normalize all expenditures to a
weekly basis.
Parents allocate time to market work, home production (child care) and leisure. First of
all, individual leisure is directly available from the LISS panel. Second, market work is the
sum of actual labor time and time necessary for traveling from and to work. Finally, time
invested in children includes bathing, dressing, playing, reading stories, going with the child
to the doctor, taking the child to school or hobbies. On average, the fathers in the sample
take care of their children 12 hours a week, while the mothers spend 18 hours a week taking
care of their children. Note that besides the time that parents care for the children, hired
daycare is also included in the analysis through the channel of the child expenditures. By
contrast, the time that grand parent’s take care of the children is not included.
To perform the analysis, we divided the 470 households into 32 household types, on
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# l1 l2 h1 h2 m1 m2 w1 w2 c1 c2 k
All 470 25,7 24,0 11,8 17,8 46,9 30,3 12,6 11,6 79,7 89,4 142,6
1 child 109 24,8 24,7 12,8 19,7 46,7 30,4 12,3 11,6 80,7 98,3 100,0
2 children 266 26,4 24,5 11,7 16,9 46,7 30,2 12,7 11,4 80,2 87,7 141,9
3 children 95 24,7 22,0 10,8 18,2 47,9 30,3 12,7 12,2 77,1 84,3 193,4
Age [0; 5[ 120 23,0 19,9 18,1 29,5 46,5 29,4 12,2 11,5 82,6 84,6 164,4
Age [5; 9[ 106 27,0 24,7 12,9 20,2 46,9 29,1 12,3 11,9 78,0 89,0 137,3
Age [9; 13[ 104 26,3 24,6 10,5 15,5 46,7 29,9 13,2 11,6 75,6 86,3 113,2
Age [13;1[ 140 26,4 26,8 6,6 8,1 47,8 32,2 12,8 11,4 85,4 94,7 158,8
No high ed 212 25,0 24,3 10,4 16,2 48,1 28,9 11,2 10,6 75,5 80,7 124,9
Higher ed 258 26,2 23,9 12,8 19,0 46,2 31,4 13,8 12,3 85,2 95,7 161,6
Table 4.2: Time use and consumption by household type (1=husband, 2=wife)
the basis of observable characteristics. Within each household type, it is assumed that the
preferences as well as the home production technology are homogeneous. First, we focus on
characteristics related to the children. Aer all, the number of children in a household and
the children’s age strongly aﬀect the appropriate household technology. Our sample consists
of households with 1, 2 or 3 children. ere are 109 households with 1 child, 266 households
with 2 children and 95 households with 3 children. Furthermore, we distinguish between
4 age categories: households with children aged less than 5 years (on average), households
with children aged between 5 and 9 years, households with children aged between 9 and 13
years old and households with children aged more than 13 years. ese boundaries on the
age categories are convenient for us, since they lead to a subdivision of the full sample into
four age categories of more or less equal size. e younger the children, the more time the
parents spend caring for the children. For example, in households with children aged less
than 5 years, father andmother care on average 18 and 30 hours a week, respectively. is in
contrast to households with older children (average agemore than 13). In these households,
the parents spend respectively 7 and 8 hours a week caring for the children.
Since there are many households with 2 children in our sample, we divided these house-
holds into even more speciĕc household types, on the basis of the variation in the age of the
children. In particular, we distinguish between households with little variation in the age
of the children and households with a lot of variation in age.8 Our ĕnal criterion to sub-
divide the sample was the education of the parents. In particular, we distinguish between
households with at least one adult having higher education (higher vocational education or
8Our threshold is themedian of the standard deviation of the age of the children, for households with 2 children.
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university) and households without higher education. is subdivision divides our sample
more or less in half. Our motivation to subdivide the sample on the basis of education is
recent work of Guryan et al. (2008), which studies the relationship between parents’ earn-
ings potential and their time spent with children, in a cross-section from the American Time
Use Surveys. ese authors’ results indicated that highly educated parents, in particular, are
more likely to spend time with their children. is is surprising, because the opportunity
cost of child care by a highly educated individual is considerably higher. We refer to Guryan
et al. (2008) for possible explanations of this observation. Based on this evidence, we con-
structed household types with and without higher education. In this way, we avoid the need
to assume that households with and without higher education have the same preferences
for child well-being. In our sample, 38% of the husbands is highly educated and 39% of
the women is highly educated. To conclude, we divided the households into 32 household
types, on the basis of the number of children, the age of the children and the education level
of the parents. Table 4.2 reports summary statistics of the time use and consumption of
the households types. e ĕrst column of the table reports the number of households in
the sample that satisĕes each criterion. A pool of households having the same household
type consists on average of 15 households, with a minimum of 6 households and a maxi-
mum of 28 households. We refer to Table 4.8 in Appendix 4.D for a detailed overview of the
household types.
At this point it is worth to note that we have done several robustness checks to test
whether the goodness-of-ĕt results are robust to changes in the division of the sample into
household types. For example, we constructed household types on the basis of the age of the
youngest child, instead of the mean age of the children. Next, we also experimented with
the number of age categories. Furthermore, we tested whether taking up additional charac-
teristics, such as the gender of the children and the age of the parents had a large eﬀect on
the goodness-of-ĕt results and the gains in terms of goodness-of-ĕt from including process
beneĕts into themodel. e average goodness-of-ĕt was each time very similar to the results
we will present in the following section.
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4.5 Results
As a ĕrst step, we compute the goodness-of-ĕt of the model with and without process ben-
eĕts for each household type. We assume that couples within a household type have the
same preferences U and the same household production function Q. In Section 4.3.2, we
presented a test for process beneĕts, under the assumption that the fathers and the moth-
ers belonging to the same household type perceive the same intensity of process beneĕts.
However, we can perfectly relax this assumption and allow the parameter is to be individual-
speciĕc. e intensity of the process beneĕts may then not only diﬀer from father tomother,
but may diﬀer from household to household. From now on, each individual may have a dif-
ferent perception of child care as leisure. To select the optimal value of the process beneĕts,
we select parameter values that maximize the goodness-of-ĕt of the model to the data. In a
next step, we study the distribution of the estimated process beneĕts. Finally, we also discuss
the discriminatory power of the test with and without process beneĕts.
Process beneĕts: speciĕcation and testing To select optimal values for the process ben-
eĕts, we consider a set of values f0; 0:05; 0:1; 0:2; 0:4; 0:8; 1:6g. ese values describe a
heterogeneous range of process beneĕts. e seven chosen scenarios are clearly distinct
and informative. A setting without process beneĕts corresponds to a i = 0, while setting
i = 1:6 corresponds a to setting in which child care time is almost fully valued as leisure.
Note that there is no big diﬀerence between setting i = 1:6 and setting i even higher,
because the curve associated with i = 1:6 approximately lies on the 45-degree line for the
most values of hi in our sample.
Per pool of households we select for each individual i in each household s a parameter
value is from the set f0; 0:05; 0:1; 0:2; 0:4; 0:8; 1:6g. We perform a random search for the
optimal parameter values. In particular, we consider 10000 combinations of is drawn at
random from this set and compute for each combination of parameter values the goodness-
of-ĕt. e goodness-of-ĕt is assessed by using the critical eﬃciency score ec, which quanti-
ĕes deviations from optimal decision-making. We then select the combination of parameter
values 1s and 2s which provides the best empirical ĕt e. At this point, it might be worth to
note that there usually exist multiple combinations of parameter values that rationalize the
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observed behavior. If we ĕnd multiple combinations of parameter values having an equally
good empirical ĕt e, we select the combination which gives the ‘minimal’ level of process
beneĕts.9 In this way we can interpret our process beneĕts as small but necessary deviations
from the traditional labor supply model without process beneĕts. Note that a search with
10000 random draws does not test every possible combination of parameter values. How-
ever, since we allow is to be individual speciĕc, a grid search on the parameter values would
suﬀer from the curse of dimensionality. Still, the improvements in terms of goodness-of-ĕt
are already substantial by considering 10000 combinations of parameter values. Note that
considering a larger number of combinations, or considering a ĕner grid, could lead to even
more gains from process beneĕts.
In Table 4.3, we present some summary statistics of the goodness-of-ĕt of the model
with and without process beneĕts for each household type. For the model with process
beneĕts, we report the best empirical ĕt e in the search for parameter values for the process
beneĕts. e last row gives the gains from process beneĕts, which are computed as the
diﬀerence between the goodness-of-ĕt e, when process beneĕts are taken into account and
the goodness-of-ĕt e0 with respect to the model without process beneĕts.
min mean median max
Goodness-of-ĕt with process beneĕts e 0,75 0,93 0,96 1,00
Goodness-of-ĕt without process beneĕts e0 0,65 0,87 0,90 1,00
Gains from Process beneĕts e   e0 0 0,06 0,04 0,19
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of goodness-of-ĕt for each of the 32 household types
A critical cost eﬃciency score e indicates that a share (1   e) of the household’s re-
sources has been wasted due to sub-optimal decision making. Under the model without
process beneĕts, it seems as if the observed households waste on average 13% of their re-
sources due to sub-optimal decision making. In particular, if the households would have
chosen a diﬀerent combination of consumption and time use, they could have chosen a
combination which was equally good in terms of utility, and which was up to 13% cheaper
9In particular, if there are multiple combinations of parameter values having an equally good empirical ĕt e,
we compute for each individual g
i(his)
his
, which is the proportion of child care time perceived as leisure. We then
select the parameter values that imply theminimal average proportionwithin a pool, necessary to achieve eﬃciency
e.
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than the currently chosen combination. Under the model that does allows process bene-
ĕts, the observed households waste on average 7% of their resources. Stated diﬀerently, the
goodness-of-ĕt of the model with process beneĕts is on average 6% higher than the model
without. We conclude that including process beneĕts substantially improves the goodness-
of-ĕt of the model. We refer to Table 4.9 in the appendix for an overview of the results per
household type. ere is quite some variation in the gains from process beneĕts. On the one
hand, there are 5 household types that do not beneĕt from including process beneĕts into
the model. On the other hand, the maximal gains from including process beneĕts is 19% in
terms of goodness-of-ĕt.
Table 4.4 reports summary statistics of the optimal values for the process beneĕts is, i.e.
the parameter values corresponding to the best empirical ĕt.
min mean median max
Process beneĕts father 1 0 0,31 0,10 1,60
Process beneĕts mother 2 0 0,31 0,10 1,60
Proportion father 0 0,35 0,24 1,00
Proportion mother 0 0,32 0,21 1,00
Table 4.4: Summary statistics of estimated values of process beneĕts and proportion of child
care time perceived as leisure, for father and mother in each of the 470 households.
e average process beneĕt parameters 1 and 2 across all households equal 0.31, both
for fathers andmothers.10 Given our optimal parameter values and the functional speciĕca-
tion of process beneĕts in (4.1), we can recover the marginal and average leisure from child
care. e marginal leisure @g(h
i)
@hi
can be used to interpret the opportunity cost of child
care time in equilibrium. Intuitively, it is less costly to invest time in children for parents
that experience more process beneĕts.
However, we focus our discussion here on the average leisure g(h
i)
hi
, which indicates the
proportion of child care time that is perceived as leisure. Table 4.4 reports some summary
statistics. We ĕnd that the proportion of child care perceived as leisure varies considerably
across individuals. e smallest level is 0 (i.e. no process beneĕts) whereas the largest level
10To test the robustness of our results, we repeated the random grid search of 10000 iterations several times.
e average goodness-of-ĕt and therefore also the gains from process beneĕts were very robust. Each time we
obtained an average goodness-of-ĕt equal to 0.93. Although the individually selected parameter values for the
process beneĕts could diﬀer, the average process beneĕts in the sample for mother and father diﬀered not more
than a couple of percentage points.
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is 1 (i.e. 100% of time spent with children is valued as leisure).
We present the distribution of the proportion of child care perceived as leisure across all
individuals in Figure 4.2, distinguishing between fathers (full curve) and mothers (dashed
curve).
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Figure 4.2: Probability density of proportion of child care perceived as leisure
e corresponding probability density curves show a peak at zero or very small process
beneĕts. e large concentration of observations around 0 can be explained by the fact the
goodness-of-ĕt of several household types can not be improved by including process beneĕts
into the model. Although the average level of process beneĕts equals 0:31 for both mothers
and fathers, the average percentage a child care time perceived as leisure is slightly larger for
fathers than for mothers (35% for fathers, 32% for mothers). is diﬀerence is also visible
in Figure 4.2. e logical explanation for this is the fact that fathers spend on average less
hours a week caring for the children than themothers (respectively 12 and 18 hours a week).
e assumptions we made about the functional speciĕcation of the process beneĕts implies
that the ĕrst hour of child care is (almost) fully perceived as leisure and every subsequent
hour less and less. e extent to which this decreases is determined by the intensity i of
the process beneĕts. As a consequence of our functional assumption, the fathers perceive
on average a (slightly) larger proportion of their child care time as leisure -even though the
intensity of process beneĕts we estimate is on average the same. However, this diﬀerence in
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the proportion of child care perceived as leisure is not signiĕcant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test of equal distributions accepts the null hypothesis that the male and female proportion
of child care perceived as leisure follow the same distribution (p  value = 0:32).11
Contractual working hours As mentioned before, we selected a sample from the LISS
panel, in which both parents participate on the labor market. When interpreting our re-
sults on process beneĕts, we therefore need to keep in mind that our results are conditional
on labor market participation. However, one could argue that the decision on whether or
not to participate in the labor market, depends on the presence of children in the house-
hold. Parents might feel the need to work less hours in the labor market, in order to have
enough time to care for the children. Moreover, parents who genuinely enjoy taking care of
the children and doing household related chores, might be more likely to work less hours
in the labor market. Furthermore, Del Boca (2002) ĕnd that the availability of child care
and part time opportunities increase both the probability of working and having a child.
ere is no need to say that the relation between the labor market participation decision,
the children in the household and the degree of process beneĕts is a complex issue. We refer
to Browning (1992) for an interesting discussion on children and household economic be-
havior. In particular, Browning (1992) also discuss labor supply models with endogenous
fertility. Moreover, Kalb (2009) discusses challenges for an empirical analysis of children,
labor supply and child care. An interesting avenue for future research is to investigate the
relation between the labor market participation decision and the degree of process beneĕts
related to child care. In this paper we make abstraction of the labor market decision. As a
preliminary exercise, we investigate the amount of process beneĕts, conditional on the hours
of employment. Note that in Section 4.4 we reported the weekly hours of market labor, in-
cluding commuting time, as reported in the time use study. Here we take a closer look at
the contractual working hours. Table 4.5 reports summary statistics of the number of con-
tractual working hours. In our sample, the number of contractual hours that fathers in our
11It is sometimes argued in the literature that, on average, “mothers care more for children than fathers,” in the
sense that an increase in the mother’s power within the couple results in more expenditures made for children, see
Blundell et al. (2005) and references therein. Blundell et al. (2005) propose a theoretical model to investigate the
claim that mothers care more for children than fathers. Cherchye et al. (2012), who build further on this model,
ĕnd no evidence that empowering mothers is more beneĕcial for the well-being of the children than empowering
fathers. Similarly, we ĕnd no evidence that mothers enjoy caring for the children more than fathers.
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sample work is on average equal to 38,8 hours per week. Furthermore, the average hours of
contractual work for mothers is equal to 25,5 hours per week. Note that these numbers are
relatively close to the national statistics in the Netherlands, reported by Statistics Nether-
lands (cbs). For example, in the year 2013, men and women in the Netherlands which are
member of a couple and with under-age children, work on average respectively 40,2 and
24,4 hours per week. Conditional on the fact that both parents work, there does not seem
to be a large diﬀerence in our sample in working hours between parents with more or less
and younger or older children.
Table 4.5: Child care, contractual work and household chores by household type (hours per
week)
Child care Work Household chores
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
All 11,8 17,8 38,8 25,2 9,3 16,9
1 child 12,8 19,7 37,5 26,3 9,6 15,3
2 children 11,7 16,9 39,2 24,8 9,1 17,0
3 children 10,8 18,2 39,4 25,1 9,5 18,7
Age [0; 5[ 18,1 29,5 39,0 25,8 9,2 13,7
Age [5; 9[ 12,9 20,2 38,2 24,2 8,6 16,7
Age [9; 13[ 10,5 15,5 39,0 24,8 9,4 18,6
Age [13;1[ 6,6 8,1 38,9 26,1 9,8 18,7
No high ed 10,4 16,2 39,9 23,7 8,5 17,3
Higher ed 12,8 19,0 37,9 26,5 10,0 16,6
We use the median values in the sample, which are equal to 38 hours per week for fa-
thers and 24 hours per week for mothers, to divide the mothers and fathers in two groups.
Consequently, we investigate the amount of process beneĕts, conditional on the hours of
employment. Figure 4.3 plots the probability density of the proportion of child care that
fathers perceive as leisure, for fathers working either less than 38 hours per week, or more
than 38 hours per week. A Kolmogorov Smirnov test (p-value = 0.33) reports that the dis-
tribution of process beneĕts of those two groups of fathers workingmore or less hours is not
signiĕcantly diﬀerent. Similarly, we do not ĕnd a signiĕcant diﬀerence between the process
beneĕts for mothers who work more than 24 hours per week, and mothers who work less
than 24 hours per week (p-value = 0.21), see Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Child care time, conditional on contractual working hours, father
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Figure 4.4: Child care time, conditional on contractual working hours, mothers
Household chores We assumed separability between the decisions on private consump-
tion, private leisure and child well-being on the one hand and other household related de-
cisions on the other hand. Consequently, we have assumed that the choice to invest time in
child care is independent of the choice to spend time on household chores. Table 4.5 reports
the number of hours per week that father and mother in our sample spend on household
chores, such as cleaning, laundry, shopping, cooking,... On average, fathers and mothers
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spend respectively 9; 3 and 16; 9 hours per week on household chores. e diﬀerence be-
tween fathers and mothers corresponds to ĕndings of Cloïn (2013), who report that women
in the Netherlands nearly spend twice as much time to household chores than men. Table
4.5 also reports the average hours of household chores by household type. For fathers, the
average per type is very stable over all types. For mothers, we observe a slight increase in
household chores when the number of children and the age of the children increases. As a
robustness check for our separability assumption, we test whether the level of process ben-
eĕts depends on the amount of time spend on household chores. We again subdivide the
fathers and mothers into two groups, depending on whether they spend more or less time
on household chores than the median father of mother.
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Figure 4.5: Child care time, conditional on hours of household chores, father
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show the probability density of the proportion of child care
perceived as leisure, for the two groups of fathers and mothers. However, we do not ĕnd a
signiĕcant diﬀerence on the basis of the amount of time spend on household chores. In par-
ticular, the p-values equal respectively 0.21 and 0.87 for fathers andmothers. An interesting
avenue for future research is to include other types of household activities into the analy-
sis of process beneĕts. In principle, various types of process beneĕts could be associated
with various time uses. For example, it might not be unreasonable to argue that time spent
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Figure 4.6: Child care time, conditional on hours of household chores, mother
cooking or cleaning can also be a direct source of utility or disutility for the household.12
Discriminatory power It is well-known that revealed preference tests sometimes lack ‘dis-
criminatory power’, i.e. that they are unable to reject the consistency of totally random,
irrational choices. is may occur when there is insuﬃcient price variation in a data set,
or the underlying model is too weak. In our setting we fully exploit interhousehold het-
erogeneity in wages, which provides considerable price variation. However, the question
remains whether allowing for process beneĕts does not weaken our testable implications.
In other words, we examine whether the optimal speciĕcation of process beneĕts - which
maximizes the goodness-of-ĕt - is still powerful enough to discriminate between observed
rational choices and simulated irrational choices. We have already argued that diﬀerent
speciĕcations of our model are not necessarily nested. Allowing for higher levels of pro-
cess beneĕts can either weaken or strengthen our testable conditions. In particular, higher
levels of process beneĕts may relax the restrictions associated with optimal production (of
child well-being) but simultaneously tighten the conditions associated with optimal con-
12In theory, other household produced goods could be included in the analysis, and process beneĕts related to
various home production activities could be included. In practice, we can only handle one type of home produced
good, otherwise, we create nonlinearities in the formulation of the household optimization problem, which makes
the theoretical model diﬃcult to test. is is a limitation of our nonparametric approach and the fact that we do
not observe the output of the home produced good. If we would have data on the output of an additional home
produced good, we would perfectly be able to include process beneĕts related to this home produced good.
160 4.5. RESULTS
sumption. e ĕnal outcome then depends on the trade-oﬀ between the eﬀect of a lower
(opportunity) cost of child care and the eﬀect of a higher level of leisure-equivalent time.
To quantify the discriminatory power of our test, we simulate 1000 random data sets per
household type. One such data set consists of random consumption and time use choices
for all households in the pool. e consumption choices correspond to random draws (of
budget shares) from a uniform distribution on the unit interval. We then divide these simu-
lated shares by the corresponding prices and multiply the result with the observed total ex-
penditures per household. Furthermore, we simulate random time use choices by drawing
time allocations from a uniform distribution on the unit interval. is is similar to Bronars
(1987)’s power index, which is based on Becker (1962)’s notion of irrational behavior.
Min Mean Median Max
No Goodness-of-ĕt observed data 0,65 0,87 0,90 1,00
process Goodness-of-ĕt random data 0,67 0,85 0,87 0,97
beneĕts Diﬀerence observed vs random -0,14 0,02 0,02 0,23
Best Goodness-of-ĕt observed data 0,75 0,93 0,96 1,00
process Goodness-of-ĕt random data 0,41 0,67 0,64 0,94
beneĕts Diﬀerence observed vs random 0,02 0,26 0,31 0,41
Table 4.6: Diﬀerences in goodness-of-ĕt of observed versus random choices
InTable 4.6we compare the goodness-of-ĕt of actual choices and the (average) goodness-
of-ĕt of random choices. Table 4.6 reports some summary statistics, we refer to Table 4.10
in the appendix for a detailed overview of the goodness-of-ĕt for every household type. e
higher the (average) goodness-of-ĕt of the random choices, the lower the discriminatory
power of our test.
Ideally, the goodness-of-ĕt of observed choices is much higher than those of randomly
simulated choices. Let us ĕrst investigate the performance of the labor supplymodelwithout
process beneĕts. On average, the observed choices are slightly more eﬃcient than random
choices (average eﬃciency of 0.87 versus 0.85). For some household types, the model with-
out process beneĕts even gives a better ĕt for the random data pools than for the observed
data pool. We then turn to the performance of the labor supply model with best process
beneĕts. is model conditions on the level of process beneĕts that gives the highest eﬃ-
ciency to the observed data set. It turns out that this alternativemodel performsmuch better
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than the labor supply model without process beneĕts. e eﬃciency of observed choices is
always higher, with diﬀerences ranging from 0.02 to 0.41. is indicates that the discrim-
inatory power of the model with process beneĕts is much higher than the model without
process beneĕts. ese results conĕrm that our extension is reasonable.
What do we learn from all this? e results in this section are important from a theo-
retical, methodological and empirical perspective. eoretically, the results motivate the
extension of standard labor supply models (with home production) with process beneĕts.
We have found that mothers and fathers perceive part of their time with children as leisure.
Methodologically, we have shown how to test and identify home production models - with
process beneĕts - in which the outputs are not only unobserved but also unmarketable. Our
model is able to distinguish between observed choices and randomly simulated choices. is
conĕrms that our method has ‘empirical bite’, even when preferences and the home produc-
tion technology remain unspeciĕed. Empirically, we found considerable variation in the
intensity of the process beneĕts from individual to individual. However, we did not ĕnd
indications that the intensity of process beneĕts diﬀers between fathers and mothers.
4.6 Extension: collective labor supply
As a robustness check, we extend our nonparametric test of process beneĕts to a collec-
tive setting. e collective model was developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and is by now
standard in the literature. In contrast to the unitary setting, which assumes that households
behave as if they were a single decisionmaker, the collective setting explicitly recognizes that
households consist of multiple decision makers, each having their own preferences. Aer
all, we can reasonably expect the preferences of fathers to diﬀer from the preferences of
mothers. As soon as the bargaining power between fathers and mothers varies, this might
lead to a violation of the assumption that households maximize a single, homogeneous util-
ity function. e collective model lets the relative bargaining power vary across households
within a pool.
Note that we do consider the parents as two individual decision makers, but still not the
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children. ere is some discussion in the literature on the role of children in the decision
making process of the household (e.g. Dauphin et al. (2011)). is discussion is particularly
relevant for older children (age 16 and older), however it is less debatable that younger chil-
dren are bystanders in the household. To model the presence of (younger) children in the
household, children are oen treated as a public good in the household (e.g. Blundell et al.
(2005) and Cherchye et al. (2012)). is is the approach we will follow.
Similar to the unitary model, we can introduce process beneĕts in the collective model.
To implement process beneĕts in the collective model, we build on contributions of Chiap-
pori (1997) and Blundell et al. (2005), who introduced household production in the collec-
tive model. For compactness, we refer to Appendix 4.C for more details on the conditions
to test consistency with the collective model with household production of child well-being
and with process beneĕts. We must note that the test in Appendix 4.C is a necessary test for
collective rationality.13 However, the collective test is not always more easily satisĕed than
the unitary test. For example, the intra-household allocation q1 and q2 of private goods
plays a role in the collective model. is in contrast to the unitary test, which only takes
the sum q = q1 + q2 of the private goods into account. e data sample retrieved from the
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences, contains information on the private
consumption of husband and wife.
As a robustness check, we investigate whether the extension of the home production
model with process beneĕts still adds value in the collective framework. Stated diﬀerently,
does including process beneĕts into the collective model still leads to gains in terms of
goodness-of-ĕt? We therefore apply the test in Proposition 4.3 in Appendix 4.C to our data
sample from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences. Towards this end we
again run a search for the parameter values i in the grid f0; 0:05; 0:1; 0:2; 0:4; 0:8; 1:6g
and select the combination of process beneĕts i which gives the best ‘goodness-of-ĕt’. e
results are presented in Table 4.7.
e average goodness-of-ĕt within the sample equals 0:98, which is 5% higher than the
13In theory, it is perfectly possible to construct a test for the collective model with home production and pro-
cess beneĕts which is both necessary and suﬃcient. However, this test can not be reformulated in terms of linear
programming conditions. We refer to Appendix 4.C for more explanation. We therefore limit the analysis to a
necessary test of the model, which is slightly weaker than the necessary and suﬃcient test. e necessary test can
be easily implemented using standard linear programming techniques.
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min mean median max
Goodness-of-ĕt with process beneĕts ec 0,87 0,98 1,00 1,00
Goodness-of-ĕt without process beneĕts e0c 0,76 0,92 0,93 1,00
Gains from Process beneĕts ec   e0c 0 0,06 0,04 0,20
Table 4.7: Summary statistics of goodness-of-ĕt for each of the 32 household types, for the
collective labor supply model with home production
unitary test. Remarkably, the gains in terms of goodness-of-ĕt from including process ben-
eĕts in the model remain 6%, the same as for the unitary case. For some household types,
the gains from including process beneĕts into the model reach up to 20%. Our results indi-
cate that it is important to deal with process beneĕts, also in collective labor supply models.
We refer to Table 4.9 and Table 4.11 in Appendix 4.D for an overview of the goodness-of-ĕt
results and discriminatory power for every household type.
e discriminatory power of the collective model with and without process beneĕts is
comparable to that of the unitary model. In particular, the goodness-of-ĕt of the collective
model without process beneĕts is on average 1% higher for the observed data than for the
random simulated data. By contrast, the goodness-of-ĕt of the collectivemodel with process
beneĕts is on average 20 % higher for the observed data. ese ĕndings strongly conĕrm
our results for the unitary model.
4.7 Conclusion
We presented tests of the labor supply model with home production of child well-being and
process beneĕts. By allowing for process beneĕts, we take into account that parents may
also enjoy spending time with children, and perceive some fraction of child care time as in-
dividual leisure. In this way, child care time ‘jointly’ produces well-being for the household’s
children -modeled as domestic production - and leisure time for the caring parent -modeled
as a substitute for pure leisure. Standard labor supply models ignore this possibility.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we identify theminimal level of pro-
cess beneĕts necessary to rationalize the choices in a sample of Dutch households, from the
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS). is minimal level is indepen-
dent of parametric assumptions on the householdmembers’ preferences and the household’s
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home production technology. As a result our method is very robust to mis-speciĕcation of
these underlying, and generally unknown, elements. Second, our method can deal with
home production even if the corresponding output is not only unobserved but also unmar-
ketable. is makes that our methodology is particularly useful for studying the well-being
of children. Aer all, child well-being is hard to observe and its price is hard to measure.
Metrics for child well-being are typically debatable. At a more general level, our nonpara-
metric framework with unobserved child outputs could be used as a benchmark to test the
ĕt of diﬀerent metrics of child well-being. e conditions of our nonparametric model -
which only imposes monotonicity and concavity of the household’s technology function -
may even be strengthened by replacing the unobserved output levelsQwith somemetric for
child well-being. e corresponding eﬀect on the goodness-of-ĕt of the model then indi-
cates whether the metric is reasonable, or not. To implement process beneĕts in this model
of home production, we generalize the revealed preference conditions in Cherchye et al.
(2015c) to take ‘joint production’ into account. e conditions in Cherchye et al. (2015c)
allow to test consistency with the maximization of a (single) utility function which is also
weakly separable in some arguments. Our extension is necessary because process beneĕts
make that utility is no longer fully weakly separable in child well-being. Aer all, time spent
with children enters both the domestic production technology and the utility function(s)
- as a substitute for leisure. Finally, we propose a necessary test for process beneĕts in the
collective model. is allows us to deal with very general forms of interhousehold variation
in the bargaining power of households.
Our results indicate that including process beneĕts signiĕcantly improves the ‘goodness-
of-ĕt’ of labor supply models with home production. is is consistent with the ĕndings
by Juster (1985), Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) and Krueger et al. (2009), who argue
that the home production of child well-being is one of the more enjoyable activities in the
household. Although we ĕnd considerable variation in the intensity of process beneĕts, we
ĕnd no evidence that fathers or mothers intrinsically perceive child care as more or less
enjoyable. On a more general level, the substantial interhousehold heterogeneity in process
beneĕts also underlines the importance of ‘joint’ production as a possible driver of labor
supply and child care decisions.
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We see diﬀerent avenues for further research. First, we exploit the cross-sectional di-
mension of the LISS data for two reasons. On the one hand, this gives us considerable wage
variation, which improves the empirical bite of our conditions. On the other hand, our
empirical analysis requires data on both consumption and time use, which severely limits
the number of households in the sample. However, panel data would allow researchers to
pool consumption and time use choices per household. is eliminates the issues associated
with interhousehold variation in preferences. Second, we have restricted attention to a static
model of consumption and time use. e domestically produced child well-being depends
on current expenditures and current time use choices. It would be interesting to investigate
how our framework extends to a more general intertemporal setting. ird, it is possible to
impose additional structure on the elements underlying the households’ decision problems.
Structure on the domestic technology that ‘produces’ child well-being may shed light on
the productivity of parental time inputs as well as on the substitutability between mothers’
and fathers’ time invested in children. A particularly convenient parametric speciĕcation
for the household’s production function is proposed in Lise and Yamada (2014). e au-
thors’ production function combines an aggregate Cobb Douglas production function, with
expenditures and (aggregate) child care time as inputs, and a Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution production function, which produces an intermediary output (child care time) from
the combination of mothers’ and fathers’ time invested in child care. is production func-
tion allows to investigate whether mothers’ time (resp. fathers’ time) spent with children
is substitutable by fathers’ time (resp. mothers’ time) invested in children. Finally, we be-
lieve that this study motivates further research on the magnitude of process beneĕts and the
relationship with observed family characteristics.
4.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We prove that the second set of conditions in Proposition 4.2 is
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for consistency with the labor supply model with home
production and process beneĕts.
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1. Necessity. We have that each observed (qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s) solves the problem
max
q;X;h1;h2;l1;l2
U(q;Q(h1; h2; X); l1 + g1(h1); l2 + g2(h2))
s:t:
q +X + w1s(h
1 + l1) + w2s(h
2 + l2)  w1sT 1s + w2sT 2s :
Given concavity, the functions U and Q are superdiﬀerentiable. Consequently, the
objective function is superdiﬀerentiable. Deĕne s as the Lagrange multiplier asso-
ciated with the constraint. An optimal interior solution for the above maximization
problem must satisfy the following ĕrst order conditions:
Uqs = s (4.3)
UQsQhis + ULis
@gi
@his
= sw
i
s (4.4)
UQsQXs = s (4.5)
ULis = sw
i
s (4.6)
for fxs a superderivative of the concave function f deĕned for x and evaluated at
xs. Here is f equal to U or Q and xs equal to qs; Qs; Lis; his or Xs. Next, deĕne
}s =
1
s
UQs :
is gives
}s =
1
QXs
; (4.7)
}s =
wis(1  @g
i
@his
)
Qhis
: (4.8)
Next, denote U(qs; Qs; L1s; L2s) = us for each s in S. en the concavity of the
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function U in q;Q and Li implies
uv   us  Uqs(qv   qs) + UQs(Qv  Qs) +
X
i
ULis(L
i
v   Lis)
for v; s inS. Combining the ĕrst order conditionswith the above inequality, we obtain
uv   us  s
 
(qv   qs) + }s(Qv  Qs) +
X
i
wis(L
i
v   Lis)
!
:
Concavity of the functionQ in h1; h2 andX implies
Qv  Qs  Qh1s(h1v   h1s) +Qh2s(h2v   h2s) +QXs(Xv  Xs):
Applying equations (4.7) and (4.8), results into the condition
}s(Qv  Qs)  w1s(1 
@g1
@h1s
)(h1v   h1s) + w2s(1 
@g2
@h2s
)(h2v   h2s) + (Xv  Xs);
which proves the revealed preference conditions.
2. Suﬃciency. Suppose that the revealed preference conditions hold.
For any (q^; X^; h^1; h^2; l^1; l^2; Q^) such that
q^ +
X
i=1;2

wis(l^
i + h^i)

+ X^  qs +
X
i=1;2
 
wis(l
i
s + h
i
s)

+Xs;
we can deĕne
Q(h^1; h^2; X^) = min
v2S

Qv +
1
}v

z1v(h^
1   h1v) + z2v(h^2   h2v) + Pv(X^  Xv)

;
with
ziv = w
i
v(1 
@gi
@hiv
):
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Assume thatQ(h1s; h2s; Xs) reaches its minimum at observation n:
Q(h1s; h
2
s; Xs) = Qn +
1
}n
 
z1n(h
1
s   h1n) + z2n(h1s   h2n) + Pn(Xs  Xn)

:
Moreover, the production inequalities imply that
Qn +
1
}n
 
z1n(h
1
s   h1n) + z2n(h1s   h2n) + Pn(Xs  Xn)
  Qs:
Hence,Q(h1s; h2s; Xs)  Qswhich shows thatQs gives a lower boundonQ(h1s; h2s; Xs):
Likewise,
U(q^; Q^; L^1; L^2) = min
v2S
"
uv + v
 
(q^   qv) + }v(Q^ Qv) +
X
i
wiv(L^
i   Liv)
!#
:
Assume that U(qs; Qs; L1s; L2s) reaches its minimum at observationm:
U(qs; Qs; L
1
s; L
2
s) = um+m
 
(qs   qm) + }m(Qs  Qm) +
X
i
wim(L
i
s   Lim)
!
:
(4.9)
Moreover, the Afriat-like inequalities imply that
um + m
 
(qs   qm) + }m(Qs  Qm) +
X
i
wim(L
i
s   Lim)
!
 us: (4.10)
Combining equations (4.9) and (4.10) gives
U(qs; Qs; L
1
s; L
2
s)
= um + m
 
(qs   qm) + }m(Qs  Qm) +
X
i
wim(L
i
s   Lim)
!
 us;
which shows that us gives a lower bound on U(qs; Qs; L1s; L2s):
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By deĕnition,
U(q^; Q^; L^1; L^2)  us + s
 
(q^   qs) + }s(Q^ Qs) +
X
i
wis(L^
i   Lis)
!
and
Q^  Q(h^1; h^2; X^)  Qs + 1
}s

z1s(h^
1   h1s) + z2s(h^2   h2s) + (X^  Xs)

:
Moreover, concavity of gi implies that
gi(h^i)  gi(his) 
@gi
@his
(h^i   his);
such that
U(q^; Q(h^1; h^2; X^); l^1 + g1(h^1); l^2 + g2(h^2))
 us + s

(q^   qs) +
 
z1s(h^
1   h1s) + z2s(h^2   h2s) + (X^  Xs)

+
P
i
wis
 
l^i   lis +
@gi
@his
(h^i   his)

:
Rearranging terms and using the deĕnition of zis, we obtain
U(q^; Q(h^1; h^2; X^); l^1 + g1(h^1); l^2 + g2(h^2))
 us + s

(q^   qs) +
X
i=1;2

wis(l^
i   lis) + wis(h^i   his)

+ (X^  Xs)

:
Due to the budget constraint, we have
U(q^; Q(h^1; h^2; X^); l^1 + g1(h^1); l^2 + g2(h^2))
 us
 U(qs; Q(h1s; h2s; Xs); l1s + g1(h1s); l2s + g2(h2s));
which proves that the bundle (qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ; Qs) maximizes the utility func-
tion U(qs; Q(h1s; h2s; Xs); l1s + g1(h1s); l2s + g2(h2s)) subject to the budget constraint
q^ +
P
i=1;2

wis(l^
i + h^i)

+ X^  (qs +
P
i=1;2
 
wis(l
i
s + h
i
s)

+ Xs). Conse-
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quently, we constructed a production function Q and utility function U that satisfy
the requested properties, such that the observed decisions solve optimization prob-
lemU-PB.erefore, the data setS is consistent with the (unitary) labor supplymodel
with home production and process beneĕts gi.
4.B Testable conditions
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the Generalized Axiom of Revealed preference can be used
to obtain testable conditions. To verify GARP, the conditions in Proposition 4.2 can be re-
formulated in terms of mixed integer programming (MIP). e binary variables Rsv then
capture the revealed preference relations R, as deĕned in Section 4.3.1. Here Rsv = 1
should be interpreted as (qs; Qs; L1s; L2s)R (qv; Qv; L1v; L2v).
en the data set S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg is consistent with the
unitary labor supplymodel with home production and process beneĕts g1 and g2 if and only
if the following MIP problem is feasible:
Problem 4.2. ere exist variables s; production levels Qs and binary variables Rsv such
that the following conditions hold for all s; t; v in S:
MsRsv  s
 
qs + w
1
sL
1
s + w
2
sL
2
s

+Qs   s
 
qv + w
1
sL
1
v + w
2
sL
2
v
 Qv (4.11)
Rst +Rtv  1 +Rsv (4.12)
Mv(1 Rsv)  v
 
qv + w
1
vL
1
v + w
2
vL
2
v

+Qv   v
 
qs + w
1
vL
1
s + w
2
vL
2
s
 Qs(4.13)
Qv  Qs  s(w1s(1 
@g1
@h1s
)(h1v   h1s) + w2s(1 
@g2
@h2s
)(h2v   h2s) + (Xv  Xs))(4.14)
with Lis = Li(lis; his) = lis + gi(his). Here we letMv be a ĕxed and large number.
It is suﬃcient that Mv is larger than the total budget of household v: First, constraint
(4.14) corresponds to condition 3b in Proposition 4.2, for which we deĕned s =
1
}s
, to
obtain linear conditions. Further, constraints (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) correspond to the
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GARP conditions. e GARP conditions can be interpreted as follows. Constraint (4.11)
states that if qs+w1sL1s+w2sL2s+}sQs  qv+w1sL1v+w2sL2v+}sQv , thenRsv = 1, which
means that (qs; Qs; L1s; L2s)R (qv; Qv; L1v; L2v). Next, constraint (4.12) imposes transitivity
of the revealed preference relations: if Rst = 1 and Rtv = 1, then Rsv = 1. Finally,
condition (4.13) requires that qv +w1vL1v +w2vL2v + }vQv  qs +w1vL1s +w2vL2s + }vQs
ifRsv = 1.
4.C Collective model
e collective model diﬀers from the unitary model in that households optimize a weighted
sumof individual utilities. Importantly, the weights in the objective function can vary across
observations in the same pool, because they are potentially dependent on the income at the
time of marriage, the relative wages of father and mother, etc. According to the collective
labor supply model, households maximize a weighted sum of fathers’ utility U1(q1; Q; L1)
and mothers’ utility U2(q2; Q; L2), subject to the household budget constraint. e well-
beingQ of the children is considered to be a public good within the household.
Problem 4.3. Optimization problem C   PB
max
qi;hi;li;X
1sU
1(q1; Q(h1; h2; X); l1 + g1(h1)) + 2sU
2(q2; Q(h1; h2; X); l2 + g2(h2))
s.t. q1 + q2 +X + w1s(h1 + l1) + w2s(h2 + l2)  w1sT 1s + w2sT 2s + ys
e bargaining weights is represent the relative bargaining power of member i in ob-
servation/household s. Also note that the decision variable q is replaced with q1 and q2: the
intra-household allocation of private goods plays a role in the collective model. We assume
that the intra-household allocation of private goods q1s and q2s is observed.
Deĕnition 4.3. Consider a data set S = f[q1s ; q2s ; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg. We
say that the data set S is consistent with the collective model with household production of
child well-being and with process beneĕts gi if there exist concave individual utility functions
U1 and U2, a concave production function Q and Pareto weights 1 and 2 such that the
observed decisions solve optimization problem C   PB.
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We propose a necessary test for consistency with the collective labor supply model with
home production and process beneĕts. Similar to the corresponding test of consistency with
the unitary model, this test can be implemented using standard linear programming tech-
niques. However, in a unitary labor supply model, there was only one unobserved shadow
price associated with child well-being: }s = UQs=s: In the current setting, we have two
possibly distinct utility functions and hence two marginal willingness’ to pay for child well-
being: one for fathers }1s = 1sU1Qs=s and one for mothers }
2
s = 
2
sU
2
Qs
=s. From the
ĕrst order conditions, it follows that }1s + }2s = 1=QXs ; or equivalently,QXs =
1
}1s + }
2
s
:
Given that we need to implement the variables }1s and }2s separately (to reconstruct indi-
vidual utility functions) and jointly (expression 1
}1s + }
2
s
in the production function), it is
not possible to formulate a programming problemwhich provides a necessary and suﬃcient
test, with linear conditions. Fortunately, it is possible to formulate a necessary test in terms
of linear programming conditions. A necessary condition for consistency with the collective
model, is that the following ĕrst-order conditions hold:
}1sQhis + }
2
sQhis +
isULis
s
@gi
@his
= wis ;
}1s + }
2
s = 1=QXs : (4.15)
Combining this with concavity of the utility functions and concavity of the production
function, we obtain the following conditions.
u1v   u1s  1s
 
(q1v   q1s) + }1s(Qv  Qs) + w1s(L1v   L1s)

(4.16)
u2v   u2s  2s
 
(q2v   q2s) + }2s(Qv  Qs) + w2s(L2v   L2s)

(4.17)
(}1s+}
2
s)(Qv Qs)  w1s(1 
@g1
@h1s
)(h1v h1s)+w2s(1 
@g2
@h2s
)(h2v h2s)+(Xv Xs) (4.18)
In a ĕnal step, we divide Condition (4.18) by (}1s + }2s), and substitute the resulting
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equation in (Qv  Qs) in Conditions (4.16) and (4.17). is gives
uiv   uis  is

(qiv   qis) + }
i
s
}1s+}
2
s

wis(1  @g
i
@his
)(hiv   his) + wjs(1  @g
j
@hjs
)(hjv   hjs)
+ (Xv  Xs)

+ wis(L
i
v   Lis)

with P is =
}is
}1s + }
2
s
: Intuitively, P is gives the share of expenditures on children that
household member i is willing to ĕnance. By deĕnition of P is we have that P 1s + P 2s = 1:
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. Consider a data set S = f[qs; Xs; h1s; h2s; l1s ; l2s ]; [w1s ; w2s ]js 2 Sg. If
the data set S is consistent with the collective labor supply model with home production and
process beneĕts g1 and g2 then there exist personalized prices P is 2 R+; production levels
Qs 2 R+; utility numbers uis 2 R+ and multipliers s 2 R++ and is 2 R++ with i 2
f1; 2g such that the following conditions hold for all s; v in S:
1. P 1s + P 2s = 1
2. u1v   u1s  1s

(q1v   q1s) + P 1s

w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v   h1s) +w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v   h2s) +
(Xv  Xs)

+ w1s(L
1
v   L1s)

3. u2v   u2s  2s

(q2v   q2s) + P 2s

w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v   h2s) +w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v   h1s) +
(Xv  Xs)

+ w2s(L
2
v   L2s)

4. (Qv  Qs)  s

w1s(1  @g
1
@h1s
)(h1v   h1s) + w2s(1  @g
2
@h2s
)(h2v   h2s) + (Xv  Xs)

Notice that parent i’s time spent with children hi is included in the Afriat inequalities
corresponding to parent j 6= i, and vice versa. e reason is that time spent on child care
generates positive intrahousehold externalities. Consequently, a parent is willing to pay for
the child care of his or her partner. Two ĕnal remarks are in order. First, similar to the
conditions in the unitary setting, the conditions in Proposition 4.3 can be reformulated in
terms of a linear programming problem with binary variables. Second, similar in spirit to
Deĕnition 4.2 in the unitary setting, we can introduce an eﬃciency level ec, which indicates
the goodness-of-ĕt of the observed behavior with Proposition 4.3.
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Household Pool Education Number of Mean Age Std Age
Type Size Parents Children Children Children
H1 13 No Higher 1 2,3 0
H2 8 No Higher 1 6,9 0
H3 10 No Higher 1 10,5 0
H4 20 No Higher 1 18,9 0
H5 9 No Higher 2 2,1 0,8
H6 14 No Higher 2 3,2 2,0
H7 13 No Higher 2 6,5 1,0
H8 20 No Higher 2 6,8 2,1
H9 8 No Higher 2 10,8 0,9
H10 21 No Higher 2 10,9 1,8
H11 25 No Higher 2 16,5 0,9
H12 20 No Higher 2 16,1 2,8
H13 7 No Higher 3 3,4 1,7
H14 10 No Higher 3 6,2 2,2
H15 8 No Higher 3 11,2 3,2
H16 6 No Higher 3 16,7 3,7
H17 28 Higher 1 1,7 0
H18 13 Higher 1 6,1 0
H19 6 Higher 1 10,5 0
H20 11 Higher 1 18,0 0
H21 28 Higher 2 2,8 0,8
H22 12 Higher 2 3,5 1,6
H23 17 Higher 2 6,5 0,9
H24 11 Higher 2 6,1 1,9
H25 15 Higher 2 10,5 1,0
H26 17 Higher 2 10,5 2,0
H27 15 Higher 2 16,0 0,7
H28 21 Higher 2 16,3 1,9
H29 9 Higher 3 3,2 2,2
H30 14 Higher 3 6,4 2,1
H31 19 Higher 3 10,8 2,4
H32 22 Higher 3 15,8 1,9
Table 4.8: Division of sample in household types
176 4.D. RESULTS
Type Results unitary model Results collective model
Goodness Gains from Average Goodness Gains from Average
of process process of process process
ĕt beneĕts beneĕts ĕt beneĕts beneĕts
eu e

u   e0u 1u 2u ec ec   e0c 1c 2c
H1 0,98 0,01 0,27 0,28 1 0 0 0
H2 0,99 0,1 0,40 0,48 1 0,07 0,13 0,07
H3 0,96 0,1 0,22 0,21 1 0,06 0,17 0,10
H4 0,75 0,06 0,29 0,41 0,96 0,12 0,46 0,54
H5 0,98 0,14 0,72 0,51 1 0,19 0,85 0,22
H6 0,91 0,13 0,54 0,25 0,98 0,15 0,59 0,33
H7 0,97 0,03 0,30 0,24 1 0 0 0
H8 0,88 0,06 0,44 0,30 0,96 0,07 0,52 0,20
H9 1 0 0 0 1 0 0,00 0,00
H10 0,88 0 0 0 0,96 0,04 0,37 0,20
H11 0,93 0 0 0 0,98 0,03 0,38 0,694
H12 0,86 0,15 0,48 0,50 0,95 0,17 0,12 0,65
H13 1 0,13 0,66 0,36 1 0,02 0,05 0,10
H14 0,99 0,04 0,45 0,66 1 0,02 0,09 0,21
H15 1 0,06 0,13 0,23 1 0 0 0
H16 1 0,02 0,04 0,31 1 0 0 0
H17 0,82 0,03 0,44 0,30 0,94 0,01 0,31 0,25
H18 0,96 0,02 0,27 0,25 1 0,01 0,25 0,31
H19 1 0,01 0,11 0,04 1 0 0 0
H20 0,96 0,06 0,60 0,44 1 0,04 0,32 0,11
H21 0,85 0 0 0 0,87 0,01 0,31 0,46
H22 0,97 0,02 0,46 0,38 1 0,12 0,24 0,39
H23 0,94 0 0 0 0,99 0 0,00 0,00
H24 0,95 0,05 0,45 0,88 1 0,07 0,29 0,14
H25 0,91 0,07 0,49 0,40 0,99 0,06 0,36 0,19
H26 0,89 0,03 0,53 0,30 0,98 0,06 0,38 0,57
H27 0,89 0,14 0,17 0,49 0,99 0,2 0,39 0,36
H28 0,84 0,19 0,58 0,45 0,9 0,11 0,30 0,33
H29 0,97 0,03 0,69 0,17 1 0,04 0,31 0,22
H30 0,98 0,01 0,33 0,36 1 0 0 0
H31 0,93 0,01 0,08 0,33 0,97 0,08 0,31 0,35
H32 0,83 0,18 0,36 0,64 0,93 0,17 0,22 0,57
Table 4.9: Results for the unitary and collective model with process beneĕts, per household
type.
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Household No process beneĕts Best process beneĕts
type e0 e0r e0   e0r e er e   er
H1 0,97 0,91 0,06 0,98 0,70 0,28
H2 0,89 0,93 -0,04 0,99 0,66 0,33
H3 0,86 0,88 -0,02 0,96 0,74 0,22
H4 0,69 0,83 -0,14 0,75 0,54 0,21
H5 0,84 0,80 0,04 0,98 0,62 0,36
H6 0,78 0,89 -0,11 0,91 0,59 0,32
H7 0,94 0,91 0,03 0,97 0,71 0,26
H8 0,82 0,86 -0,04 0,88 0,56 0,32
H9 1 0,94 0,06 1 0,94 0,06
H10 0,88 0,86 0,02 0,88 0,86 0,02
H11 0,93 0,89 0,04 0,93 0,89 0,04
H12 0,71 0,74 -0,03 0,86 0,47 0,39
H13 0,87 0,93 -0,06 1 0,76 0,24
H14 0,95 0,91 0,04 0,99 0,66 0,33
H15 0,94 0,84 0,10 1 0,79 0,21
H16 0,98 0,97 0,01 1 0,92 0,08
H17 0,79 0,67 0,12 0,82 0,41 0,41
H18 0,94 0,88 0,06 0,96 0,66 0,30
H19 0,99 0,92 0,07 1 0,88 0,12
H20 0,9 0,89 0,01 0,96 0,61 0,35
H21 0,85 0,74 0,11 0,85 0,74 0,11
H22 0,95 0,88 0,07 0,97 0,62 0,35
H23 0,94 0,83 0,11 0,94 0,83 0,11
H24 0,9 0,90 0,00 0,95 0,60 0,35
H25 0,84 0,84 0,00 0,91 0,55 0,36
H26 0,86 0,87 -0,01 0,89 0,53 0,36
H27 0,75 0,76 -0,01 0,89 0,58 0,31
H28 0,65 0,78 -0,13 0,84 0,49 0,35
H29 0,94 0,91 0,03 0,97 0,76 0,21
H30 0,97 0,84 0,13 0,98 0,63 0,35
H31 0,92 0,68 0,24 0,93 0,59 0,34
H32 0,65 0,73 -0,08 0,83 0,48 0,35
Table 4.10: Goodness-of-ĕt of observed and random data, for the unitary model
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Household No process beneĕts Best process beneĕts
type e0 e0r e0   e0r e er e   er
H1 1 0,95 0,05 1 0,95 0,05
H2 0,93 0,97 -0,04 1 0,91 0,09
H3 0,94 0,94 0,00 1 0,87 0,13
H4 0,84 0,90 -0,06 0,96 0,63 0,33
H5 0,81 0,88 -0,07 1 0,79 0,21
H6 0,83 0,94 -0,11 0,98 0,68 0,30
H7 1 0,96 0,04 1 0,96 0,04
H8 0,89 0,90 -0,01 0,96 0,65 0,31
H9 1 0,98 0,02 1 0,98 0,02
H10 0,92 0,91 0,01 0,96 0,69 0,27
H11 0,95 0,94 0,01 0,98 0,58 0,40
H12 0,78 0,79 -0,01 0,95 0,72 0,23
H13 0,98 0,97 0,01 1 0,96 0,04
H14 0,98 0,96 0,02 1 0,88 0,12
H15 1 0,91 0,09 1 0,91 0,09
H16 1 0,99 0,01 1 0,99 0,01
H17 0,93 0,75 0,18 0,94 0,57 0,37
H18 0,99 0,94 0,05 1 0,79 0,21
H19 1 0,97 0,03 1 0,97 0,03
H20 0,96 0,94 0,02 1 0,79 0,21
H21 0,86 0,80 0,06 0,87 0,57 0,30
H22 0,88 0,94 -0,06 1 0,78 0,22
H23 0,99 0,89 0,10 0,99 0,89 0,10
H24 0,93 0,95 -0,02 1 0,83 0,17
H25 0,93 0,90 0,03 0,99 0,73 0,26
H26 0,92 0,92 0,00 0,98 0,65 0,33
H27 0,79 0,83 -0,04 0,99 0,62 0,37
H28 0,79 0,86 -0,07 0,9 0,66 0,24
H29 0,96 0,96 0,00 1 0,86 0,14
H30 1 0,92 0,08 1 0,92 0,08
H31 0,89 0,79 0,10 0,97 0,59 0,38
H32 0,76 0,80 -0,04 0,93 0,64 0,29
Table 4.11: Goodness-of-ĕt of observed and random data, for the collective model.
Part IV
General conclusion
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e analysis of optimizing behavior - also called eﬃcient or rational behavior - has re-
ceived considerable attention over the past decades. e main objective of my dissertation
was to extend and apply tools that are developed to test consistency of observed behavior
with theoretically optimizing behavior. I considered optimizing behavior in two diﬀerent
settings, namely a production and a consumption setting. Although these two ĕelds of study
seem very diﬀerent at ĕrst sight, the methods and models we discuss are both rooted in a
structural model of choice behavior. e main diﬀerence between the two ĕelds is perhaps
the observability of the outputs of the production process. As a consequence, the methods
to test eﬃcient production behavior and rational consumption behavior diﬀer in practice.
In a production setting, the output of the production process is observed, which leads to
powerful methods to quantify deviations from optimizing behavior (called ineﬃciencies).
In a consumption setting, we do not directly observe the utility obtained from consuming
a bundle of goods. However, it is still possible the analyze the choices of individuals, on the
basis of price and income information. In particular, the analysis of consumption choices
is based on the behavioral hypothesis that a consumer chooses a bundle of goods that he
prefers to all other bundles that he can aﬀord. e analysis of consumption choices usu-
ally focuses on determining whether observed choices are rational or not. However, it is
also possible to quantify deviations from optimizing behavior, in terms of money wasted by
making suboptimal choices.
In my dissertation I have adopted a nonparametric approach to analyze production and
consumption decisions. e advantage of a nonparametric approach is that there is no need
to make (typically unveriĕable) assumptions about the parametric speciĕcation of the pro-
duction function or demand function, but rather ‘lets the data speak for themselves’. A well-
established nonparametricmethod to analyze producer behavior isData EnvelopmentAnal-
ysis (DEA). e ĕrst part of my dissertation focused on production behavior and presents
extensions and empirical applications of DEA-based methodologies. e second part of my
dissertation discussed consumption behavior and employs revealed preference methodol-
ogy, which is a popular nonparametric method to analyze consumption behavior. Let me
brieĘy review the contributions set out in this dissertation, and subsequently discuss avenues
for future research.
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Contributions In Chapter 1 we highlighted the behavioral interpretation of DEA. e
behavioral approach starts from a clear speciĕcation of the production-behavioral model
- for example cost minimization or proĕt maximization - and imposes the least structure
on the production possibilities. e appropriate behavioral model of course depends on
the speciĕc application. e behavioral approach is opposed to the conventional axiomatic
approach for reconstructing production possibilities, which we apply later in Chapters 2 and
3. To recall, the axiomatic approach reconstructs the production possibility set on the basis
of a number of production axioms, such as free disposability and convexity. e eﬃciency of
a productionunit is thenmeasured as the distance of the observed input-output combination
to the boundary of the production possibility set.
Interestingly, duality relationships link the behavioral to the axiomatic approach. We
therefore argue that duality relationships can justify the use of particular production ax-
ioms. Still, we plead for carefully checking the validity of axioms and for investigating the
sensitivity of the results with respect to these axioms if it is diﬃcult to verify them empiri-
cally. In our empirical application on US universities, we illustrate that whether an axiom
is imposed or not, can have a considerable impact on the eﬃciency results.
Chapters 2 and 3 extend theDEA-basedmethodology ofCherchye et al. (2013) formulti-
output eﬃciency measurement. Multi-output eﬃciency measurement presents a more ad-
equate view on production economics, compared to the standard production approach, by
including additional information on the link between inputs and outputs. By using a multi-
output approach, we obtain methods that have considerably more discriminatory power,
which opens up new possibilities for further research. Moreover, having more detailed in-
formation on the sources of ineﬃciency, should lead to more targeted actions for eﬃciency
improvement. Cherchye et al. (2013) explicitly include information about the decomposi-
tion of the inputs to the outputs, by distinguishing inputs that can be directly allocated to
speciĕc outputs (output-speciĕc inputs) from inputs that simultaneously beneĕt the produc-
tion of multiple outputs (joint inputs). is allows the authors to introduce output-speciĕc
production technologies, which remain linked through the use of joint inputs.
InChapter 2, we use this input information to develop amethod that investigateswhether
a reallocation of inputs across outputs can yield eﬃciency gains. In particular, we introduce
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the notion of coordination eﬃciency to quantify the gains from reallocation. Interestingly,
our method also provides speciĕc guidelines to achieve a more optimal input allocation.
We continue the empirical application of education and research at US universities.
However, we now explicitly model the multi-output nature of US universities. We believe
the multi-output methodology is particularly well-suited to analyze the joint production of
education and research, as it can account for both joint inputs and inputs speciĕcally al-
located to education or research. We found that more than half of the universities in the
sample could considerably improve their eﬃciency by adopting a more optimal input allo-
cation (over education and research outputs).
In Chapter 3, we build on the multi-output methodology of Cherchye et al. (2013) to
estimate output-speciĕc economies of scale. e distinguishing feature of the methodology
is that returns to scale may diﬀer between the diﬀerent dimensions of production. Fur-
thermore, to estimate output-speciĕc returns to scale, we take into account output-speciĕc
environmental heterogeneity. In particular, we allow that environmental variables may be
relevant for the production of particular outputs, but not for others. Finally, the proposed
methodology distinguishes between discretionary and non-discretionary output variables.
We therefore measure the performance of DMUs only with respect to the output variables
that the DMU management controls and actually wants to maximize. All the pieces are in
place to perform a thorough examination of economies of scale using a complete multi-
output assessment.
We employ themethodology to examine the optimal scale size of prisons in England and
Wales, using publicly available data provided by the Ministry of Justice. Besides the task
of incarcerating convicts, we consider in our study also qualitative outputs, including the
provision of a humane prison environment and successful reintegration. Furthermore, we
control for the inĘow of prisoners in a particular prison and for the socioeconomic environ-
ment in which the prisoners released have to reintegrate. With respect to prisons in England
and Wales, we do not ĕnd support for the idea that public managers are confronted with a
prison size dilemma. Depending on the operating environment, we found that medium to
large scale size is optimal for both incarceration and providing purposeful and outside-cell
activities. For successful reintegration, the results are mixed, but we did not ĕnd indications
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for drastic productivity gains by moving towards a very small prison scale.
Finally, the methodology of Chapter 4 diﬀers from the previous chapters. In Chapter
4, we have integrated household production in a revealed preference analysis of household
consumption. In the household production function approach, ĕrst introduced by Becker
(1965), households combine time andmarket goods to produce domestic commodities. e
domestic commodities then generate utility for the households. We focus on the household
production of child well-being, which is produced by means of parental time and consump-
tion goods allocated to the children.
Furthermore, we include process beneĕts related to child care, by allowing that par-
ents may enjoy spending time with the children. In our framework, child care time ‘jointly’
produces well-being for the household’s children - modeled as household production -and
leisure for the caring parent - modeled as a substitute for pure leisure. We therefore present
a revealed preference test of a labor supply model with home production of child well-being
and process beneĕts. A major advantage of the revealed preference methodology is that the
method can deal with home production, without making functional assumptions about the
household production technology. Furthermore, the corresponding output does not even
have to be observed. ismakes themethodology particularly useful to study the well-being
of children.
e revealed preference test determines whether the observed choices (with respect to
time use and consumption) are consistent with the labor supply model with home produc-
tion and process beneĕts. If the choices are consistent, the behavior of the households is said
to be rational. On the other hand, if households are not fully rational, we can quantify how
much these households deviate from optimizing behavior, in terms of the money wasted
by making sub-optimal choices. Towards this end, we introduce a measure of critical cost
eﬃciency. A low critical cost eﬃciency indicates that the observed decisions are not in line
with the theoretical model. We therefore use the critical cost eﬃciency as our goodness-of-
ĕt measure, which quantiĕes if the model under study is a reasonable model to study the
observed behavior. Note that we presented a test for the unitary framework and one for the
collective framework. In the unitary framework, a household is assumed to act as a single
decision maker. By contrast, collective models explicitly recognize that households consist
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of multiple decision makers, each having their own preferences. In the collective model, the
choices of a household are assumed to be the result of a bargaining process.
We applied our test to a sample of Dutch households, retrieved from the Longitudinal
Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS). Our results indicate that including process
beneĕts considerably improves the goodness-of-ĕt of labor supply models with home pro-
duction. As expected, we found that the goodness-of-ĕt of the collective model is higher
than the unitary model. Still, we showed that the gains from including process beneĕts into
the model were equally large (in terms of goodness-of-ĕt) for the unitary and the collective
model. Moreover, we also discussed the discriminatory power of the test. Towards this end,
we simulated random data sets and compared the goodness-of-ĕt of the observed choices
with the (average) goodness-of-ĕt of the random choices. We found that the discriminatory
power of the model with process beneĕts is much higher than the model without process
beneĕts.
Further research In this dissertation I have discussed methods which are designed to test
consistency of observed behavior with theoretically optimizing behavior. In my opinion a
great challenge is to carefully specify the underlying behavioral model, to obtain a fair analy-
sis of optimizing behavior. Taking all speciĕcities of the production process into account not
only leads to more realistic models, but also to methods with more discriminatory power.
Also in the context of household consumption, it is crucial to specify behavioral models that
ĕt the data as good as possible. At the same time, the corresponding tests of consistency with
the model need to be capable of discriminating between observed and random behavior.
In this dissertation, we attempted to bridge the gap between consumption and produc-
tion analysis. Chapter 4 was a ĕrst study to integrate household production in a revealed
preference analysis of household consumption. I hope that the work in this dissertation
may serve as a step up for many future research, which applies insights of the production
setting to the consumption setting and vice versa. Let me outline some ideas for further
research on the basis of the contributions in this dissertation.
First, note that it is perfectly possible to combine themethodological extensions inChap-
ter 2 and 3. In particular, we could include alternative returns to scale assumptions to in-
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vestigate possible eﬃciency gains from input reallocation. e methodology in Chapter 2
currently assumes variable returns to scale. However, one could impose alternative returns
to scale assumptions such as constant, increasing and decreasing returns to scale, whichmay
diﬀer from output to output. is would lead to a methodology which models the produc-
tion process in amore realistic manner and hasmore power to identify eﬃciency gains from
reallocation.
Second, the empirical application on economies of scale in prisons in England andWales
illustrates the potential of the multi-output methodology to provide guidance in policy de-
bates. emethodology inChapter 3 is tailored to all particularities of the prison production
process and enables us to meaningfully answer the prison size dilemma. However, our re-
search was based on publicly available data. eMinistry of Justice could reĕne the analysis
by adding detailed information on the allocation of expenses to speciĕc outputs. is would
lead to an evenmore detailed insight into the multi-output production process of local male
prisons.
ird, we focused in Chapter 3 on economies of scale in prisons. However, the method-
ology is more generally applicable and well suited to analyze economies of scale in multi-
output public sector organizations andmulti-outputmanufacturing plants. Just some exam-
ples are economies of scale in ĕre protection (Duncombe and Yinger (1993)), in education
(e.g. Andrews et al. (2002) and Leithwood and Jantzi (2009)) and in health care (Given
(1996) and Wholey et al. (1996)).
Furthermore, we showed in Chapter 4 that including process beneĕts into the model
signiĕcantly improves the goodness-of-ĕt of the model for the observed data. In a next step,
it would be interesting to link themagnitude of the process beneĕts to observed family char-
acteristics. is information would also enable us to compare the level of process beneĕts
we retrieved with the ĕndings of studies that attempt to directly measure process beneĕts.
Examples of such studies are Juster (1985), who asks in general whether people like an ac-
tivity, and Krueger et al. (2009) who use a time use diary in which individuals can indicate
the nature of the activity and the extent to which various emotions were present.
Next, Chapter 4 focused on a static model of consumption and time use. In particular,
the level of child well-being only depends on current expenditures and current time use
186
choices. An avenue for future research is to investigate how our framework extends to a
more general intertemporal setting, in order to study human capital formation.
Finally, the role of fathers for the development the child has been widely discussed in
the literature (see e.g. Yeung et al. (2001) and Lamb (2004)). It would be interesting to
compare the eﬀect of mother’s time and father’s time on the well-being of the child. In
our framework, it is possible to impose additional structure on the elements underlying
the households’ decision problems. Structure on the domestic technology that ‘produces’
child well-being may shed light on the productivity of parental time inputs as well as on the
substitutability between mothers’ and fathers’ time invested in children.
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